Honor, Symbols, and WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2001 - 344 頁 Nelson Mandela's presidential inauguration invitation to his former jailer; the construction and destruction of the Berlin Wall; the Gulf War's yellow ribbons. While the symbolic nuances of words and actions such as these are regular concerns for foreign policy practitioners, the subject has never been emphasized in international relations theory. That will change with the publication of this exceptionally original work. Many practitioners see symbolism as peripheral compared to resources, interests, military power, and alliances. Those who theorize about norms, ideas, and institutions tend to be open to the importance of symbolism, but they have not drawn out its details. Barry O'Neill's Honor, Symbols, and War puts symbolism at the center of the discussion. O'Neill uses the mathematical theory of games to study a network of concepts important in international negotiation and conflict resolution: symbolism, honor, face, prestige, insults, and apologies. His analysis clarifies the symbolic dynamics of several phenomena, including leadership, prenegotiation maneuvers, crisis tension, and arms-control agreements. This book will be of interest to political scientists, in particular those involved with game theory and international relations. Its findings also will prove useful to students of cultural anthropology, sociology, social psychology, and political behavior. Barry O'Neill is Associate Professor of Politics, School of Management, Yale University. |
內容
Introduction | 3 |
Message Symbols in Practice | 9 |
Message Symbols in Theory | 25 |
Focal Symbols | 45 |
International Tension and Trust | 63 |
What Is National Honor? | 85 |
Challenges to Honor | 101 |
Commitments Based on Honor | 127 |
Prestige Normative Regimes | 193 |
Normative Regimes as Game Equilibria | 200 |
Moral Authority | 208 |
Nuclear ThoughtStyles and Nuclear Symbolism | 215 |
Conclusion | 241 |
Appendix A Game Theory and Intangibles | 253 |
Game Theory Rational Choice Theory | 259 |
Methods of Calculation and Proofs | 287 |
Insults as Assaults on Face | 139 |
Commitments Based on Face | 165 |
Apologies | 177 |
303 | |
323 | |
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常見字詞
action attack audience behavior ceremonies challenge Challengee's chapter Chicken game choose commitment common knowledge communicative act concept conceptual metaphor context conventional cost credibility crisis culture deference defined definition deterrence element example expected focal point focal symbolism force function game models game theory gives goals graph Gulf Gulf War higher hold honor illocutionary point individual insult international apologies involves irrationality Joust knows leaders matrix meaning message symbols metaphor metonymy military missiles mixed strategy move Nash equilibrium NATO normative regime nuclear weapons objective one's other's outcome payoff peace person player President prestige Prisoner's Dilemma prize probability promise prospective tension prototypical scenario punishment pure strategy rationale Saddam sender shows situation social someone song Soviet Union speech act Stag Hunt subgame perfect equilibrium suggests symbolic message symmetrical equilibrium thought-styles tion treaty United utility violates yellow ribbons