CHAPTER II

INDIFFERENCE AND SUSPICION

THE working organization which resulted from the Roosevelt dinner consisted of a committee to bring about the Paris caucus. It was composed of George A. White, Eric Fisher Wood and Ralph D. Cole. Roosevelt was designated agent of liaison with the men in the United States. His job was to "remain in observation" of the trend of affairs in France, and when (and also, if) a propitious moment arrived to apply for embarkation orders, to proceed to the United States, get his discharge, surround himself with competent aids and begin to propagate the idea and sow the seeds of organization among the home forces, then in the happy throes of hasty demobilization.

The committee agreed to split up its work in this way. Wood and Cole were to write all combat divisions, army and corps headquarters, all sections of the Services of Supply, and miscellaneous commands. They were to convey news to the European and American press and to do all that could be done by mail and telegraph to spread information and arouse enthusiasm in the Paris meeting.

White was to be an ambassador extraordinary with a roving commission. He was to tour the A. E. F. on government gasoline, visiting combat divisions, interpreting, expounding, explaining what all these letters and telegrams from Wood and Cole were about. He was to adjust differences, remove misapprehensions, compose misunderstandings. He was to tell the story in words of one syllable and to see to it that every outfit turned out its quota for Paris.

To plan all this was rather simple. To execute the plan was quite another matter, and not so simple. These men were all in the Army. Their time was not their own. Travel was a matter controlled by orders relating to official business, to considerations "necessary in the military service."

Cole went back to his division, where he found work to do which precluded his carrying out the part of the task that had been assigned to him. Wood fell to it with such volunteer assistance as he could command. With untiring energy and a painstaking faculty for detail he tackled the paper work necessary to establish the approaches for a successful caucus. His unheralded labors contributed much to

the success that followed.

White's mission was more interesting. It had the spice of risk. He decided there were so many colonels hanging around Chaumont at the time that one would not be missed. He decided to be that one himself. With a carefully selected assortment of travel orders-rather dim and blurry about the date lines and a wary eye for assistant provost marshals, he set out. Of course, in the view of the average soldier, that red, white and blue G. H. Q. sign on his Dodge rendered these precautions superfluous. But White went doubly prepared. In fact, the G. H. Q. sign did come in handy a time or two, but no one asked to see the antiquated orders.

Ambassador White had not progressed far on his visiting list when it became apparent that certain definite objections, or rather suspicions, regarding the project whose interests he was endeavoring to further, were crystallizing in the minds of those who had heard about the Paris dinner or had read the literature sent out by Wood and his assistants.

In the first place, what sort of slick Army scheme, inspired by the General Staff, was this thing, anyway? Why the inordinate interest of G. H. Q.? Why should G. H. Q. send a colonel travelling in a staff automobile all over France, Luxembourg and occupied Germany to drum up interest in an ex-service men's organization before anybody had a chance to rank that coveted prefix, "ex-"? Wasn't all this a deep-laid plot to work up propaganda for compulsory military service or other militaristic ideas which every soldier believed lay close to the hearts of the elderly generals of the

old Regular establishment? Why the rush to form a veterans union before we got out of uniform? Wouldn't that come along inevitably, at the proper place, which would be at home, and at the proper time, which would be after demobilization? No, this thing wasn't right. G. H. Q. had something up its sleeve.

Brigadier-General Charles H. Cole, of the 26th Division, told White point blank that he regarded the whole thing as Regular Army propaganda, and he would have nothing at all to do with it. Another New Englander informed White that the Yankee Division would form an association of its own and fight "that Army bunch." The Y. D. was still smarting over the removal of its commander, MajorGeneral Clarence Edwards.

In the second place, it was all a political move, an earlybird attempt to swing the soldier vote in the 1920 presidential election to the candidate the General Staff clique might select. Some said this was Pershing. Some, curiously enough, said it was Leonard Wood. Quite a few said it was political medicine making of which Roosevelt was to be the beneficiary. That suspicion was quite general. Naturally it reached Roosevelt's ears, and had a profound influence on his career with the organization he had conceived. As soon as he was satisfied the thing could stand alone, and was headed in the direction he believed it should be headed, he withdrew from active participation, literally fighting his way to the door.

In the third place, it was a society for the glorification of the Sam Browne belt-a society by, for, and of the officers. This report was more widespread than any of the others, because it had a wider field in which to spread. Generally speaking, the prestige of officers was hardly at its highest pinnacle in February after the Armistice. An officer was the impersonation of rank and authority, and rank and authority were two things the enlisted nineteentwentieths of the Army were somewhat indifferent toward