Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contribution of the New Institutional EconomicsUniversity of Michigan Press, 2000 - 556 頁 A much-needed exploration of the New Institutional Economics, or NIE, including a critical assessment of its central theoretical contributions since the field's early beginnings in the 1960s, is this book's objective. It traces the development of major ideas about the genesis and significance of institutions as these ideas have been presented in the NIE. Given the fundamental understanding underlying work in this new area of research--that transactions involve the use of real resources and have costs--the book views the NIE as an amalgam of transaction-cost economics, property-rights analysis, and contract theory. Efforts are made to explain how the various theoretical strands discussed in the NIE literature fit into the general fabric of modern institutionalism, and how the new concepts put forward can be applied to institutional analysis. Since the new institutionalist approach contrasts sharply with that of the traditional neoclassical model, special attention is given to elucidating the points of difference between the two. And, along these lines, a final chapter deals with the troubling question of whether neoinstitutionalist theory can be advanced by efforts to extend or generalize neoclassical theory. The book will be essential reading for economists attracted to the NIE approach. In addition, scholars from such disciplines as political science, sociology, and law will find the work useful as the NIE continues to gain wide academic acceptance. Eirik G. Furubotn is currently serving as Research Associate, University of Texas at Arlington; he recently retired as James L. West Professor of Economics, Texas A&M University. Rudolf Richter is Professor of Economics, Center for the Study of the New Institutional Economics, University of Saarlandes. |
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內容
Introductory Observations | 1 |
11 Some Basic Assumptions and Terms | 2 |
12 The Strange World of Costless Transactions | 8 |
13 The Ideal Type of the Classical Liberal State | 11 |
14 The Ideal Type of Market Socialism | 12 |
15 Constructed or Spontaneous Orders? | 14 |
16 The Work of the Invisible Hand Can Be Accelerated | 15 |
17 Rational Incompleteness | 17 |
57 SelfEnforcing Agreements | 239 |
58 Looking Back | 246 |
59 Bibliographic Notes on Formal Contract Theory | 250 |
510 Suggested Readings for Chapter 5 | 262 |
The New Institutional Economics Applied to Markets Firms and the State General Remarks | 265 |
61 The Elementary Rules of a Private Ownership Economy | 266 |
The Firm the Market and the State | 269 |
63 A Brief Guide to the Literature on Order and Organization | 278 |
18 Enforcement | 19 |
19 The Political Process | 21 |
110 Agency | 22 |
111 Institutional Stability | 23 |
112 Once More with Feeling | 25 |
113 The New Institutional Economics and Modern Institutionalism | 29 |
114 Some Notes on the History of the Old Institutional Economics | 33 |
115 Suggested Readings for Chapter 1 | 37 |
Transaction Costs | 39 |
21 The Concept of Transaction | 41 |
Illustrations and Attempts at Definition | 42 |
23 Guesstimating the Size of Transaction Costs | 49 |
The Activity Transaction | 54 |
25 Some Notes on the Development of the TransactionCost Literature | 62 |
26 Suggested Readings for Chapter 2 | 67 |
Absolute Property Rights Ownership of Physical Objects | 69 |
Some Basic Concepts | 71 |
Illustrations and Attempts at Definition | 76 |
The Private Property Issue | 85 |
34 Common Pool Resources | 98 |
35 The Emergence of Property Rights | 104 |
Some Notes on the Literature | 114 |
37 Suggested Readings for Chapter 3 | 119 |
Relative Property Rights Contractual Obligations | 121 |
41 Basic Principles of Contractual Obligations | 123 |
42 Diverse Types of Contractual Obligations | 127 |
43 Some Elements of Contract Theory from the Economists Viewpoint | 140 |
44 Three Types of Contract Theory | 147 |
45 Resume | 169 |
Some Notes on the Literature | 172 |
47 Suggested Readings for Chapter 4 | 176 |
Contract Theory | 179 |
51 Overview of the Types of Contract Theory to Be Discussed | 181 |
The Expense Preference Model | 183 |
Moral Hazard | 186 |
Adverse Selection | 202 |
55 Implicit Contracts | 227 |
56 The Incomplete Contract Model | 232 |
64 Suggested Readings to Chapter 6 | 281 |
The New Institutional Economics of the Market | 283 |
71 The Market as Organization | 284 |
72 On Price Rigidity | 285 |
73 Market Organization as a Result of Market Cooperation | 287 |
74 Some Views of Neoinstitutionalists on Market Organization | 291 |
Conclusion and Outlook | 312 |
76 A Brief Guide to the Literature on Market Organization | 314 |
77 Suggested Readings for Chapter 7 | 319 |
The New Institutional Economics of the Firm | 321 |
82 The Incentive to Integrate | 328 |
83 The Limits of Integration | 336 |
84 Ownership and Control | 342 |
85 Institutional Models in the Tradition of the Neoclassical Theory of the Firm | 354 |
86 The Traditional Soviet Firm | 366 |
87 The Socialist LaborManaged Firm | 375 |
88 Codetermination | 389 |
Forerunners and First Steps | 404 |
Summary and Main Literature beyond Coase | 405 |
811 Suggested Readings for Chapter 8 | 410 |
The New Institutional Economics of the State | 413 |
91 A Simple Neoclassical Theory of the State | 414 |
92 The Role of Political Institutions | 417 |
93 Political Markets | 420 |
94 International Relations | 423 |
95 A Brief Guide to the Literature on the Economics of the State and International Relations | 430 |
96 Suggested Readings for Chapter 9 | 434 |
Future Development of the New Institutional Economics | 435 |
101 Institutionalism as Extended Neoclassical Theory | 439 |
102 The Initial Approach Reconsidered | 441 |
103 The Basis of a New Paradigm | 464 |
The Opportunities for Progress | 477 |
Glossary | 483 |
497 | |
539 | |
547 | |
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