Senator JOHNSON. Did you learn from any of them that they did share his views that we should undertake that four-point program that he recommended? General COLLINS. Was he speaking of foreign commanders, or American commanders? Senator JOHNSON. He was speaking of both. General COLLINS. Both? I have had one communication from General Ridgway, the date of which I do not recall now, in which he told me that from his point of view, of being a commander in the field, and he made that clear, that he felt that he should support that proposal of General MacArthur's, which involved the release of any restrictions on Chinese Nationalist forces operating on the mainland of China. Senator JOHNSON. And he limited it to that one?. Senator JOHNSON. In the four-point program? General COLLINS. That is right, sir. Senator JOHNSON. That may have been what General MacArthur had in mind when I asked him about General Ridgway's feelings: And by that statement, of course, you include General Ridgway? General MACARTHUR. General who? Senator JOHNSON. Ridgway. General MACARTHUR. I would, of course, prefer to let General Ridgway speak for himself; but I will say "Yes." Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General MACARTHUR. I think you will find, if you will go into the reports that he made, that he is quite in agreement. Now, do you know of any report, other than the one you mentioned, that General Ridgway has made, to the effect that he agrees with the program recommended by General MacArthur? General COLLINS. I do not know of any, Senator; no, sir. Senator WILEY. That doesn't mean that there aren't any. Senator JOHNSON. Wait a minute. I have another question here to ask, which I asked General Bradley yesterday NORTH KOREAN AND CHINESE CASUALTIES General Collins, do you have an estimate of the total number of casualties that have been suffered by the North Koreans and Chinese Communists, from the beginning of the war? General COLLINS. I believe I have such an estimate. Let me check here and see whether I have it with me here. Yes, sir. The estimate that I have, which includes killed, wounded, nonbattle, and prisoners of war, both Chinese Communists and North Koreans, is 1,025,000. Senator WILEY. What date? General COLLINS. As of now. Senator JOHNSON. Does that include battle and nonbattle casualties? General COLLINS. Yes, sir. Senator JOHNSON. What are the estimates? How do you divide those? General COLLINS. I don't have a breakdown of that, except for 1 week. The week from the 17th to the 23d of May, our estimates are that they suffered almost 90,000 casualties in that 1 week. That includes only killed in action, wounded in action, and those taken prisoners of war. Senator JOHNSON. Battle and nonbattle, it is your estimate there are more than a million casualties? General COLLINS. Yes, sir. Senator JOHNSON. Now, General, in your estimation, to what extent do those casualties cut down the military potential of the Chinese Communists? General COLLINS. I think they reduce the military potential of the Chinese materially, because, as I said earlier, the forces that they have sent in have been the very best troops that they have; and I have word from one of our officers recently returned, just yesterday, that so far as the North Koreans are concerned, particularly the prisoners that we have been taking recently, they have been much older men than the younger, more vigorous men that we took originally. ALLIED CASUALTIES OTHER THAN UNITED STATES Senator JOHNSON. Do you have an estimate on the allied casualties, other than ours? General COLLINS. Yes, sir. I believe that the ROK, Republic of Korea, battle casualties total something over 167,000, actually 167,254. Other United Nations forces, total battle casualties, 4,823. Senator JOHNSON. That is both battle and nonbattle? General COLLINS. No, sir; that is just battle casualties. Now, including the nonbattle casualties, and frankly that is a very poor term Senator JOHNSON. That is the next thing I want to go into. General COLLINS. "Sick and injured" would be a far more accurate term than "casualties." If they had occurred at home, in a home station in the United States, nobody would ever think of calling them nonbattle casualties; they would be listed on the sick book and called "sick." Because of the fact that they are in a theater of war, you get into this military lingo which, in more cases than one, is terrible; and if you get such a term as "nonbattle casualty," actually, it means sick and injured. The sick and injured casualties in the Republic of Korea forces totaled 30,202; and in the other United Nations forces, just under 5,000, actually, 4,962; so that the total battle casualties and sick and injured, Republic of Korea Army, total now 197,456; for the other United Nations forces, 9,785. Senator JOHNSON. That is all, General. Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Green? (No response.) Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper. General COLLINS. I wonder if I can add a word further to the question, or is the Senator's time up? Chairman RUSSELL. He has 1 minute. General COLLINS. I would like to add the point with respect to this so-called nonbattle casualties that, to the best of my knowledge, I am not positive of this, now, that the sick rate in Korea is, if anything, less than the garrison rate in the United States. That has usually been the case. Our troops in the field usually have a lower sick rate than the people living right in the garrisons. I think that has held in Korea, as it has in all our wars. Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper. Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Collins, I want to ask you a few questions about soldiers. General COLLINS. About what, sir? Senator HICKENLOOPER. About soldiers. General COLLINS. Right. Senator HICKENLOOPER. I will say this with utter sincerity and complete conviction, that I consider you one of our great, brilliant generals. I think your record bears that out, and I am sincere about that, and I want to take you out of the category, with that personal observation. MAC ARTHUR'S RECORD AS A SOLDIER Hasn't it been true, in our history, that periodically some of our great military leaders have been firm in their convictions, and have had rather outstanding disagreements with their superiors on policy in times past, in our history? General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I think that there are occasions. Senator HICKENLOOPER. I Won't canvass the list, but I think there is a well-known list. They have been people of strong conviction, and there have been a number of instances where they have been great leaders. General COLLINS. Yes, sir. Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now there have been some slightly, perhaps not even slightly concealed questions asked repeatedly here, the purpose of which seems to be to draw from you or some other witness the idea that General MacArthur is either a bungler, a fool, or a stupid military leader, and that he may have made some inexcusable blunders from time to time. Because of my respect for your opinion, and my sincere admiration for your record and proven ability, I shall ask your opinion on this. Taking General MacArthur's record as a soldier, as a strategist, as a field captain, in the broadest term, field general, and without asking you to classify or to A B C in degree of ability or of brilliance, what would you say about General MacArthur's over-all standing in brilliance and leeadership, and in what general category—top, middle, or lower-would you place General MacArthur in the history of our great military men in the United States? General COLLINS. I think he is one of the most brilliant military leaders that this country has produced. Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, sir. Now has his record been replete with any substantial military blunders from the standpoint of strategy or tactics or has he demonstrated generally in his military career a successful line of strategy and a successful line of tactical operations in matters for which he has been responsible throughout his career? General COLLINS. Throughout his career he has been brilliantly successful. Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, sir. DISPOSITION OF OUR FORCES IN NOVEMBER 1950 Now with regard to this situation in December and January when the Reds came over in force and split the Tenth Corps away from the Eighth Army, isn't it a fact that their positions at the time when they were farthest north and perhaps the farthest split apart, that the front, which our entire forces were to hold, was much broader in length, much longer than down in the waist of Korea near the thirty-eighth parallel? General COLLINS. Yes, sir; that is correct. Senator HICKENLOOPER. Isn't it a fact that because of the terrain and the hogback of mountains which went up there, that direct and continuous liaison between the Tenth Corps and the Eighth Army way in the north of Korea was far more difficult than it is down in the waist part of Korea, that is, by waist I mean the center part of Korea; isn't that correct, General? General COLLINS. It would have been more difficult; yes, sir. Senator HICKENLOOPER. General MacArthur testified, I believe that that push to the north was a known and designed reconnaissance in force which if lightly resisted would push on north, and which if heavily resisted would have to withdraw. It did encounter superior force, and according to the preconceived plan of such a reconnaissance in force, a withdrawal was put into effect, and, as I recall his testimony, he said that the casualties were surprisingly small in this orderly withdrawal. It was a tough one. I don't mean to minimize it, but considering the forces against us that were pouring in, that the withdrawal was accomplished according to plan and with what might be considered a reasonable minimum of casualties under all the circumstances. Would you say that that is a fair statement? Do you agree with that generally? General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I do agree. CONSULTATION OF PACE ON DISMISSAL Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you. Now, General Collins to your knowledge was Secretary Pace consulted about the relief of General MacArthur in April in those meetings? General COLLINS. No, sir. Mr. Pace was outside of the country at the time. He had already left the country, to the best of my recollection. Senator HICKENLOOPER. To your knowledge was his advice sought by anyone by cable, wireless, message or otherwise? General COLLINS. Not that I know of, sir. Senator HICKENLOOPER. I mentioned Mr. Pace, of course, because he is Secretary of the Army and the civilian head at least over you in your capacity as Chief of Staff of the Army. General COLLINS. That is right, sir. Senator HICKENLOOPER. There may be some question about your membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to where the line of command comes. General COLLINS. There is no doubt that he is my Chief in the Army. FREEDOM OF SPEECH OF OFFICERS Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now I want to read to you your own statement about the freedom of speech of officers. I am reading from the record of interrogation of General Marshall on May 11 and I am reading from page 1322. I had previously read from the hearings on the troops-to-Europe issue. Senator Lodge had asked you when you appeared as a witness. there whether or not there was any truth to the statement that wraps had been ordered on military officers to prevent them from testifying as to their opinion or giving committees of Congress their personal views, and Senator Lodge said he had asked you the question and you said, "Definitely not." Then Senator Lodge: In other words, an officer is free to respond to an invitation by any committee of Congress to come up and say what he thinks? General COLLINS. Completely so. So far as the Army is concerned, I can say without any reservation whatever that here in essence are the instructions that we have complied with for years. An officer called before a committee of the Congress must present the considered view of the Department of the Army or the War Department. I think that is a logical thing. And then you go on to discuss that, which I agree with. I think he is obligated to support or to present the view. Then you continue: However, an officer is permitted to answer to queries complete and utterly unfettered personal views so long as he says "this is my personal view." Senator LODGE. So that is a protection to the public and to the Member of Congress involved is it not, so that he will know that the officer is expressing a personal view and not a view of the Department. I am fully aware, General, that that refers to coming before committees of Congress. That is a public declaration of personal views which I take it would not be in major premise different from expressing a personal view to the Member of Congress such as Congressman Martin. Now I would like to read you—I am hurrying along because I will ask your composite comment-are you familiar with a book called The Armed Forces Officer which I believe is just coming off the press? It is put out by the Department of Defense by General Marshall, that is he has promulgated it here? General COLLINS. I am not familiar with it personally, Senator. Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I will assure you it is an official publication of the Government Printing Office, and it has a statement by General Marshall as Secretary of Defense on page 8 this language for the guidance of officers, saying about the officer: The service officer is charged only to take a lively interest in all such discussions That is about public and military affairs. He has no more right to condemn the service unfairly than has any other American. On the other hand he is not expected to be an intellectual eunuch, oblivious to all of the faults in the institution to which he gives his loyalty. To the contrary, the nature of that loyalty requires that he will use his force toward the righting of those things which reason convinces him are going wrong, though making certain that his action will not do more damage than repair. And continuing the second paragraph: His ultimate commanding loyalty at all times is to his country, and not to his service or his superior. He owes it to his country to speak the truth as he sees 83797-51-pt. 2-36 |