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There are three factors which have a profound influence upon a man's attitude toward the Army and, eventually, toward re-enlistment: (1) The extent to which he is identified with the Army group; (2) the extent to which his Army life and work are predictable and purposeful; and (3) the extent to which he finds satisfying leadership qualities in his officers and noncommissioned officers.

Operating together, these three kinds of experiences add up to morale. The creation of these conditions are a central part of the officer's or noncommissioned officer's responsibilities as a leader.

1. Group Identification: By group identification we mean the degree to which the soldier feels that he is part of an attractive, important group that he "belongs."

The sense of "belonging" is extremely important for the reason that men simply will not re-enlist into something of which they do not feel a part. Unless a soldier can build solid bonds with other men, he feels isolated and tends to cling to his identifications in the civilian world. His "we" feelings remain hooked on to civilian life.

There are a number of things which can be done to build a strong feeling of belonging. First, you should try at every opportunity, from the recruit's first day, to make him feel that he is a "soldier." It is surprising how many enlisted men report that they are not treated as "soldiers" that they want to do "more soldiering" but can't. Avoid "boy scout" treatment as a substitute for real soldier-to-soldier relationship.

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create within-group tensions.

Favoritism and inequality of hardship are the greatest enemies of team spirit. But when the officer explains to his men the necessity of taking certain actions and tries to equalize deprivations and hardship throughout, the number of complaints de

creases.

In this connection you should carefully note another point: don't try to make the Army compete with civilian life. The Army is not civilian life, and its failure in attempting to imitate civilian ways will serve only to reinforce a man's conviction that civilian life is "the real thing." Some think that unless you give the men "ice cream and cake" every day they will not like the Army. Soldiers take more pride in their outfit when they realize that everything is not "ice cream and cake," and that at the same time they were able to come through it with a "well done." Admit, when indicated, that there are rough spots in both the Army and the civilian world and that these are the rough spots in the Army. Don't apologize with a picture of civilian life hidden behind your words.

This doesn't mean that you shouldn't try to eliminate the rough spots when you can, but when they are unavoidable you should face them realistically together with your men and with no "soft soap."

There are several obstacles to building group unity over which you will frequently have very little control but which you should in any case recognize. Because of the great pressure exerted at present by the Army's basic mission, some of the formal administrative procedures for handling men tend to work against creating strong group feelings. When men are not trained, shipped, and assigned to duty in groups, the sense of belonging is slow to develop. Similarly, rapid personnel changes and the practice of moving men individually by MOS designation prevents the formation of tightly knit groups.

Because of these evident difficulties it is necessary to take an active intent in and make a direct effort to speed the growth of group unity. Under a nonstatic situation there is little chance for the natural factors of group growth to take place, they are so slow that the group composition changes before any noticeable development takes place. Consequently, only by personal effort can the present obstacles be overcome. Actually, group awareness and unity can be accomplished quickly provided the group goals are well defined and accomplished. Satisfaction of attainment is vital to building group unity.

While there will always be certain obstacles to group unity which you cannot remove, you can at least minimize their effect by adopting as far as possible groupcentered personnel practices within your own command.

2. A Predictable and Purposeful Situation: All men seek a well-defined, clear-cut situation in which events are consistent, predictable, and purposeful. Without this, they feel uneasy and defensive. This is especially important with regard to rewards and punishments. It is not only the severity of the punishment and the size of the reward that count, but also whether these experiences have some orderly basis which is known to the men.

Some irregularity will arise that you cannot prevent. But there is still much you can do, especially with regard to discipline. It is erroneous to believe that rigorous discipline injures morale and sets a man against the Army; it is detrimental mainly when it lacks predictability and purpose. Men will accept and grow on discipline when it is consistent, and purposive. Most injurious to men's attitudes toward the Army is discipline which is meaningless and pointless to the men. On many occasions what appears sensible and necessary to you will be seen differently by your men. You must make

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3. Leadership Qualities: It is difficult for a soldier to have positive, favorable expectations of the Army if he does not first like his officers and noncommissioned officers and have confidence in them as leaders, and feel that he can depend on them to help him do his own job as a soldier.

The surest source of information about what officer qualities are most important to soldiers is the soldiers themselves. The Army has conducted studies and discovered that the following qualities are those which soldiers look for most in their officers and noncommissioned officers:

a. Ability. Competence comes first. The good officer must know his stuff, for on this depends the men's confidence in his leadership.

b. Next to ability is interest in the wel

fare of the soldier the extent to which the officer notices his men, shows that he understands them, and can be trusted to help them in time of need. Know your men and show it. Know their names, their histories, their feelings, their weaknesses, their good points, their morale. A superficial interest will be quickly recognized and will produce negative rather than affirmative results.

c. Promptness in making decisions is next. Decisiveness is a skill hard to acquire. But it can with attention be cultivated. When you have a hard choice, remember you do not usually have to make a snap judgment. Your men will respect your judgment even more if you reserve decision until you are in possession of all the facts necessary for a wise choice.

do not hesitate to call on your subordinates for counsel if they are qualified to give it. But choose your course before you give your orders.

d. Good teacher or instructor follows. The leader who has the patience and the ability to make things clear to the men under him is valued for that reason. Remember that men learn to do by doing. Lectures are only the embroidery on training. It is actual performance that does the work. When men do not understand you, it is your fault. If you cannot express yourself clearly, it may be because you do not understand the subject well yourself. Think things through carefully before you try to explain.

e. Judgment, common sense, and the ability to get things done follow next in order.

f. Soldiers dislike an officer who throws his rank around, who tests his own authority continually. They sense that he is not sure of himself.

. The man who tells you when you have done a good job rates well as a leader. The best incentive to good work is the prospect that it will be noticed and remembered by the leader.

"Good education," "sense of humor," and "guts or courage" follow in that order.

Impartiality is next. Leaders who do not "save the dirty jobs for the fellows they don't like" are valued. The good leader is fair to all his command; he never uses his authority to satiate his personal likes or dislikes. Next in importance is industry. Leaders who "do as little work as

they can get away with" are not respected by the enlisted men.

k. When an officer "gives orders in such a way that you know clearly what to do," that too is a mark of merit as a leader. Soldiers also like an officer with a "clear, strong voice."

The chief things a man wants from a leader are, then, competence and continuous interest in his welfare.

If you are a company commander, it is also important that you develop the same qualities in the other officers under your command by displaying those qualities toward the officers under you; otherwise, these officers may nullify your own exercise of these traits. In brief, you must show them, not merely tell them.

"Dramatic" Experiences

Army experiences are especially sensitive to what might be called "dramatic instances" that is, single, outstanding experiences which create a powerful and compelling impression. These are usually short-lived, even accidental, experiences which, because of their vividness, may either make or break impressions built up over a long period of time. Examples are a "lousy assignment," a "raw deal from the C. O.," a promise which was broken after it had been guaranteed. Most such experiences arise from false expectations either gained from thoughtless misinformation or lack of proper information. Such experiences tend to color the soldier's outlook for some time after their occurrence, and if reinforced by other similar experiences, they may build up into really important reasons in the soldier's mind for not re-enlisting. The most damaging of all "dramatic experiences" are those which injure the man's prestige and his sense of personal worth.

They are especially likely to be detrimental to re-enlistment when they occur

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The defeatist attitude on the part of some officers that re-enlistment is severely blocked by the competition of civilian life is untenable. Many soldiers would make out just as well, and often much better, in the Army. In many instances the soldier does not recognize this; his expectations of civilian life are unrealistic and out of line with the facts. He is substituting fantasy for facts, wishful thinking for realistic thinking.

Wishful Thinking

The young inductee knows that certain civilian jobs are "important," and, since he wants prestige, he "kids" himself into thinking that he could easily get one of these jobs, or that the advancement is rapid and the pay big. In actuality, he frequently has no real knowledge of the opportunities in such employment, of the training required for entry, or whether he would really like that kind of work. Essentially, this soldier wants these expectations because they make him feel important.

The same approach applies to the feeling of security. Realizing that he may not be successful if he got out of the Army a man bolsters himself against a feeling of insecurity about his future by telling himself and others that he has "terrific connections” and is going to do "big things." He really means that he wants the opportunities he speaks of and hopes to find them, but again this is wishful thinking.

Personal Pressures

A soldier's re-enlistment decision is also determined by the pressures which are brought to bear on him by other people and which are frequently of the utmost importance. We are influenced by the opinions and persuasions of others, especially persons we like and with whom we are anxious to "keep face." These influences may come from individuals or groups.

Individual Pressures: One such pressure may be the "close friend," either in the Army or in the civilian world. If the soldier has a good friend who has "struck it rich" in civilian life, he may be encouraged to get out and "climb on the gravy train." The fact that the soldier knows that his pal is seemingly doing well may make him feel dissatisfied with his own progress and desirous of a chance to do just as well. Or the soldier may have a close friend in his platoon who tells him that "this is no place for you" and frequently gives him some very "bum dope" as to what he could do as a civilian.

Parents sometime exert a pressure on the soldier to get out, but that is usually confined to cases where there is some strong, legitimate reason behind the pressure, such as the parents' need for help in running a business or farm. The Army has found that when asked, "What would you think if your son re-enlisted in the Army?" most parents reply, "It's up to him to decide."

Occasionally a young soldier will have certain vocational goals imposed on him by a parent, usually his father. He may not desire to follow these goals but nevertheless feels impelled to do so. He may even prefer to remain in the Army, and experiences a genuine conflict over what to do.

With married men, wives may be a source of personal pressure which influences the soldier to get out of the Army. In this case it is important to consider how satisfied the soldier's wife is with her "Army experiences." Although the Army provides many of the things which make the basis for good family life, it appears that housing conditions may be especially important in determining whether the wife appreciates these advantages.

Group Pressures and "Opinion Leaders": Group pressures can exert a very powerful influence upon the soldier's reenlistment decision. The most powerful

roup pressure is that exerted by the men -f his platoon.

We all can think of many examples in ▪ur own experience of these forces. The unit commander must have, therefore, a thorough knowledge of the "opinion climate" and the "opinion leaders" of the group.

"Keeping Up With One's Buddies": Group pressures may work against re-enlistment in still another way. A soldier who has no particularly firm civilian opportunities may nevertheless claim that he has, both to himself and others, if the other men in his group have such opportunities. The soldier who hears his buddies talk about getting this or that job when they get out makes similar claims in order to save face. He wants to 'keep up with his buddies" to appear to have just as many civilian connections and "deals" as they do, and he may kid others— and himself into thinking that they are real.

The payoff against re-enlistment comes at ETS. The soldier is caught by his own claims. He can't back down and is forced to accept his discharge in order to substantiate his earlier claims. He may actually want to re-enlist, but doesn't for fear of being "found out."

Occasionally it is possible to salvage some of these cases by arranging for them to take re-enlistment leave at ETS. In this way, the soldier can "leave the Army" as far as his buddies are concerned and return after the others have gotten out. He can 'ollow through on re-enlisting and yet "save ace."

The Re-enlistment Decision

The decision to re-enlist or not to reenlist is the climax of all the factors we liscussed in this and the preceding chapters. Before looking at the actual decision process nore closely, it would be a good idea to sumnarize the main points made so far:

1. Re-enlistment involves an active de

cision.

2. The decision is made in terms of the man's wants. The Army appeals mainly to the want for some aspect of security.

3. The choice is made in accordance with the soldier's expectations about the Army and his alternatives in civilian life.

4. These expectations are frequently unrealistic or false. The soldier would decide otherwise if his expectations were based on sound facts.

5. Personal pressures, from individuals and groups, often influence the soldier's decision.

Thus, if the soldier is to make a sound decision, he must first

1. be aware of his wants and goals;
2. have a realistic understanding of his
possibilities in civilian life, and in the
Army;

3. be free from personal pressures
which would bias his judgment.

But there is one thing more the soldier must do to make a sound decision. He must weigh his various alternatives in terms of his wants; he must actually add them up and come out with a decision.

These are the things a soldier must do to arrive at a sound decision. This is the only kind of decision which the Army desires to support, because it has lost many of its most valuable, potential re-enlistees who have failed to make a sound decision. There are some men who will decide, and rightly so, that the Army is not for them. The Army will go along with this for it knows that in the long run the best re-enlistment is one which will profit the soldier. But it is that large body of soldiers who leave because of unsound decision-making that the Army is especially interested in salvaging.

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