THE JOB

STAFF COORDINATION WITH REGULAR GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

The refugee relief program was not only itself complex, but discussion of it is further complicated by the fact that the act created a composite of different programs which varied from one country to another. Facets of the program which can be treated on an overall basis are so handled, but the country summaries which follow in this report give a more readily understandable picture of the segments. On September 18, 1953, the Secretary of State issued a departmental order (18 F. R. 6268) delegating to the Administrator of the Bureau of Security, Consular Affairs, and Personnel, Scott McLeod, the authority, functions, and responsibility which had been placed in the Department of State by the Executive order. The funds transferred to the Department were then allocated by the Administrator among the six agencies of the Government concerned in the program operations according to an outline of their authority and functions unanimously agreed to by all concerned.

Delay in establishment of the program on an operating basis was encountered by the unforeseen difficulty of the Personnel and Security Offices of the State Department, whose duty it was to recruit and screen prospective staff members. Among thousands of qualified applicants for employment, few had the necessary civil-service status and, among applicants with civil-service status, few were qualified for the available positions as employees of the Department of State and the Foreign Service of the United States under the program. The average period required to screen a prospective employee was 67 days. An average of 30 days more was needed to conclude actual appointment to a position and transportation to a post of duty abroad. The desire of such persons to give notice to existing employers, to dispose of domestic obligations by leasing or subletting their homes, storing furniture and fixtures, taking terminal leave from previous employment before reporting for duty and assignment abroad were further delaying factors. Also involved were inoculations, a brief training course, applications for necessary passports, procurement of foreign visas, and arrangements for living quarters and office space in foreign countries, each of which, in its turn, took its toll upon the statutory time available for the operation of the program. The Administrator, in accord with the intent of Congress, utilized existing facilities of Government departments in lieu of establishing a new agency to administer the act. The United States Public Health Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the United States Employment Service, the Department of the Army, and the Department of the Treasury were enlisted, and their services were coordinated into their fields of interest.

INVESTIGATIONS

Security provisions of the proposed Emergency Migration Act represented a challenge of magnitude. Except for certain aspects of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, the implementation of which had been subject to criticism, there was no precedent in United States immigration policy for the comprehensive investigative requirements contained in this act. Although operational problems presented by the new act were in some ways akin to those of 1948, many observers agreed that the need for adequate security screening was greater than before. A notable difference of opinion was manifested among Members of the Congress when it came to evaluating the security effectiveness of the proposed screening provisions. Those known to favor less restrictive immigration legislation felt that the screening would be too cumbersome and subject to abuse to such a degree that the intent of the Congress concerning numbers admitted could be flouted. Supporters of stringent immigration policies felt that the security provisions were inadequate to insure complete safety. The opinion of one expert, cited in the House, was to the effect that a proper screening job could never be done on the 240,000 aliens provided for in the original Senate bill unless 8,000 trained "intelligence agents" were assigned to the task.

However, at the peak of refugee relief program operations in July 1956, the Refugee Screening Division of the Counterintelligence Corps in Germany and the investigative organization of the refugee program had on their payrolls only 1,600 employees, including 481 American and 223 supporting personnel and 896 locally recruited indigenous employees. At the conclusion of the program, 250,960 investigations had been completed of the 276,999 requested, and despite the precedent-shattering obstacles which had to be overcome, the investigative phase of the program at many posts was brought to a successful conclusion months ahead of schedule.

On September 16, 1953, Executive Order 10487 was issued. Section 1 of this order designated the Department of State

as the agency of the Government of the United States which shall, subject to the provisions of section 2 hereof, make or prepare the thorough investigations and written reports required by section 11 (a) of the said Refugee Relief Act of 1953, regarding the character, reputation, mental and physical health, history, and eligibility under the said act of persons seeking admission into the United States under the act.

Section 2 of Executive Order 10487 reads:

The Department of the Army and such other agencies of the Government as the Department of State may request shall, in accordance with arrangements agreed upon between the Department of State and any such agency, furnish the Department of State such assistance as it may need in carrying out its responsibilities under section 1 of this order.

On September 25, 1953, Secretary of State's Delegation of Authority No. 72 was issued, assigning the responsibilities contained in section 1 of Executive Order 10487 to the Bureau of Security, Consular Affairs, and Personnel.

On November 27, 1953, Secretary of State's Delegation of Authority No. 74 was issued, assigning responsibility to the Administrator of the Bureau of Security, Consular Affairs, and Personnel for the administration and enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act and all other immigration and nationality laws relating to the powers,

duties, and functions of diplomatic and consular officers of the United States.

Investigative unit known as IRP

The newly appointed Director of Investigations arrived in the Department of State early in December 1953 from his former assignment as regional security officer at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and began to organize the investigative agency within the meaning of section 11 (a). In accordance with the wishes of the Administrator, the new investigative body was placed under the broad supervisory administration of the Director of the Department's Office of Security.

The investigative body developed under the act was known as investigations refugee program. It developed its investigative and security standards from the legislative mandates contained in sections. 11 (a), 11 (d), and 15.

Section 11 (a) read:

No alien shall be issued a visa under this Act or be admitted into the United States unless there shall have first been a thorough investigation and written report made and prepared by such investigative agency or agencies of the Government of the United States as the President shall designate regarding such person's character, reputation, mental and physical health, history, and eligibility under this Act, and such investigations in each case shall be conducted in a manner and in such time as the investigative agency or agencies shall determine to be necessary.

Section 11 (d) of the act read:

No person shall be issued a visa under this Act or be admitted into the United States unless complete information shall be available regarding the history of such person covering a period of at least two years immediately preceding his application for a visa: Provided, That this provision may be waived on the recommendation of the Secretaries of State and Defense when determined by them to be in the national interest.

Section 15 of the act read:

Except as otherwise expressly provided by this Act, all of the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (66 Stat. 163) shall be applicable under this Act.

Pursuant to section 15, IRP gave due consideration to the excludability provisions of section 212 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act in developing investigative and security standards by requiring that the investigations prescribed by sections 11 (a) and 11 (d) include full coverage with respect to these excludability provisions.

In a letter addressed to the Honorable Patrick J. Hillings, Joint Committee on Immigration and Nationality Policy, House of Representatives, on July 28, 1953, Scott McLeod, Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, outlined in general terms the precautionary measures that would be taken to insure maximum compliance with provisions of the act, as well as with existing immigration laws, and with respect to maintaining the internal security and national interest of the United States.

The letter follows:

MY DEAR MR. HILLINGS: I refer to your telephone conversations with my Office and Mr. L'Heureux concerning the extent of the security investigation which would be conducted by the Department of State under the proposed emergency immigration bill.

Although it has never been considered desirable to outline, specifically, the various steps which are followed in the investigation of an applicant for a visa, as such outline could be used by the applicant in concealing information and avoiding or evading appropriate investigation, it may be stated that every possible source of intelligence, political, and criminal information will be checked before

preparing the written report required under the act in the case of each applicant for a visa. The administrative authorities have assiduously avoided making public the investigative procedures and methods under the normal immigration laws, and there is even more reason why such publication should be avoided with reference to this act.

The investigative functions are operated in a generally satisfactory manner under the Immigration and Nationality Act and should be even more effective under this act, which contains a provision enabling the consular officer to withhold the issuance of a visa in the case of an alien concerning whom he does not have sufficient information to form a clear judgment of eligibility. An applicant's self-serving declaration, regarding the facts in his case, will be of no avail under this act in the absence of corroborative, substantive, and supporting evidence, such as affidavits from persons who know the applicant and are able to testify regarding his antecedents. If the applicant is unable to submit corroborating evidence to the consul, an investigation will not, necessarily, be undertaken in his case, thereby reducing the number of overall investigations.

In other words, an applicant under this act is required to meet all of the very stringent security requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Moreover, he is required to produce affirmative evidence which will satisfy entirely the consular officer and the immigration inspector. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act the consul may withhold the visa only if he knows, or has reason to believe, that the applicant is inadmissible under one or more excluding provisions of the act. Under the provisions of the act now being considered, the consul may withhold the visa on the mere basis that sufficient information is not available to determine, reasonably, the applicant's eligibility and admissibility, The security provisions under the proposed act are stronger than under any present or former immigration laws. Any doubt that may exist will be resolved against the applicant and in favor of the United States.

In the event that the consular officer is reasonably satisfied upon the basis of his examination of the applicant and in the light of affirmative evidence adduced by the applicant, that he may qualify for a visa, he defers final judgment of the case until appropriate investigative agencies of the United States Government have made a thorough investigation and prepared a written report. The nature of the investigation and its scope will vary according to the agency charged with this responsibility and the available sources of this information. But one thing is certain, the investigation will be thorough and every available source of information will be checked. The consul and the immigration inspector will thereafter independently make their final determination regarding the alien's eligibility and admissibility.

It has been determined that the Department of State, Office of Security, will undertake investigations of applicants under the proposed act in all areas except the United States zones of Germany, Berlin, and Austria. Since this is a new function of the Office of Security there is no experience on which to base any results of the investigative procedures. However, it is contemplated that each consular establishment authorized to issue visas under this act will have assigned to it a group of security investigators who will be responsible for conducting thorough investigations on each applicant. The investigation will cover as much as possible information pertaining to the applicant's character and reputstion, medical history, etc. It is anticipated that competent investigators will develop local sources of information including city government officials, local police, businessmen, and social leaders. Every effort will be made to check police in each locality in which the applicant may have resided in addition to actually making neighborhood checks, employment checks, etc. It is hoped that clear channels of communication will be set up between these investigative teams and headquarters of the Office of Security presently overseas so that all United States Government agency files will be checked. In most cases, this will include a check of Central Intelligence Agency files overseas.

It is also hoped that this information fulfills your request on the subject.
Sincerely yours,

SCOTT MCLEOD,

Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. The investigative criteria and security standards developed by IRP proved adequate and ultimate sanction for them, based upon operational experience, was received on March 29, 1955, from the InterDepartmental Committee on Internal Security, a subcommittee of the National Security Council.

Scope of security investigations

Implementation of the security phase of the act involved personal background and residence investigations, checks against pertinent files of United States Government agencies both at home and abroad, as well as checks against other available sources. Pursuant to section 2 of Executive Order 10487, working arrangements were made with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Department of Defense and other Government agencies as developing needs required.

Arrangements made with the Department of Defense were primarily concerned with utilizing the Counterintelligence Corps to conduct program investigations in West Germany, Berlin and Austria.

Whereas the presence of the United States Occupation Forces in central Europe facilitated the conduct of the investigations required to issue 90,000 visas allotted by the act to Germany and Austria, no such facilities were available elsewhere. IRP was required to establish strategically located field offices in the remaining program areas, staffed by American investigative and supporting personnel, including locally hired employees.

Officers of the Department's Office of Personnel, in recruiting qualified American investigative staff, were guided by three principal considerations; (a) investigative experience; (b) language and area knowledge; and (c) all other criteria normally applicable in hiring Foreign Service staff personnel. The recruitment effort, however, presented problems which led to initial delays. It was difficult, for example, to locate outside of other Government agencies personnel in the necessary number who possessed the variety of languages and area knowledge required by the program. An additional discouraging factor was the temporary nature of the program. When it became evident that recruitment could not be successfully completed within the limited time available, program officials amended the qualifications to the extent of recruiting younger men on a trainee basis.

Recruitment and assignment in the required numbers continued until October 1955, not only in the officer category but in the clerical and secretarial as well. In May 1954, authorization was obtained to hire wives of American Government personnel serving abroad in order to relieve problems created by clerical-secretarial shortages. Subsequently, as an emergency measure, the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration authorized the transfer of a number of Foreign Service staff supporting personnel from their regular assignments to IRP field offices.

All newly recruited personnel required security background clearances pursuant to Executive Order 10450 and, although every possible measure was taken by the Department's Office of Security to expedite this requirement, it nevertheless represented a further factor in the establishment of IRP's overseas operations.

In order to prepare newly appointed investigative personnel, a comprehensive orientation and training course was developed in cooperation with the Department's Foreign Service Institute. This course included the usual orientation given newly appointed Foreign Service staff personnel. Lectures by visa experts covered emergency immigration legislation in the light of humanitarian and diplomatic needs and in relationship to historical and current United States