The next morning at nine o'clock the Hong interpreters, a class of men known as linguists, arrived at the English factory with servants carrying ceremonial chairs. Before anyone noticed what they were doing, they took the chairs to the state reception-room, called the hall, and there arranged three of them facing south, the quarter of happy augury towards which authority always faces in China, with two rows of four chairs at right angles to them and facing east and west. When this was done, they announced that the three mandarins would take the chairs facing south and the Hong merchants the others. They were unable to answer the question where Lord Napier and his colleagues would sit, but presumed they would stand.

Mr. Astell, the secretary, hastened to inform His Lordship that a monstrous and calculated insult was intended. Napier immediately came to the hall, was astounded when he saw the chairs, and became incensed on noticing further that one row was so placed that its occupants would have their backs to the portrait of George IV. The late Governor Chu had so sat down, as was well known and remembered still with indignation, though he had later expressed regret, saying it was done inadvertently. How disingenuous had been his regret was now apparent. They were scheming to do it again.

Napier then gave his orders. A table was fetched. He would sit at it facing south with a mandarin on either hand. Mr. Astell would sit at the other side of it, facing north, with one mandarin on his right and the Second Superintendent on his left. The Hong merchants would sit in a row a little back from the table and directly face the portrait. By this arrangement no one had his back to King George. When the chairs were in their new position, Howqua, accompanied as usual by Mowqua, arrived and was shown up. As soon as he saw the chairs, he appeared much disturbed and intimated that, were the present arrangement retained, he and his fellow merchants would be blamed and squeezed. He was sure that for a trifling matter such as the position of a few chairs His Lordship would not see an old friend of British commerce victimized. Had he not said only the other day how much he disliked the Manchu domination and sympathized with His Lordship's aspirations for open trade? His Lordship was of placid temper and slow to wrath: the Viceroy himself had admitted as much. His Lordship would therefore hear him with patience when he urged that the chairs be restored to their original position. After all, His Lordship was now resident in China. By the usages of that country, mandaríns of his visitors' rank always sat facing south on such occasions as the present or else they would abdicate their rightful authority. The order of the chairs, no doubt, was what obtained in England when one official was receiving another, but here things were different, and he must ask His Lordship to consider again before he inflicted what would be taken for a deliberate affront, for which, he had already remarked, the Co-Hong would have to pay.

But Napier was not moved by this pleading to concede the smallest modification, and as it was by now eleven o'clock, the hour fixed for the visit, he took his seat at the table, being in full dress.

There followed a wait of two hours and a quarter, Napier becoming more and more impatient and angry. The mandarins were not late; throughout the East a personage of rank is never late; he just does not

arrive until two hours after the time fixed; for him to be punctual would be to compromise his dignity, though when visiting a superior in rank he must not be content with punctuality but arrive some hours early-in the case of Imperial audience, six hours early. That the mandarins should have kept Lord Napier waiting for two hours and a quarter was therefore in order, for they considered him their inferior. As the clocks were striking the quarter after one, the mandarins were ushered into the hall. The two Superintendents were seated, but rose, bowed, and requested their visitors to take the chairs set for them. It was an anxious moment. Would they do so or make objection? Whatever may be said against the Chinese senior official of that date, at least he had perfect manners when you met him and an instinctive feeling for the close connection between manners and dignity. For the mandarins when confronted with the chairs to have shown the smallest sign of surprise or vexation would have been a breach of manners, a blow to dignity and so a loss of face. With pleasant faces they seated themselves, smiling, and even protesting that the honour was too great. Lord Napier, however, ascribed their amenability to the frigates or the emissaries, the Viceroy's desire to settle or their own contemptible characters, and opened the proceedings by asking Howqua, through Dr. Morrison who was seated behind him, whether he had not been directed by them to give notice of their intention of calling at eleven o'clock. For once the millionaire was off his guard or perhaps he could not conceive of the rudeness behind the question. He replied without hesitation in the affirmative. On getting this answer, Lord Napier proceeded to rebuke the mandarins for having kept him waiting over two hours. "It is an insult to His Britannic Majesty," he said severely, glancing at the portrait of his late Majesty, George IV, "which cannot be overlooked a second time. Whereas on previous occasions you have had only to deal with the servants of a private company of merchants, you must understand henceforth that your communications will be held with the officers appointed by His Britannic Majesty, who are by no means inclined to submit to such indignities." In this last His Lordship was anticipating too hopefully, for, in fact, no further official communication was ever to be held with him.

To his reproof the mandarins made no reply. That they felt the occasion to be highly disagreeable cannot be doubted, but training and tradition enabled them to disguise their feelings and deprive him of the satisfaction of witnessing their upset.

Continuing to conduct the meeting, Lord Napier now asked the senior mandarin, who was Prefect of that quarter of the city in which the factories were situated, to be good enough to state the object of the visit. The Prefect replied that the Viceroy had ordered him to ascertain the cause of His Lordship's arrival, the nature of his business, and when he proposed to go.

In reply to the first question Napier drew their attention to the Edict of 16 January 1831, in which the then Viceroy had addressed the Select Committee of the Company through the Co-Hong and asked them, in view of their impending dissolution, to write to England and suggest that a competent head to the free merchants be appointed to manage the commerce as heretofore in conjunction with the Co-Hong. "In response to that request," said Napier, "I was appointed. Here is

the Sign Manual setting up my Commission. As to the nature of my duties, these are set out in my letter to the Viceroy, which his men refused to take delivery of at the gate and which I invite you now to deliver to His Excellency or open and read, if you prefer. The reply to the third question is that I shall go to Macao when it suits my convenience."

The Prefect replied that the late Viceroy's Edict had asked for a person of the status of merchant, so that the old system could be continued. Instead, the King of England had sent an official, granted him certain powers, and given him instructions to change the system. The system had been formulated by the Emperor. If the King of England desired to change it, he should have written to the Viceroy, explaining wherein he desired alteration, when His Imperial Majesty's orders would have been sought. Had he been bearer of such a letter, His Lordship would have been asked to remain at Macao pending instructions from the capital. If the Emperor had agreed to the proposed amendments, then he could have taken up his residence in Canton. As it was, the King of England through ignorance of the correct procedure had sent no letter but only His Lordship, who, with no less ignorance, had thought that by entering Canton without a pass and claiming as a right privileges that the Emperor, not only had not granted, but had never been asked to grant, he could change overnight regulations that had been in force for centuries.

To this lucid statement of the Chinese point of view, Lord Napier had no more convincing reply than that it would have been incompatible with his dignity for the King of England to address a letter to the Viceroy.

After some desultory argument the Prefect returned to his original point. He was not authorized to take delivery of the letter to the Viceroy, he said, for that would be contrary to the rules, but if His Lordship would inform him of its contents, he would be much obliged, for it was principally to obtain this information that the Viceroy had sent him. To this Napier replied that official matters of such importance could not be communicated by word of mouth.

This ended the call. The mandarins had been told not to take delivery of the letter and they had failed to obtain a statement of its contents; they had also failed to convince Lord Napier that his procedure was irregular and that he had no locus standi. But their manner showed no trace of annoyance or pique. They accepted Napier's invitation to partake of refreshments and over their wine appeared to be in high spirits. The noble Lord was surprised at their easy geniality and put it down to the firm line he had taken and not to their determination to maintain face to the end. When they hinted, still playing their role, that they might be waiting again on him shortly, he believed them, thinking that the Viceroy would yet yield to avoid resort to force, and, when they announced their departure, there was quite a little scene of compliments and farewells.

As soon as they were gone, Napier composed a memorandum, which he sent to London a few days later. The tone throughout is of a man who has gained a victory. If indeed he had, then this victory of the chairs was His Lordship's only victory in China.

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[From Chapter III, How Communists Negotiate. Coypright © 1955 by Admiral C. Turner Joy. The Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.]

THE LOADED AGENDA*

By C. Turner Joy

(Senior Delegate and Chief of the United Nations Command Dele-
gation, Korean Armistice Conference)

Among men who adhere to logic, an agenda is understood to be only a list of topics to be discussed, concerning which agreed conclusions are later required. For example, Americans meeting to discuss arrangements for a baseball game might adopt an agenda as follows: 1. Place the game is to be played.

2. Time the game is to start.

3. Selection of umpires.

Communists, however, would submit an agenda like this:

1. Agreement that game is to be played in Shanghai.
2. Agreement that game be played at night.

3. Agreement that umpires be Chinese officials.

Thus the Communists seek to place their negotiating opponents on the defensive from the outset. If their rigged agenda is carelessly accepted by their opponents, the Communists are able to argue that the only questions remaining are: exactly where in Shanghai the ball game is to be played, exactly what time at night the game is to start, and precisely which Chinese are to officiate. Notice how the Communists sought these advantages by such procedures at Kaesong. Consistent with their concept of an agenda as a set of conclusions, the Communists formally proposed the following as the first two items for discussion:

1. Establishment of the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line between both sides, and establishment of a demilitarized zone, as basic conditions for the cessation of hostilities in Korea.

2. Withdrawal of all armed forces of foreign countries from Korea.

Nam Il supported these two points by simply asserting that they were "basic and inseparable." He said that withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea was "a basic step toward peace." Thus the Communist concept of an agenda was a set of conclusions which would restore the situation in Korea to that obtaining before they launched their aggression.

*NOTE BY SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF.-Admiral Joy's account of the Korean Armistice Conference is based on ten months of negotiation (July 1951 to May 1952). The Conference continued in fits and starts for another year and concluded with the signing of the Armistice Document at Panmunjom on July 27, 1953.

Dialogue illustrations appearing in this chapter from Admiral Joy's book are verbatim from the records of the Armistice Conference.

In contrast, note the agenda proposals made by the United Nations Command on the same day in connection with the same two points:

1. Agreement on a demilitarized zone across Korea.

2. Cessation of hostilities and acts of armed force under conditions which will assure against resumption of hostilities in Korea.

This difference of approach gave rise to a major discussion between Nam Il and me on the first day of the conference.

ADMIRAL JOY: It is the position of the representatives of the United Nations Command that the proper order of business is to first establish the general topics which both sides agree to discuss, then subsequently to determine the specific agreement, the details. Such a case is that of the demilitarized zone. Your delegation has offered a particular demarcation line [the 38th Parallel] and a particular demilitarized zone as an agenda item. The delegation of the United Nations Command believes that first it should be agreed that discussion of some demarcation line and some demilitarized zone is desired by and agreeable to both parties. Once this general topic is agreed on, later meetings can approach the question as to which particular line and zone can be agreed upon. It is for this reason that the United Nations Command agenda contains items which only describe the general area of discussion. No effort should be made to state in an agenda what the details of these arrangements will be. Agreement to place an item on the agenda in no way commits either delegation to any specific detail. The same is the case with the demilitarized zone. Both delegations wish to discuss a demilitarized zone. Exactly where this zone shall be will become a topic of later discussion. We both can agree, however, that the general question of a demilitarized zone should be one of the items to be discussed on the agenda. At a later meeting the exact boundary definition of the demilitarized zone may be reached. I will now take up the question of the withdrawal of foreign armed forces. What do you mean by foreign armed forces? What forces do you include?

GENERAL NAM IL: Please go ahead.

ADMIRAL JOY: The various governments with armed forces in Korea operating with the United Nations Command have authorized these armed forces to be in Korea. Therefore, the withdrawal of these armed forces from Korea must be approved by those same governments, as well as by the United Nations itself. The delegation of the United Nations Command can make arrangements only pertaining to the cessation of military action of these armed forces within Korea. Only after an armistice has been agreed to and military action has ceased can the matter of withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Korea be discussed with the governments concerned. Therefore, it is our view that this matter cannot be placed upon an agenda for the military representatives to discuss.

GENERAL NAM IL: First I am going to answer the question of the foreign troops what is meant by the foreign troops. By "foreign troops" we mean all troops who are here under the permission