Accountability without Democracy: Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural ChinaCambridge University Press, 2007年8月27日 Examines the fundamental issue of how citizens get government officials to provide them with the roads, schools, and other public services they need by studying communities in rural China. In authoritarian and transitional systems, formal institutions for holding government officials accountable are often weak. The state often lacks sufficient resources to monitor its officials closely, and citizens are limited in their power to elect officials they believe will perform well and to remove them when they do not. The answer, Lily L. Tsai found, lies in a community's social institutions. Even when formal democratic and bureaucratic institutions of accountability are weak, government officials can still be subject to informal rules and norms created by community solidary groups that have earned high moral standing in the community. |
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第 288 頁
... village democratic reforms on my dependent variable, village governmental provision of public goods.1 Since the promulgation of reforms in 1988 allowing the implementation of elections for a portion of officials at the village level and ...
... village democratic reforms on my dependent variable, village governmental provision of public goods.1 Since the promulgation of reforms in 1988 allowing the implementation of elections for a portion of officials at the village level and ...
第 289 頁
... village officials for about three to four hours. Enumerators tried to meet with at least the village accountant and either the Party secretary or the village head. Enumerators filled out the survey questionnaire by interviewing the ...
... village officials for about three to four hours. Enumerators tried to meet with at least the village accountant and either the Party secretary or the village head. Enumerators filled out the survey questionnaire by interviewing the ...
第 291 頁
... village head is a member of the Communist Party (0 = no; 1 = yes). Percentage of village officials in Party: Number of village officials (in both the village committee and the village Party branch) who are members of the Communist Party ...
... village head is a member of the Communist Party (0 = no; 1 = yes). Percentage of village officials in Party: Number of village officials (in both the village committee and the village Party branch) who are members of the Communist Party ...
第 296 頁
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內容
287 | |
Index created | 293 |
Villagewide Lineage Groups versus Subvillage Groups | 295 |
jointly for all outcomes k Rejecting this hypothesis means that | 296 |
Appendix Table A31 Intercorrelations r among Indicators of Village Governmental | 297 |
Appendix Table A51 Descriptive Statistics | 300 |
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常見字詞
316 Existence 316 villages access to running Classrooms Usable committee members free created through principal denote village government denotes a measure denotes a village determination of election determination of final determination of primary Dummy indicating effect on public election oversight committee empirical specification enterprises in 1995 Estimating the Effects existence of paved final candidates free formal power free of interference Fujian halls with spirit Hebei hypothesis means Identifying and Estimating income per capita incumbent village committee institutional controls Jiangxi Mean Deviation Measures of village Party control paved roads preelection procedures presented in Equation primary candidates free principal components analysis provision of public provision outcome measure public goods provision public projects Rejecting this hypothesis restated as H0 running water Seemingly Unrelated Regression Shanxi significant effect targets for public temple manager township government vector of socioeconomic village government investment village governmental provision village head village officials village Party branch YCS YCS YCS