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to undertake certain functions on behalf of Chinese in the United States who wished to return to mainland China. The fact of this invitation was widely publicized as part of the third power arrange

ment.

A few days later at the next meeting when the Chinese howled in protest and said the government of the United States should have invited the government of the United Kingdom Chargé in Peking, we politely agreed that if they wanted us to invite the government of the United Kingdom we would do that, too. We had thought that was what they were to do, but if they did not wish to extend an invitation, in the interests of politeness, and to aid the implementation of the agreed announcement, we were willing to invite any and everybody. Nobody, however was mandated.

The restrictive meaning of "mandated" never stood a chance. None of the correspondents who read the bulletin on the press board of the Palais des Nations could read wei-t'o in Chinese, but all understood the English word "invite," and so invite it was to the world at large. who read the world press. Mandated never got off the ground, and after a few days even the Chinese gave up the argument.

From now on the word "invite" has a special place in my memory. But one thing more I also surely know: never again will the Chinese accept any word I proffer them across the table. At least they will give it a very long second look. Maybe, too, they now realize that I did know the modern, limited meaning of "mandate" for the word wei-t'o, which they had tried so glibly to explain away.

[From Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era. Prentice-Hall, Inc. Copyright © 1962 by The RAND Corporation. Reprinted by permission.]

THE TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS

AND

PEKING'S ATTITUDE TOWARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS
By Alice Langley Hsieh

(Senior Staff Member, Social Science Department, The RAND
Corporation)

To the decision-makers in Peking, the Soviet technological-military breakthrough in the second half of 1957 must have appeared to signal the end of a period during which the combined requirements of China's internal economic program and the external balance of power seriously reduced the range of techniques available to her for affecting the international scene. The shift in the balance of forces, which they confidently believed had occurred, was now expected to provide them with new and more flexible areas for political and military maneuvering behind the shield of Soviet nuclear power. If the Chinese did not overestimate the strategic importance of the change, they certainly miscalculated the manner in which the Soviet Union was prepared to exploit its new position. Thus, Peking's evaluation of Soviet military-technical developments provides the key to China's more bellicose attitude in late 1957 and, at the same time, to China's apparently frustrating relationship with the Soviet Union since then. While free politically to some extent to exploit what they regarded as a strengthened Soviet position, the Chinese could not take for granted that the Soviet Union would use its nuclear power to advance China's political and military ambitions. Control of the Soviet deterrent shield remained with the Soviet Union. The latter, notably in the 1958 Quemoy crisis, did not appear prepared to see a situation develop where they might become involved in a nuclear war because of China's political and military ambitions.

Nor did the Soviet Union appear willing to grant its partner a finished nuclear weapons capability. While it may have agreed to step up assistance to China's indigenous program for the development of a nuclear weapons production capability, its ambivalence with respect to the prospect of China's future possession of nuclear weapons was reflected in its proposal to the Chinese of an alternative strategy—that of an Asian atom-free zone.

Such an approach was obviously unacceptable to the Chinese and by the spring of 1958 it was clear that Peking was prepared to continue on the premise that the only road to an independent nuclear weapons capability was by way of a broadly based indigenous materials and development program-even though such a program relied on Soviet

assistance. Meanwhile, pending the day when China could produce her own nuclear weapons, Peking had no option but to accept a transitional strategy that recognized China's relatíve military weakness and called for military caution (though permitting carefully controlled probing actions) and continued reliance on the Soviet Union's deterrent posture. It was within this context that China carried out operations against Quemoy in the summer of 1958.

THE 1958 TAIWAN CRISIS

In retrospect it would appear that in addition to pacifying the Chinese on the Middle East crisis (the Chinese were obviously dissatisfied with Moscow's failure to forestall United States intervention in Lebanon), the purpose of Khrushchev's sudden visit to Peking [and his meeting with Mao, July 31 to August 3, 1958] was to discourage the Chinese from precipitating operations in the Taiwan Strait. While little is known of specific Moscow and Peking estimates of the military situation at the time, it would appear likely that the Soviet Union preferred to avoid any risk of involvement in war with the United States, and for this reason was not prepared to give the Chinese any commitment that might encourage them to pursue operations in the area. Peking no doubt had hoped for a Soviet commitment. Even though this was not forthcoming it was still prepared to gamble on the possibility that the United States might deny itself the use of nuclear weapons at least with respect to the off-shore islands. In other words, the 1958 Taiwan venture was to give every appearance of being another probing operation designed to test United States (and Chinese Nationalist) determination to hold the islands, as well as America's tactical nuclear intentions in the area. If the United States failed to respond, the Chinese would be in the position of having demonstrated to the Russians that the latter's estimate of the situation had been incorrect.1 But Peking was to take no moves that might have invited nuclear retaliation; in fact, careful precautions were taken against such a risk....

On August 23, the heavy bombardment of Quemoy began. Between August 22 and September 7, the Chinese domestic press and radio avoided all reference to the possibility of nuclear war, to the use of nuclear weapons in the Taiwan Strait crisis, or to the United States. nuclear build-up there. Yet in late August, reports were being carried in The New York Times that the Essex and four destroyers were being detached from the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean to join the 7th Fleet in the Far East and that the United States was enhancing its nuclear capability in the area. On September 1, The New York Times quoted

1 Other reasons sometimes advanced to explain Peking's precipitation of the 1958 Quemoy crisis include: (1) by inviting an American blow against the mainland, to blackmail the Soviet Union into expanding its military commitment to China, including recognition of Peking's nuclear weapons requirements; and (2) to stimulate greater popular support for the commune program. In view of Mao's two meetings with Khrushchev and the probability that the Soviet position was clearly stated on each occasion, it appears doubtful that the Chinese could seriously have expected the "blackmail" technique to prove successful or to have been willing to assume the risks such a technique might have involved. To the author, it appears more reasonable to formulate the issue as between the Chinese and the Russians in the context of "testing-demonstration." The commune theory, which would explain Chinese foreign policy purely in terms of internal developments, conveniently ignores the sequence of developments in China's external and military policies over the previous eight years, more particularly the period since mid-1957. 2 The New York Times, August 28, 1958.

a United States naval officer in Taipei: "You can say that, in view of post-war developments in weapons, this fleet [the 7th] will have the biggest striking power in history." On August 29, Pravda reported the dispatch of the Essex to the Taiwan area. On August 31, Pravda warned that "he who today tries to threaten an attack against the CPR [PRC] must not forget that he is threatening the Soviet Union also" and asserted that the "Soviet Union will give the CPR the necessary moral and material help in its just struggle,' " 5 but did not commit the Russians to any specific military response. On September 4, in commenting on his official statement made earlier that day at Newport, Secretary of State Dulles indicated that the United States would help defend Quemoy and Matsu if Chinese Nationalist garrisons there proved unequal to the task. At the same time, he made it clear that an area commander would require specific permission from President Eisenhower before using tactical nuclear weapons-an issue that had been awaiting clarification since August 28 when the President had initially been queried on this score in the context of continuing press reports of a United States nuclear buildup in the Taiwan Strait area. Coincident with Secretary Dulles' comments of September 4, some reevaluation of the military situation and of United States intentions appears to have taken place in Peking. On September 6, some days before the Chinese blockade of Quemoy was effectively breached, Chou En-lai indicated that his government was prepared to resume ambassadorial talks with the United States. At the same time, Chou unmistakably suggested a distinction between the off-shore islands and Taiwan (a distinction that was to be maintained for another two weeks), thus, further indicating a desire to reduce tension in the area." It was only then that Khrushchev made his deterrent threat-only after the peak danger point in the crisis had been passed, only after the risk that any threat might have to be implemented had been much reduced. In his letter of September 7 to President Eisenhower, Khrushchev accused the United States of resorting to atomic blackmail against China and stated for the first time that "an attack on the People's Republic of China . . . is an attack on the Soviet Union." 8 Had Khrushchev's enunciation of the Soviet deterrent posture in relation to China come before September 6, it might have constituted a dangerous gesture, for it might have been difficult for the Soviet Union to predict the United States reaction to it. Moscow could well have felt that such a threat, issued at the height of the crisis, might cause the United States to miscalculate Soviet intentions and to resort to reckless action with unforeseeable consequences. After Chou's proposal to resume political talks, however, the Soviet Union had reason to assume that the United States would evaluate Khrushchev's statement in the framework of reduced tensions.

After. September 6, the military phase of the crisis continued, but with certain significant differences, much as the context of Korean

8 The New York Times, September 1, 1958.

+ Pravda, August 29, 1958.

5 Pravda, August 31, 1958.

& The New York Times, September 5, 1958.

7 NCNA, Peking. September 6, 1958, in SCMP, No. 1851, September 11, 1958, pp. 1-2. 8 The New York Times, September 9, 1958.

warfare had changed after the opening of talks. Moreover, Chinese domestic comment resumed its references to atomic weapons in connection with the Taiwan Strait crisis only after the Khrushchev letter. On September 7, P'eng Chen, the mayor of Peking, asserted that "the United States war maniacs even clamor openly that they will not scruple to use atomic weapons to extend their aggression and practice war threats." 10 In the days following, Ta Kung Pao and Jen-min Jihpao warned that the United States could not intimidate the Chinese people with its atomic bombs.11 From then on, the Chinese press and radio talked freely of "United States atomic blackmail" and the United States nuclear buildup in the area. Simultaneously, wide publicity was given to Khrushchev's assertion that an attack on the PRC was an attack on the Soviet Union.

As the Taiwan Strait crisis moved more and more into a political phase, with the resumption of ambassadorial talks at Warsaw, Khrushchev became more outspoken in defining the character of the Soviet Union's deterrent posture. In his letter of September 19 to President Eisenhower he said:

As I had noted in my previous message, some American military leaders are even trying to threaten China with atomic weapons. Press reports say that units of the American Air Force equipped with nuclear weapons are rushed to Taiwan as well as various rocket and guided missiles of the Nike-Hercules type, missile launching ramps are built, etc.

Such action of the United States Government naturally cannot reduce tension in this area, improve the general climate, or create the conditions for greater confidence. On the contrary, these actions tend to aggravate the situation and increase the danger of an outbreak of war involving the use of the most destructive modern weapons.

I must tell you outright, Mr. President, that atomic blackmail with regard to the People's Republic of China will intimidate neither us nor the People's Republic of China. Those who harbor plans of an atomic attack on the People's Republic of China should not forget that the other side too has atomic and hydrogen weapons and the appropriate means to deliver them and, if the People's Republic of China falls victim to such an attack, the aggressor will at once get rebuffed by these same means. . . .

I had told you earlier and feel it necessary to stress once more, that an attack on the People's Republic of China is an attack on the Soviet Union. We have a treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance with the great friend, ally, and neighbor of our country, a treaty meeting the fundamental interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples, the interests of peace, and may no one doubt that we shall completely honor our commitments.12

Khrushchev did not give the slightest implication that "the other side" in possession of atomic and hydrogen weapons was the PRC. The Chinese reaction to his letter followed the familiar pattern of

A detailed analysis of the interlocking nature of the military, political, and propagandistic developments in the several phases and subphases of the Taiwan Strait crisis is beyond the scope of this study. At least three major military phases, however, can be identified: (1) August 23 to September 6; (2) September 7 to October 6; and (3) the period after October 6. Parallel to this general military phasing there appear to have been several important political-propagandistic subphases (for example, the distinction between Quemoy and Taiwan from September 6 to September 20, and the identification of Quemoy and Taiwan from September 20 onward), which may be evidence of shifts in emphasis in response to international opinion.

10 NCNA, Peking. September 7, 1958.

11 Ta Kung Pao, September 8, 1958: Jen-min Jih-pao, September 9, 1958. 12 The New York Times, September 20, 1958.

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