I am perfectly willing to bear my full share of that responsibility; but I hope that all of the Members of the Senate will cooperate to the utmost in discharging their responsibility and obligation, which is equally mine.

Now, General MacArthur, I do not know whether or not you have a prepared statement. The Senators present would appreciate any remarks you may care to offer as a basis for opening these hearings. Keep your seat, General, if you choose, if you find it more comfortable.

General MACARTHUR. Thank you. I associate myself

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, are you going to swear the witness? The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for reminding me of that.

General MacArthur, the committee took the extraordinary action, in view of the fact that we did not know what the scope of these hearings would be, and the large number of witnesses that might be brought in, of directing me as chairman to administer the oath to all of the witnesses who might appear.

The evidence which you are about to present the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations bearing upon the matters under inquiry shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

(General MacArthur and General Whitney nodded affirmatively.) The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MacARTHUR, ACCOMPANIED BY MAJ. GEN. COURTNEY WHITNEY

General MACARTHUR. I would associate myself entirely, Senator, with your preliminary remarks. I have no prepared statement.

My comments were made fully when I was so signally honored by the Congress in inviting me to appear before them. I appear today not as a voluntary witness at all, but in response to the request of the committee, and I am entirely in the hands of the committee.

EFFECTIVENESS OF INTEGRATION OF ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. General, I shall ask a few questions, then, bearing upon particularly the matters within the purview of the Committee on Armed Services. This is the first opportunity that the committee has had to have with us a commanding officer from the field who has been in close day-to-day contact with operations in Korea.

You, of course, are aware of the long efforts that have been made in the Congress to coordinate the activities of the several branches of the service, to eliminate duplication, and to weld them into an effective fighting machine.

I should like to ask you if, as a result of your experiences in Korea during this struggle, you feel that we have accomplished the complete integration as a fighting machine of the various services.

General MACARTHUR. I can only speak for what has occurred within what was my theater of responsibility, Senator. You would know more about the integration here or in continental America probably than I would, but in the Far East the integration of the three fighting services has been as complete as I could possibly imagine.

They have worked as a team. The responsiveness of each service to the desires and wishes of the other has been almost perfection. The integration there has been much more than the integration of the three services. It has been the integration of the forces of a number of nations, all of which had various components there. I would rate it as 100 percent, and the only reason I do not rate it higher is because I believe the mathematicians say 100 percent is all there is.

The CHAIRMAN. That includes the cooperation between the air in support of ground forces as well as all of the other phases of activity, tactical activity?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir. What I am referring to is the coordination. I am not referring to the efficiencies; I am referring to basic amalgamation of the services and their efforts in support of each other.

QUALITY OF SOUTH KOREAN SOLDIERS

The CHAIRMAN. General, we have received conflicting reports as to the battle efficiency of the South Korean forces. Some of the fragmentary reports we have received and some of the reports we have received from those in the lower echelons has been that they are very fine soldiers, and others that have been there have spoken of them somewhat disparagingly. The committee would like to have your viewpoint on the South Korean soldiers.

General MACARTHUR. In courage and in determination, and in resolution, they are very fine troops. They lack the background of long tradition. They lack an officer corps, which takes years to build up. They lack in the efficacy of long periods of training. The lack in certain instances of matériel and other deficiencies is apparent. But within the physical limitations that exist, I regard them as very fine, indeed.

Their casualties, compared with the forces that were committed, reflect an indomitable spirit for victory. They are lightly armed and are at their best in what you might call the reconnaissance and exploitive features of campaigns.

They do not have the depth of matériel to resist, as well as some other of our forces there, the attack of well-equipped, experienced modern armies.

In certain of their efforts, such as the exploitive pursuit they are unequaled. They can go further on less than any troops I have ever commanded. As all troops have, they have many excellent points and they have some weak points.

The CHAIRMAN. You refer to their

General MACARTHUR. The difference in reporting is perfectly natural. You will find that that exists on all battlefields in all areas. The instances that fall under one man's observation may be good; another group may be bad. The sum total of the Korean, as I say, within his limitations, is high.

The CHAIRMAN. You refer to their lack of matériel. We are supplying them. Is that because we do not have the supplies for them or because they are not capable of using larger quantities of matériel and equipment?

General MACARTHUR. The supplies that were available to me were not entirely adequate to arm them in the same ratio as our own troops.

In supplying heavy weapons, such as artillery, tanks, and things of that sort, it takes a high degree of training, it takes time. They have a great pool of manpower but it is untrained. To train it takes considerable time, and the supplies to equip them on the same basis as our troops have not been available.

INTEGRATION OF UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN KOREA

The CHAIRMAN. You referred, General, to what had been accomplished in handling troops of different nations, of various tongues. Do you think that the experience we have had there might stand us in good stead in the event of an all-out war where we would undertake to have armies that would be composed of soldiers from many nations? Has it been on a large enough scale to assist us and other members of the United Nations-have they transported enough troops there to where that experience would really be of any benefit to us in the case of an all-out war between communism and the free world?

General MACARTHUR. I would doubt it very much, Senator. The forces of all of the nations except the South Koreans and ours are token forces at best.

The CHAIRMAN. Were any difficulties encountered in integrating the efforts of those token forces?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have American officers who could speak Turkish, for example, to serve as liaison with the Turkish commanding officer?

General MACARTHUR. We managed to make ourselves reciprocally understood.

The CHAIRMAN. The reason I asked the question-I have been concerned about our training of our commissioned personnel, particularly, in the different languages to enable us to have a coordinated force in the event, which God forbid is necessary, to assemble one to resist communism.

General MACARTHUR. I will say that the Turkish Brigade is one of the finest I have ever been associated with.

The CHAIRMAN. Elite troops, I suppose, and picked for that purpose, were they not, General?

General MACARTHUR. I could not tell you that, Senator.

CHINESE COMMUNIST AIR STRENGTH

The CHAIRMAN. What was the estimate of the Chinese air strength at the time you left the theater, the best estimate that our intelligence had been able to gather of the strength of air that was available by Chinese Communists or others?

We read from time to time where there are brushes between our jet planes and enemy planes of some character and description. Do you have any estimate you could give us as to the total strength of that Chinese Air Force?

General MACARTHUR. The estimates varied. They varied as low as 300 planes and as high as 800 planes. I saw one estimate that went up to above a thousand. The actual strength is conjectural.

The CHAIRMAN. Have they yet attacked our Ground Forces in Korea, the Chinese?

General MACARTHUR. Not in any serious way. There has been an occasional, sporadic strike of one or two planes, but nothing of any serious nature whatsoever?

The CHAIRMAN. Has that been bombing, strafing, or both?

General MACARTHUR. I could not tell you, Senator. The instances were of such minor importance that the details I would not attempt to recall.

SOVIET STRENGTH IN THE FAR EAST

The CHAIRMAN. I was impressed, General, in your tribute to the Japanese people in your address to the Congress. You stated about the hazard of removing all of the troops that we had, garrison troops, from Japan to the field in Korea. Îf Russia had seen fit to have moved at that time, I assume that they could have captured Japan, could they not?

General MACARTHUR. I would doubt it very seriously, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. You would doubt it?

General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir. I don't believe that Japan could have been taken except by an amphibious effort. And as long as we held control of the sea and of the air over that sea, I would doubt that the Soviet would have been able to overrun Japan in any coup de main.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is always difficult for us to have any real estimate of Russian strength in that area. Some sources contend that it is very substantial; they have great airborne armies that they can transport by air from place to place as well as considerable air strength. What did your intelligence reveal as to that?

General MACARTHUR. I will give you my own estimate, if you will permit me.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MACARTHUR. The Soviet in the Far East deploys possibly between [deleted].

[Deleted] of armed men in the various three services. He is dependent for their support almost entirely from European Russia.

This side of the Bicol region, there is no industrial set-up of major proportion, so that all of the munition equipment, all the strategic war weapons, all of the sustenance that goes in in such major quantity to support armed forces, must pass over that railway line which runs from European Russia across Siberia.

That line is strained to the very utmost now to maintain on a normal peace basis the forces which the Soviet maintains in Siberia.

I do not believe that it would be within the capacity of the Soviet to mass any great additional increment of force to launch any predatory attack from the Asiatic continent.

I believe that the dispositions of the Soviet forces are largely defensive. I believe that the Soviet has so often repeated the incorrect statement that we are planning to attack him, that he has finally begun to believe himself.

I believe that the weakness of Red China, a weakness which is very noticeable in the air and on the sea, is a corollary of the inability of the Soviet logistical system to send out those munitions to assist its ally.

I believe that the Soviet has the capacity to launch a punishing attack upon Japan, but I do not believe the Soviet has the capacity to overrun Japan until she gets command of the sea and of the air.

That she could get the command of the sea in the face of our magnificent Navy, I would be very doubtful of under any circum

stances.

SOVIET AIR STRENGTH IN FAR EAST

Their air is not to be discounted. The estimates of the air strength in the Far East vary. I have seen it put as high as [out] planes, including the naval planes of their fifth and seventh fleets, which are out there.

My own belief is that they could initially launch, perhaps [deleted] planes.

Of those planes, the majority are fighters. Of those fighters, the majority are jets, and are excellent.

The Soviet probably suffers greatly from a lack of maintenance facilities, gasoline, petroleum supplies, and other things.

How long she would be able to maintain an air effort in an all-out war out there is, of course, speculative.

My own opinion is that it would not be too long. I believe that their efforts would deteriorate from the beginning of hostilities.

She has over there now in counted planes, of course [deleted], but they are scattered; their use, their logistical position, gives no indication of any immediate preparation for assault.

Now, when you speculate along that line you are truly speculating. This is the estimate that I had at the time I left.

The very fact that when I poured all our troops from Japan into Korea, and there was no slightest evidence on the part of the Soviet to take any advantage as far as Japan was concerned of that situation, would tend to bear out my estimate.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the submarine strength of the Soviet in that area?

General MACARTHUR. The Soviet, the Russian over the centuries. has never been able to develop a navy. It has been of course the political basis of Russian foreign policy to obtain a commercial naval force with a combat force to protect it.

RUSSIAN INTEREST IN ACCESS TO THE SEA AND SEAPOWER

The Russian has always believed that he could not take his rightful place in the international sphere of commerce and industry unless he shared the commerce of the seas. For centuries he has been seeking warm waters. For centuries the fundamental political policy of the British Empire, no matter what party grew up in place of the Prime Minister, has been to prevent that, and always they have been successful.

The objective of Russia for many decades was the Mediterranean. It not only would have given her warm water, given her a chance to develop her transportation, her water transportation facilities, but would have cut the lifeline of her great rival.

Whether you believe in the British or whether you do not, they were amazingly successful either on the field of battle in the utilization of the principle of the balance of power, or in combinations and leagues of various nations to prevent that tremendous expansion. Without that, Russia could not dominate and control the world.