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[Chapter XII, Faithful Echo. Copyright © 1960 by Robert B. Ekvall. Twayne Publishers. Reprinted by permission.]

REPATRIATION OF CIVILIANS: THE SINGLE
AGREEMENT*

By Robert B. Ekvall

(Interpreter for the U.S. Negotiating Team, 1955 Geneva Ambassadorial Talks; now Honorary Curator, Asian Ethnology, Thomas Burke Memorial State Museum, University of Washington)

Choosing the right word at the conference table is a split-second decision, although in any conference, ready-made and much-worn clichés are common coin. Choice of the right word in the text of an agreed announcement or joint communiqué, on the other hand, is the end result of argument, hard semantic bargaining, and, if need be, linguistic chicanery which may at times backfire. Such hair-splitting may seem unnecessarily fine, yet it deals with reality, and the results mean loss or gain as may be seen in the agreed announcement that came out of the Sino-American talks in September of 1955.

In the summer of 1955, forty-one Americans, arrested on a variety of charges, were in Communist Chinese jails, brainwashed, broken, sick, and unwilling pawns in a series of intricate moves in power politics. On the first of August of that year, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, representing the government of the United States of America, and Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, representing the government of the People's Republic of China, together with their assistants and interpreters, met in the president's room of the Palais des Nations in Geneva to negotiate the release and return of these Americans.

The wording of the understanding which had brought the United States and the People's Republic of China face to face at a conference table was carefully impartial. The subject of the talks was to be "the return of civilians and other practical matters at issue." The formula tacitly admitted the fiction that there were Chinese civilians in the United States who would equally benefit, though as a matter of fact no Chinese were being similarly held in the United States. At the first meeting, after procedural matters had been settled, it was agreed that the return of civilians would constitute the first item of the agenda.

*NOTE BY SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF.-The Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial Talks in Geneva to secure the release of the Americans in China took place August 1, 1955 to September 10, 1955. The exchanges in these meetings are still secret, so this first-hand account by Colonel Robert B. Ekvall, an ingenious interpreter, is of special interest.

Washington and Peking concluded an agreement in six weeks of hard negotiations. This single agreement (the only concluded transaction which the U.S. has had on a government-to-government basis with Peking) was promptly violated by Peking, from the American standpoint, and became a matter of bitter dispute between the two countries. Peking did not immediately release the American prisoners, as the Americans sincerely thought the agreement meant, and the prisoners were dribbled out of China over a long period of time. As of 1969 a few Americans were still in Chinese jails.

It was also agreed that the meetings would be private in nature, that is, disagreement would remain within the conference room and only agreements would be publicly announced.

The subject appeared too simple and uncomplicated to be true. It wasn't; or at least not entirely so. Behind this simple façade was the extremely complicated range of the different postures, diverse motivations, and opposed policy objectives of the two governments. The summary of these differing motivations and objectives which follows is not an official one; nor is it one admissible by either side. It is a distillation of all the ideas and impressions left in the mind of this interpreter by reason of his function and has validity only in that context as his personal opinion.

The Americans wished to secure the release of all their nationals held in Communist Chinese jails while according the minimum possible degree of recognition-quasi-diplomatic, de facto, or whatever other sort to the People's Republic of China and at the same time move forward as slowly as possible-always talking, however, rather than risking war-in negotiation and agreement on whatever else might be comprehended within the term "other practical matters at issue."

The Chinese, by the calculated piecemeal release of the Americans at a rate designed to bring the most benefit in support of their objectives, wished to gain the maximum advantage from an accumulation of quasi-diplomatic contacts and exchanges, such as a well-publicized official contact in regular meetings and the issuance of statements of mutual agreement. The sum total of all this would be an impressive picture of the United States and the People's Republic of China, in increasing harmony, moving toward settlement of such matters as embargo and cultural exchange and finally arriving at a meeting at the foreign ministers level which, inferentially, could only result in de jure as well as de facto recognition. Such a sequence would enhance the international status of the People's Republic of China and, as a useful by-product, would arouse aggravation, frustration, and mounting suspicion of United States motives and policy in the very heart of the government of the Republic of China in Taiwan.

Such was the background, agreed agenda, and masked motives of the talks which began in August of 1955. The talks were not like those of Panmunjom, for though the two interpreters had both been there, everything else was different and the atmosphere was relaxed and easy. With urbanity and even the minimal social amenities the talks moved slowly toward the first agreement.

First, of course, we reached "agreement in principle," which only means that both sides agree to keep on talking. Then we reached agreement "in substance," but much of that substance was unformed, eluding definition. Then, section by section, paragraph by paragraph, and finally, sentence by sentence and clause by clause, the substance of agreement was defined. On the day before the announcement would be made only agreement on two or three words remained as a task not yet finished. That completed, the first agreement between the governments of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China-fashioned, however, as two separate parallel statements by the respective governments-would be ready for announcement to the world.

Propaganda and fictions held as fact frequently victimize their authors quite as much as the intended dupes. The fiction, held as basic truth by the Chinese, that the Chinese language is internationally equal with English, while possessing a certain validity at the conference table, was a handicap when addressing world public opinion and led to strange linguistic maneuvering with unforeseen consequences.

One item of critical importance in the agreement was when or how soon the civilians would "exercise their right to return." Our aim was the immediate: hours of close and sometimes bitter argument and probing had been spent in trying to determine just when all those who had suffered so long and hoped so long in vain in Chinese jails could expect release. But the stubborn refusal of the Chinese ruled out immediacy for all, though promising it for some. Much hope had been held out, however, that all could leave very soon after we reached agreement on the announcement; such an announcement in itself would be sign and proof of bettered relations between the two countries. In the English text originally proposed by the United States negotiator, the phrase used was "promptly to exercise their right to return." A Chinese rendering of the word "promptly" was a matter of some difficulty. The word for "promptly" in the most common Chinese use also means "immediately" and we knew that would not be accepted. In the course of explanation, we defined "promptly" in terms of "without delay." But the Chinese would not accept such a definition and rejected the word "promptly" in the English text because it implied a command. Such had not been our intent but, belatedly, it was realized that in certain contexts the word "prompt" did mean something like an order, or at least more than a diplomatic nudge. Disclaiming all intent to give commands, we agreed to drop "promptly."

In the English text which the Chinese proposed the phrase "as soon as possible" was one we could not accept. Although "soon" was what we wanted, we did not want it dependent on the "possible" which introduced a new concept, not of time but of possibility. The attention of both sides then focused on the term used in the Chinese text proposed by the Chinese. It was a compound, chin-su, chin, utmost, and su, fast. It seemed to embody just what we were seeking, and I proposed as its English equivalent "very quickly."

The Chinese felt constrained to consult among themselves and after some discussion countered with their own suggestion. The need to have the last word seems to be one of the compulsions of their negotiating posture. They are never willing to accept what has been suggested by the other side when it is in conformity with their own desires but feel compelled to suggest something that bears their own trademark. In this instance they should have let well enough alone, for they suggested "expeditiously."

It was the best of words for us. In addition to the idea of "quickly," which was all the Chinese had in mind, it had connotations of efficacy and efficient action far beyond anything we had sought to gain in the word "promptly." It was strong, and as the club they offered us for use, "expeditiously" was heavier than we could have hoped for. The weight of the phrase "expeditiously to exercise their right to return" has pressed strongly ever since on a world opinion that still knows English better than it knows Chinese and which has never noticed, if

it ever heard, that chin-su only means "utmost speed" with no overtones of efficacy and efficient action.

The proposal to have a third power in each capital, Washington and Peking, designated to exercise certain subsidiary functions in the implementation of the agreed announcement, was originally a Chinese suggestion. They probably-though this cannot be proven-expected to derive benefits not listed as the function of the third power. By specifying that India be the third power charged with implementing certain matters in Washington they may have hoped to involve the Indian Embassy in Washington in irritating démarches with the United States Department of State on controversial matters, thereby creating ill will between the two governments. They also may have hoped that by the designation of the Indian government as in some way representing the interest of the government of the People's Republic of China in Washington it would give that government the semblance of being responsible for all Chinese in the United States, in this way making it appear to the Chinese authorities on Formosa that an additional bit of de facto recognition had been gained for the People's Republic of China.

The United States side accepted the suggestion about the third power arrangement both because it was to our interest to appear reasonable when it could be done without giving in on principle, and because it was also felt that it would be a real advantage to have the United Kingdom's representative in Peking recognized as having the right, under certain circumstances, to make representations to the government of the People's Republic of China on behalf of American civilians in China.

Concealed within the agreement to incorporate the third power arrangement within the agreed announcement were two different points of view about just how the two third powers were to be brought into the picture.

The United States position was that the government of the area wherein the third power would function should give permission or authorize the representative of that power to act. Thus the government of the United States would authorize the Indian Embassy in Washington under certain conditions to give aid to, or make representations on behalf of, certain Chinese civilians in the United States. In turn, the government of the People's Republic of China would give permission to the office of the United Kingdom Chargé in Peking to act similarly on behalf of American civilians in China.

The Chinese position was that the government of the persons involved should ask the third power to undertake those functions on behalf of its nationals. Thus the government of the People's Republic of China would ask the government of India to instruct the Indian Embassy in Washington to look after Chinese civilians in the United States; similarly, the government of the United States would ask the government of the United Kingdom to instruct the office of the United Kingdom Chargé in Peking to look after civilians in China.

The basic conflict in these two positions was never clearly brought to the conference table. Both sides preferred to let sleeping dogs lie and glossed over the real issue, hoping to gain later advantage. And in this equivocal state of affairs we arrived at the problem of wording the substantive sentence in the text of the agreed announcement.

The wording originally proposed by the American side read in English "shall be authorized," and the suggested Chinese language version was closely equivalent-something like "shall receive authority." By whom that authority was granted, or from whom received, was a sleeping dog carefully left undisturbed.

The English text proposed by the Chinese side read "shall be entrusted" but omitted the prepositional phrase necessary to qualify the meaning of the verb "entrust." The use of prepositions in English is a particularly tricky matter for Chinese, who prefer to ignore them even when they are most proficient in the language. In the Chinese text the term they proposed was wei-t'o (mandated).

The fundamental confrontation of the two terms "authorized" and "mandated" had brought the essential conflict of viewpoints to the conference table, albeit disguised as a textual matter. If the third power were "authorized," that authorization would logically be given by the government of the country in which the function was to be exercised. If the third power, however, were "mandated," a case could be made that the mandating should be done by the government having proprietary interest in the persons concerned.

Throughout the argument about the text, the English word "mandated" was never used by the Chinese English-language interpreter. The omission had some justification. The Chinese compound wei-t'o has a much larger semantic content than its newly assigned modern meaning of "mandate." The first syllable means to designate a representative and appears in many combinations that have reference to members of representative bodies or membership on official commissions. The second syllable is essentially an honorific, politely signifying beseech. It appears in such phrases as "I place myself in your hands" or "I abandon myself to your grace.'

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The Chinese side was easily induced to drop the English word "entrusted." As tactfully as possible it was pointed out that without the preposition "with" the sentence was ungrammatical and incomplete and would require the addition of another qualifying clause in a text already trimmed and forged to near completion.

Apparently on the assumption that I did not know the mandate significance of wei-t'o, the Chinese took the line that a sense of politeness alone was the reason for its use in the text. "Authorized" was harsh and overbearing, lacking in courtesy. After all, we were asking others to do something for us. The real meaning of wei-t'o was merely "to invite politely."

The Chinese language is rich in polite variants and words meaning "to invite." I offered Ambassador Wang a number of these, including one so flowery and ornate a part of the grand ceremony of an imperial past, that he laughed out loud and said I was too old-fashioned. By then they were sure I did not know the new mandate meaning of wei-t'o.

Eventually we agreed to leave wei-t'o in the Chinese text. But it had been so carefully defined as "invite" that the Chinese by their own logic were constrained to accept it as such in the English text which then read "shall be invited."

It was a neutral and unpretentious word but by its meaning the United States government invited the Indian Embassy in Washington

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