of the popular party, and who did not at all approve of the manner in which they had been supplanted. M. Isturitz was one of these, and joining the Moderado opposition, he turned out, with the favour of Queen Christina (who had begun to fear her enterprising protégé), Mendizabal, as Mendizabal had turned out Torreno. But a party had been created too powerful to be thus set aside. The insurrection at La Granja, was the consequence; and the Queen Regent was forced by Sergeant Garcia to give her sanction to the impracticable constitution of 1812.

A few extracts from Lord Palmerston's letters will give an idea of the course of those affairs, and show the coolness that had already established itself between the two Governments.

Foreign Office: August 19, 1836.

That

Dear Aston,1-This acceptance of the constitution of 1812 by the Queen Regent, and the change of ministry at Madrid, are the consequences of the mistaken policy of the French Government about Spain. The French last year grew jealous of our influence in Portugal, Spain, and Greece. In Portugal they succeeded in ousting Carvalho, and got Loulé appointed instead; and a pretty mess Loulé and his colleagues made of it! intrigue nearly brought Portugal to bankruptcy. They then succeeded some months later in Spain, and turned out Mendizabal, and gave the power to Isturitz and Cordova; but there they were tampering with matters in a more ticklish state, and the consequences have been more serious. They have produced great and extensive misery in Spain during the last four months, and now they have established, nominally at least, a most absurd and stupid constitution. In Greece they were defeated without much loss. But what a little and narrowminded policy and view of European affairs that must have been, which led the French Government to exhaust against their dear friend and ally all those resources of intrigue and diplomacy which, if well applied, might have produced some results honourable to them and beneficial to Europe! However, so goes the world, and one must take men as one finds them, and make the best of what is, shut one's eyes to failings and faults, and dwell as much as one can upon good points.2

1 Mr. Aston was British Minister ad interim at Paris.
2 This was a very frequent observation of Lord Palmerston's.

OPINION ON THE CHANGED ATTITUDE OF FRANCE.

337

Stanhope Street: Sept. 20, 1836.
I think the tone for you to

My dear Granville,-.. take is, that we look upon France as backing out of the alliance as fast as she can, that we are sorry for it, but wash our hands of the consequences; and upon those who have advised, or who may execute the plan, must rest the responsibility of any inconveniences which may follow; that constitutional government must triumph in the Peninsula, and that France will find herself in the disagreeable predicament of having abandoned a cause overclouded for the moment, but destined to succeed, while we shall have the merit and honour of having consistently supported it; that France will lose her credit with the Liberal party in Europe, whom she is about to desert, and will never be trusted or favoured by the Holy Alliance men, unless she could assimilate her Government to their model, which is impossible; that she will therefore be hated by the first and despised by the latter. Such will be her fate as to her external relations, nor will the effect of her policy upon her internal condition be much more fortunate. Her Government will become identified, in the opinion of the nation, with the arbitrary party in Europe, and with the enemies of free institutions. Discontent will increase: the discontented will enter into communication with the ultra-Liberals of Spain and Portugal, and plots and conspiracies will spring up like mushrooms. The French

Government no doubt think that when matters have gone to a certain length in Spain, France will be called upon to re-enact the drama of 1823. But grievously do they deceive themselves in that. Spain is not the same as then; France is not the same as then. Louis Philippe could not send an army to put down institutions in Spain merely because those institutions were too democratic. The order for such an army to march would be the knell of his dynasty. France is putting herself in a false position, and at no distant time she will find her mistake. We have performed the duties of friendship in warning her; the fault will be hers if the warning is in vain.

Stanhope Street: Sept. 27, 1836.

We ought to come to an explanation with the French Government, and to understand what it is they wish either to bring to pass or to prevent in Spain. Do they want Don Carlos to succeed? Would that be consistent with the honour of a party to the Quadruple Treaty; would it be conducive to the interests of the dynasty founded in July? Do they think the

establishment of a republic in Spain would greatly tend to the internal tranquillity of France? It seems to me that, next to Isabella herself, Louis Philippe is the person in Europe most interested in a speedy suppression of the civil war; and he is indisputably the individual who has the greatest power of putting the war down.

Foreign Office: Jan. 27, 1837.

Our speech will be moderate and short. On foreign affairs we shall say little, and especially not one word about France or French alliance. We can say nothing in their praise, and therefore silence is the most complimentary thing we can bestow upon them.

Foreign Office: Feb. 3, 1837.

Nothing, you see, could have passed off more quietly than our two nights on the Address. Nobody but our friend Bowring said a word about France. After all the vapouring of the papers about foreign affairs this is what Hume, in his classical language, calls a mere monte mus.' I take it that if affairs had gone ill in Spain, and had afforded a good handle against us, the Tories would have laid hold of it; but that as matters seem turning out well, they would rather wish the thing settled, in order to have one stumbling-block the less in their

way.

If, as you say, the French will have been mortified at not being mentioned in the speech, they will probably not be pleased at being so wholly forgotten in the debate.

Foreign Office: Nov. 3, 1837.

I have had a conversation with Sebastiani about Molé. He asked me how things went on between you and Molé. I said, well and ill. That nothing could be more cordial than Molé's manner of receiving you, and that he always spoke to you with the greatest openness and confidence about the weather, and the French elections, and what was going on in the Chambers, and so forth; but that whenever you bring the conversation to those European questions in which England and France have a common interest, and upon which something or other is to be done, Molé immediately shuts himself up in his cold reserve, has no opinion, is not sufficiently informed as to the facts, will reflect upon the matter, and, in short, evades giving any answer.

INCREASING COOLNESS OF FRANCE.

339

Affairs had now arrived at a state in Spain that brought pretty well to a close the deep interest with which for some time past the Spanish peninsula had been regarded. It was evident that the cause of Don Carlos would be the losing one; but it was also evident that the Christinos when triumphant would still be agitated and weakened by divisions, and that the country, though rescued from stagnation, tyranny, and superstition, would only arrive slowly and by degrees at anything like settled prosperity and stability.

It is not necessary, therefore, to prolong quotations on this subject. What has been cited was intended to show, and is sufficient to show, that Lord Palmerston had, or thought he had, serious complaints to make against the French Government as to the unfair and unfriendly manner in which it performed its duties as an ally, and that the differences between the two! Governments first broke out in Spain.

The fact of these differences is important, because they no doubt prepared the way for subsequent differences in the East; inasmuch as Lord Palmerston ceased to attach the same consideration to intimate relations with France which he had attached to them when he thought that Power might be relied on for maintaining a steady union for peaceful and liberal objects among the Governments of the West.

CHAPTER XI.

ACCESSION AND CORONATION OF QUEEN VICTORIA-SPEECH ON BRITISH POLICY IN SPAIN-STATE OF THINGS AT CONSTANTINOPLE -POSITION OF MEHEMET ALI IN EGYPT.

BEFORE proceeding further with the narrative of public events on the Continent, a most interesting one must be noticed that had occurred to us in England-namely, the accession of Queen Victoria. Two short notices taken from Lord Palmerston's correspondence allude to it.

Foreign Office: June 20, 1837.

My dear Granville,―The poor King was released from his sufferings at an early hour this morning. He retained his mental faculties to the last, and was able to give directions on business even so late as yesterday.

The Privy Council met this morning at Kensington, and was most numerously attended. The proclamation will be tomorrow. The Queen went through her task to-day with great dignity and self-possession. One saw she felt much inward emotion; but it was fully controlled. Her articulation was peculiarly good; and her voice remarkably pleasing. To-day and to-morrow the two Houses do nothing but take the oaths. On Thursday there will be a message, as usual in such cases, to the two Houses; and an address in reply. We shall then go on with such business as may not admit of postponement, and in about a month in all probability we shall dissolve.

Foreign Office: June 27, 1837.

To-day the Queen received the Addresses of the House of Commons, and afterwards the foreign ministers. They were introduced one by one. Nothing could be better than her manner of receiving them; it was easy and dignified, and gracious.