Now recently the Russian has probably had a new vision opened. That vision is no longer confined to the warm water of the Mediterranean or Europe. It is the possibility of reaching the warm waters of the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

If by any combination she could extend down to the Indian Ocean, she would not only outflank the Mediterranean, of course, but it would place her fair and flush upon the continent of Africa, which for the next hundred years, with its enormous industrial potential, is something that attracts all commerce and all industry, whatever its nationality might be.

It is a vision which perhaps transcends anything that the old Czarist regimes ever had.

Now as to the possibilities of what may accrue after you reach warm water, you have reached a different phase. As I said to start with, the Russian has never been a seagoing man. It has been his enormous weakness. His great strength has always been on the ground.

It takes decades, some of us believe it takes centuries, to develop a merchant marine and combat vessels to protect them. The Russians have never shown that capacity in the slightest degree.

STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET NAVY IN THE FAR EAST

Over in the Far East their fleets, the Fifth and the Seventh Fleet, are light elements, cruiser, destroyer. They would not be a match either in quantity and certainly not in quality with our own forces.

Along the lines of submarines, the estimates vary. Probably the superior methods of gathering intelligence here in the Central Intelligence Agency gives a great deal more information than I could give you. I am very limited, and what I could gather was on my immediate front and under inhibitions that have probably never been equaled.

SOVIET SUBMARINES

My own belief is that she might have, in the neighborhood of Vladivostok, and in that area, probably [deleted] submarines.

The CHAIRMAN. Any snorkels, General?

General MACARTHUR. I should say that she would have, perhaps, [deleted] modern submarines-German.

Now, whether she has the German crews to man them, I do not know. If they have, they are first class. No better submarine service was ever developed than the German.

Now, the boats, themselves, are unquestionably German. Whether they are manned by efficient crews, I could not tell you. I would have doubts about it.

The majority of their submarines are of low radius, and are largely for defensive purposes. Their training is largely to prevent an amphibious thrust by us into their harbors.

Now, a submarine attack is a serious thing to any logistical line of supply overseas. The mere threat of it means that you cannot dispatch transports and supply ships without the enormous effort of convoying them.

So, the mere threat of submarining would have a very potential effect upon the operations in the Far East.

RUSSIA'S MESHING OF ACTION TO OURS

The CHAIRMAN. General, you stated, in your address to the Congress, that Russia would not necessarily mesh their actions to ours. Could that be construed as a statement of your belief that they would not mesh their actions with ours?

General MACARTHUR. Everything I say, Senator, of course, is on my own personal authority, and represents nothing but my own views. The CHAIRMAN. A great many people are interested in your views.

SOVIET CHOICES OF ACTION

General MACARTHUR. My own belief is that the Soviet has two great choices-this perhaps oversimplifies, but it will illustrate my thought.

Those two great choices are: First, whether he, at some time or other, is going to attack or not.

The second choice is the reverse of that: Whether he is not going to attack.

He knows, just as well as you and I know, that we are not going to attack him.

If he has determined that he is not going to attack, that he is doing well enough in the present atmosphere, that he is acquiring and expanding as rapidly as he can digest it; and that he is not going to attack, and that is his basic policy-I do not believe that anything that happens in Korea, or Asia, for that matter, would affect his basic decision.

If he has determined that he is going to use force, sooner or later, what occurs in Korea, or in Asia, might affect his timetable.

I believe that he will make his decisions on a higher basis than the incidents that are occurring in Asia at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you have any opinion as to whether their strategy is to move in Asia, or Europe, first; or do you think that they have any hard and fast plans in either direction, but are awaiting events that might make one or the other area more propitious?

General MACARTHUR. I would say that it would be highly speculative to attempt to guess; that it would be quite ridiculous.

I believe that the Soviet high command, from the military standpoint, represents a high degree of efficiency. I do not believe that they would put themselves into any strait-jacket of inelasticity, any program of A, B, C, or June, July, or August, which would determine

it.

I believe that, like all good commanders, they would be flexible enough to adjust their movements to the conditions that exist.

GROUND TROOPS NEEDED TO ACCOMPLISH UN MISSION IN KOREA

The CHAIRMAN. General, did you ever submit any estimate as to the number of troops that would be necessary to accomplish the mission of the United Nations in Korea, under the conditions which attach themselves to the command in that area?

General MACARTHUR. I have constantly asked for more troops than I was able to obtain, Senator, from the beginning of hostilities.

The numbers that were available to me were limited, and I was informed to that effect; and, with what I had, I did the best I could. The CHAIRMAN. It may be an estimate that you would not care to make, but do you have any estimate of the number of troops that it would take?

General MACARTHUR. You go into a field that cannot be answered categorically, in that way, Senator.

The number of troops that you speak of are the ground troops, I suppose?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, and their supporting elements.

General MACARTHUR. The supporting elements are acting in such a limited way that it is impossible, for me, at least, to make a categorical reply to your question.

The air and naval forces that were at my disposal out there were only operating at a fraction of their efficiency. They are in effect-by being confined to the narrow area of the battleground of Korea-they are in effect merely performing that function which would be regarded as tactical support of the infantry line.

The great strategic concept of stopping the supplies to troops, of preventing the build-up of troops to be thrown against them, to the disorganization of transportation lines-all of the uses which over the years and centuries the Navy and Air are supposed to do are not permitted over there.

If you would take off and permit them their full capacity, I do not believe it would take a very great additional component of ground troops to wind this thing up.

Now, actually if you do not permit the use of our forces in their normal capacity, you would not be able to supply enough ground troops in Korea to be able to safely clear North Korea.

You would go up to the Yalu and you would be in a position where the enemy could jump you immediately. I don't know how many troops it would take you to do that-ground troops-but they are quite beyond the capacity of this country to supply and maintain with our base 10,000 miles away-and do anything else.

RELATIONSHIP OF COMMANDER TO UNITED NATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. General, will you clarify for the benefit of the committee your position as Commander in Chief of the United Nations there as well as of the United States forces? When you submitted your request for troops, did you submit it to the Government of the United States or did you submit it to the United Nations or both? General MACARTHUR. Senator, my connection with the United Nations was largely nominal. There were provisions made that the entire control of my command and everything I did came from our own Chiefs of Staff and my channel of communication was defined as the Army Chief of Staff.

Even the reports which were normally made by me to the United Nations were subject to censorship by our State and Defense Departments. I had no direct connection with the United Nations what

soever.

The controls over me were exactly the same as though the forces under me were all American. All of my communications were to the American high command here.

CENSORING OF REPORTS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Were any of your communications to the United Nations that went through that chain of command actually censored? General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir. The reports that I made, comments and suggestions-suggestions came back to me as to whether I would accept the changes. Many of those changes I accepted. There were at least in one case changes which I would not accept, changes which seemed to me to place a political slant upon a mílitary officer's report, which were not warrantable.

In that it created a degree of discussion between the State and Defense Departments..

The Defense Department supported my point of view, and maintained that nothing should go in over my signature that I did not approve.

I might say that I would not have permitted anything to go in over my name that I did not approve.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that change to which you refer, General, that you refused to make on the request of the Defense Establishment? You said there were

General MACARTHUR. I don't know whether the requests were from the State or the Defense Establishment.

The reports that I submitted were passed through both of them, but they made a number of changes in practically every report. I have not got the files here, and I couldn't tell you.

The CHAIRMAN. I, of course, realize the impossibility of remembering everything that was in them. You stated there were some of them that you agreed to, but there was one occasion that you did not agree to a change. I thought, perhaps, that would stand out in your mind as much as would some, if not argument, discussion, at least, on this subject.

General MACARTHUR. No, sir. I couldn't reconstitute this without going into the records. It is entirely available. All you have to do is call on the Department for it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir; but I have not had an opporunity to do so; I have had quite a few details to read all these records, and I, of course, knowing your memory, thought, perhaps, you would recall just what that incident was.

General MACARTHUR. The general gist of it was, as I said, that it seemed to introduce a political slant which the State Department believed would be advantageous in its handling of the various nations of the United Nations at Lake Success.

It did not agree with my own military concepts, and the reports I put in were intended to be entirely factual-the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, as far as I saw it.

Is there any objection to my smoking?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no; it is perfectly agreeable. The members of the committee have been smoking, and we certainly would not extend to them any right that would not be extended to you, General.

TIME OF PROPOSAL TO BOMB MANCHURIA AND BLOCKADE CHINA

Prior to the time that the Chinese Communists intervened in the war, had any question arisen as to the blockade of China or of the bombing of bases in Manchuria in the event that they did intervene?

General MCARTHUR. I don't entirely recall, Senator, except the question of the "hot pursuit," I know that the Air wished from the very beginning to pursue an attacking enemy plane to the death, whether it was over the border line or not.

The directives forbade that. The question of the blockade of China, the Chinese coasts, as far as I can recall, when the war was confined to the North Koreans, hadn't agitated our headquarters anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the North Koreans did not have enough air to make that really a vital question; did it, pursuit?

General MACARTHUR. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It did not really become an issue until after the Chinese intervened.

General MACARTHUR. Correct; but the question was raised at the very beginning, whether we could pursue an attacking plane to a conclusion in the air fight.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall at what period during the operations that you first formally suggested to the Defense Establishment that you be permitted to carry on air operations over Manchuria or to blockade the China coast? I do not mean the exact date, General; I mean relative to events. Was it just after the Chinese intervened or about the time that you issued your statement that it was an entirely new war?

General MACARTHUR. It was after the Chinese intervened, and it was definitely established that they were making war on our forces in Korea.

There were various recommendations put in immediately thereafter-after it was determined that China was warring against us, Red China, I put in the application for the use of-that the wraps be taken off the forces in Formosa. There were other recommendations that went in at various times, but I would not-I could not at this stage-I will say that there were a number of visits by the Army Chief of Staff, General Collins, at which those points were discussed in detail, and our position was set forth. However, the decisions were made in Washington, and were complied with completely and absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. So after the Chinese Communists came in and immediately after it was evident that they were in large numbers attacking your forces, you did recommend that the naval blockade be enforced and that what you have very graphically described as a sanctuary in Manchuria be subject to air attack, and that the Chinese Nationalist troops be employed?

General MACARTHUR. I very definitely recommnded that the Chinese Nationalist troops be employed. Whether there was any definite written form in the other things, I do not recall.

In my discussions with General Collins I pointed out how extraordinarily necessary it was to lift those inhibitions.

FORM OF THE PROPOSALS

The CHAIRMAN. But you did not formally request that through channels, that those interdictions be removed?

General MACARTHUR. The requests were made of course to the Army Chief of Staff, General Collins, in the references. You understand that from the beginning these inhibitions were listed, Senator, and