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relation to demand, but rather to illustrate some of the more fundamental considerations, of possibly lasting value.

At the outset, it is in order to consider the base figure of 65,605,000 gross tons of shipping, which represents the world's supply at the middle of 1939, minus 2,900,000 tons on the Great Lakes. Up to May 5, 1940, war losses of Allied, German, and neutral vessels are reported to have totaled 1,728,000 gross tons,2 or 2.6 percent of the aforementioned supply.

Corresponding figures for individual countries, though of an earlier date, are set forth in the following table:

Principal Countries' Tonnage and War Losses

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It would not be difficult in normal times to build at a rate equaling the above losses, for the reason that in a good year 2,500,000 gross tons and more actually have been built. Under war conditions, however, the possibilities are uncertain, and what in fact has been accomplished by the shipyards of the world since the fall of 1939 is only partially of record. For obvious reasons, the belligerent countries have suppressed reports of the activities of their yards, although, in the case of the United Kingdom, some indication of the situation can be had from the statement of the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, made to Parliament early in 1940, wherein he expressed the hope that British yards would attain a figure greater than that representing the peak of the war of 1914-18, namely, 1,338,000 gross tons in 1918. When pressed by other members of Parliament to explain from what date this annual output would commence, the Civil Lord replied that it would be in a year from February 1, 1940, and added that after February 1, 1941, there would be a program at least as great as that of the previous 12 months. In expressing this view, however, the Civil Lord remarked: "That is the ideal at which the Admiralty is aiming." In comparison with the tonnage actually launched in British yards for several years prior to 1939, it will be seen that the foregoing estimate of 1,338,000 gross tons is rather large, in that the output during the period from 1931 to 1938 ranged from about 500,000 tons to 1,000,000 tons.

Few recent statistics are available for neutral or nonbelligerent countries other than the United States. Denmark and Sweden ap

2 These figures are from the records of British Lloyds and are the only ones of such scope available. They may be conservative and somewhat incomplete because of the difficulties of maintaining current records in wartime. A later report received just prior to going to press shows a rather sharp increase in the rate of losses. This report covers the period from the outbreak of the war to July 7, 1940, and gives a total up to that time of 2,204,000 gross tons-reflecting intensified warfare on Britain following the fall of France.

pear to have done rather well in 1939, mainly because of progress before the outbreak of the war. Reports from these countries state that Denmark delivered 140,000 gross tons and that Sweden built 250,000 tons. As the war continued, however, in 1940, it became evident that work in these countries and in the Netherlands was being subjected to increasing difficulties, even before the occupation of Denmark and the Netherlands by German forces in the spring of 1940. These difficulties were apparent from inquiries received in the United States for supplies of steel and other materials. The United States, on the other hand, had in progress in 1940 an enlarged and accelerated program, begun before the outbreak of the European war in 1939, under the impetus of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. This country, in fact, had under construction, in May 1940, 1,349,000 gross tons, more than twice as much as a year earlier and more than at any previous time since 1920. It seems doubtful, however, whether the increase in building activity in the United States was sufficient to offset the decrease in other countries, and, even though such were the case, it would be necessary to take into account the restricted areas in which shipping of this country could operate in compliance with our neutrality legislation.

To the war losses must be added, for the period of their inactivity, the ships under the control of a belligerent but out of service owing to the command of the seas exercised in particular areas by another belligerent. In this category, in May 1940, were the following: German vessels except those engaged in the Baltic and nearby North Sea; Danish vessels likewise, after the occupation of Denmark by German forces, except those that were intercepted or otherwise became subject to the Allies. In addition, there were Belgian, Netherland, and Norwegian vessels insofar as they came under the domination of Germany following its invasion of those countries. While actual figures are not available, it appears that only the smaller part of each of these fleets was in home waters and that the larger part became integrated with the Allied fleets and thereby afforded a wider range of operation. Swedish shipping, in turn, acquired a peculiar status following the invasion of Norway by German forces in that it ceased operations to and from the home country except in the Baltic, but continued its services abroad to some extent between foreign countries.

OVERSEA TRADE

Difficult as it is to estimate the world supply of shipping in wartime, it is doubly difficult to relate that supply to the demand. Only general and short-range conclusions can be drawn from conditions prevailing at a given time; thus it appears that while the oversea trade of the United States increased following the outbreak of the European war in 1939, that of the world at large declined somewhat during the same period. The relative demand for ship space, however, seems to have been more than sustained for a number of reasons, including war losses, employment of merchant vessels for military purposes, dislocation of shipping from normal routes, and reduced shipbuilding output. An indication of the demand for shipping in the "free" market can be had from the rates obtained by neutral vessels in comparatively safe trades. Such vessels, for example,

obtained $9 a ton and more in May 1940 for the carriage of coal from Hampton Roads to the east coast of South America, in comparison with only $2.50 before the outbreak of the war in September 1939. Correspondingly, they obtained $15 a ton for the carriage of scrap iron and steel from the Pacific coast of the United States to Japan, in comparison with only $4.25 previously. (See United States chapter-beginning on p. 10-for extended review of rates between this country and South America.)

The trend of United States foreign trade during 8 months of the war, from September 1939 to April 1940, is shown in the table below. It will be seen that, on the basis of value, exports rose about 35 percent and imports 24 percent over the trade in the same months of the previous years. In order to estimate the corresponding increase in the volume of trade it is necessary to allow for price changes. This being done, figuring price increases of 7.9 in the case of imports and 9.0 in the case of exports, it appears that exports increased in volume by about 25 percent and imports by 14 percent.

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Other statistics which shed light on the trend of oversea trade are those of the Panama Canal. The table below shows the total cargo traffic through that canal and the traffic by principal routes during the months of July 1939 and April 1940. It will be noted that the total traffic declined by about 10 percent, which figure is much higher than that for the whole period, this being only about 11⁄2 percentthe decline having set in during December and increased progressively through the remaining months to the end of April. Of special significance as regards particular routes is the increase in traffic between the United States and South America and the decrease in traffic between Europe on the one hand and the Pacific coasts of Canada, the United States, and South America on the other. This decrease is traceable in part to the concentration of shipping between Europe and North America on the Atlantic seaboard and in part to the disruption of Scandinavian and other shipping previously engaged to a large extent on that route. Unfortunately, corresponding statistics are not available covering Suez Canal traffic, for they would have supplemented those for the Panama Canal very materially, especially for the period prior to Italy's entry into the war in June 1940.

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3

The cost of ship operation tends to increase sharply in wartime, though in varying degrees, according to route and nationality of vessels which determine the hazards and require compensatory advances in seamen's wages, insurance premiums, and other items of expense. It is to be expected that seamen will demand more pay for. the increased risks to which they are subject, also that underwriters or governments will have to provide additional insurance against the perils of war and charge a premium therefor, over and above that for ordinary marine insurance which, in peacetime, is all that is necessary. When these mounting expenditures are taken into consideration it becomes clear that increases in ocean freight rates are inevitable.

An indication of the importance of the above items which, together with fuel, account for one-third or more of the total operating cost, can be had from the following estimate of the comparative expenditures by American vessels for voyages beginning in July 1939 and in May 1940 on three widely separated routes, namely to the Mediterranean, South America, and the Far East. Because of the situation of the United States in the Western Hemisphere and the prohibition of American vessels from operating within combat areas, the added cost with respect to such vessels has been moderate compared with that of foreign vessels traversing combat areas. Take, for instance, seamen's wages: the increase on American vessels up to May 1940, had ranged only from about 15 percent to 40 percent whereas on foreign vessels it had reached as high as 350 percent, this being on Danish vessels sailing to and from Great Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands prior to the occupation of Denmark by German forces in the Spring of 1940.

3 Although in belligerent countries this employment may take on the character of military service, and pay, therefore, be governed accordingly.

245910-40

Estimate of Voyage Expenditures by American Vessels

Item

Beginning
July 1939

Beginning May 1940

1. Round voyage, New York and Mediterranean ports, cargo steamer, 5,000 gross tons, speed 10 knots:

Wages (sea pay roll).

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Fuel (bunker "C") (at sea).

8,400

10, 200 (+21%)

War-risk insurance (hull)1.

None

1,300

Total..

17,400

24, 100 (+39%)

2. Round voyage, New York and east-coast ports of South America, combination cargo and passenger steamer, 5,200 gross tons, speed 13% knots:

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3. Round voyage, New York and Far East ports of the Orient, cargo motor

ship, 5.900 gross tons, speed 11 knots:

Wages (sea pay roll)

20, 500

Fuel (heavy grade Diesel) (at sea).

8, 350

War-risk insurance (hull)4_.

None

24, 600 (+20%)
8, 350
1,000

28, 850

33, 950 (+18%)

Total..

1 This insurance cost is based on a rate of three-eighths of 1 percent and a valuation of $350,000.

2 This insurance cost is based on a rate of one-half of 1 percent and a valuation of $475,000. 3 Obtained on Pacific coast.

4 This insurance cost is based on a rate of one-fourth of 1 percent and a valuation of $400,000.

CONTRABAND CONTROL

The Department of State in its Bulletin of March 23, 1940, reports a total of 128 American vessels as having been detained by belligerents during the period from September 1, 1939, to March 15, 1940. The following table shows the average time such vessels were detained: Detention of American Ships by Belligerents

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British authorities have claimed progress in shortening delays at contraband control bases, stating that on March 12, 1940, there were 23 neutral ships in the three contraband control bases in the United Kingdom, of which 14 had been there for 4 days or less. This total included 14 Dutch vessels (7 for 4 days or less), 3 Belgian (all for 4 days or less), 2 Swedish (one for 4 days or less). In addition, one Estonian, one Italian, and one Norwegian ship also had been detained 4 days or less, and one Portuguese ship had been detained more than 4 days.

During the week ended March 9, the Contraband Committee is said to have considered the cargoes of 86 ships which had arrived since March 2, as well as 47 outstanding cargoes from the previous week.

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