Accountability without Democracy: Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural ChinaCambridge University Press, 2007年8月27日 Examines the fundamental issue of how citizens get government officials to provide them with the roads, schools, and other public services they need by studying communities in rural China. In authoritarian and transitional systems, formal institutions for holding government officials accountable are often weak. The state often lacks sufficient resources to monitor its officials closely, and citizens are limited in their power to elect officials they believe will perform well and to remove them when they do not. The answer, Lily L. Tsai found, lies in a community's social institutions. Even when formal democratic and bureaucratic institutions of accountability are weak, government officials can still be subject to informal rules and norms created by community solidary groups that have earned high moral standing in the community. |
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第 289 頁
... township were surveyed. In each village, two enumerators met with one to three village officials for about three to ... government investment in public projects: Total village government investment in village public projects, divided by ...
... township were surveyed. In each village, two enumerators met with one to three village officials for about three to ... government investment in public projects: Total village government investment in village public projects, divided by ...
第 290 頁
... village . Existence of an active village pastor : Dummy indicating whether the vil- lage has a village pastor or priest ... government assets : Village government total current or float- ing assets . 1997 village tax revenue per capita ...
... village . Existence of an active village pastor : Dummy indicating whether the vil- lage has a village pastor or priest ... government assets : Village government total current or float- ing assets . 1997 village tax revenue per capita ...
第 291 頁
... village committee and the village Party branch) who are members of the Communist Party, divided by total number of village officials. Existence of bureaucratic targets for public projects: Dummy indicating whether the township government ...
... village committee and the village Party branch) who are members of the Communist Party, divided by total number of village officials. Existence of bureaucratic targets for public projects: Dummy indicating whether the township government ...
第 292 頁
... township government; determination of primary candidates free of interference from the village Party branch; determination of primary candidates free of interference from the incumbent village committee; determination of final ...
... township government; determination of primary candidates free of interference from the village Party branch; determination of primary candidates free of interference from the incumbent village committee; determination of final ...
第 298 頁
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常見字詞
1997 government assets 1997 tax revenue ancestral hall Capita Investment Existence cells are seemingly Classrooms Usable coefficient estimates Control variables Distance Data Are Deleted denote village government denotes a measure denotes a village Distance from county Dummy indicating effect on public enterprises in 1995 Estimating the Effects Existence of Paved Existence of Running Existence of village Figures in cells final candidates free free of interference Fujian halls with spirit Hebei hypothesis means income per capita incumbent village committee Index of Implementation Jiangxi Missing Data Number of natural p-value Paved Paths Percentage Paved Roads Existence Percentage of Classrooms primary candidates free principal components analysis Provision of Public public goods provision running water seemingly unrelated regression Shanxi six outcomes spirit tablets table is tested temple institutions temple manager term are equal thousands of yuan unrelated regression coefficients Usable in Rain village government investment Village Governmental Provision village officials village Party branch Village terrain