nese Communist negotiating style. According to Mao, the process of development of everything exists in and by contradictions between opposites, which in all but a few exceptions move inevitably toward a new beginning "in a never ending series of dualities." In his words: "Contradiction and struggle are universal, absolute, but the methods of solving them, that is, the forms of struggle differ according to the nature of the contradiction."3 Mao has made the notion of constant and desirable struggle towards a goal the core of his life and thought since he became a Communist in the early 1920s. This ideology of contradiction and struggle molds and dictates the automatic response of the Communist state of mind in the Central Committee or at the negotiating table. In Mao's own oft-quoted words, repeated in Peking again in October 1966: The socialist system will eventually replace the capitalist system; this is an objective law independent of man's will. However much the reactionaries try to hold back the wheel of history, sooner or later revolution will take place and will inevitably triumph.* Accordingly, all the world is divided into two parts, or two camps, in the doctrine according to Mao. And never the twain shall meet when the split involves "imperalism" and socialism. The beginning and the end of our story of United States dealings with Communist China illustrate this Maoist dialectic view of the world. In Ambassador Johnson's original meeting with the Chinese Communists in Geneva, he arranged the chairs more or less in a circle just so as to avoid the dialectic division into two sides and facilitate a more informal give-and-take than had obtained at Panmunjom. But when their turn came to arrange the next meeting, the Chinese Communists placed the chairs so that the opposing sides again confronted each other across a divide. The Panmunjom bisection and stalemate has lasted ever since. A decade later, in September 1965, Foreign Minister Chen Yi concluded a remarkable news conference, after violently attacking the United States, by telling the world that it had to choose between "two alternatives": the reimposition of colonial shackles under United States imperialism or the waging of "resolute struggles" to defeat United States imperialism. Chou En-lai's declaration in 1966 ended our story in the same dichotomy." Despite the availability of much factual information, the Chinese Communist leaders must fit every development into the LeninistMaoist mold. Despite their collection of facts, they seem to make little if any logical deductions from what others would call the criteria of objective analysis and empirical observation of the real world. In the American phrase, they know all the answers. Because of their discipline and dogma, the Chinese Communist representative believes in his infallibility. The American negotiator, accordingly, can expect his Chinese Communist opposite number to adhere rigidly to a whole set of doctrinal preconceptions and ideological behavior patterns. Although many contradictions can be reconciled, the struggle between the two camps is the cardinal exception in the dogma. It excludes any lasting compromise, doctrinal acceptance, or basic reconciliation and accommodation. The Chinese Communist Party definitively stated 3 John W. Lewis, Major Doctrines of Communist China (New York: W. W. Norton & Co.). p. 89. Peking Review. Vol. IX, No. 44. October 28, 1966, p. 7. 5 Same, Vol. VIII, No. 41, October 8, 1965, p. 14. the Maoist doctrine of international contradictions during the SinoSoviet ideological dispute in the summer of 1963 when Peking listed the contradiction between the "socialist" camp and the "imperialist" camp first in the contemporary world scene. The struggle between two fundamentally different social systems-socialism and capitalismwas conceived a priori to be "very sharp." Peaceful "all round" negotiation and lasting coexistence with the United States were out of the question. It should never be extended to apply to the relations between oppressed and oppressor nations, between oppressed and oppressor countries or between oppressed and oppressor classes, and never be described as the main content of the transition from capitalism to socialism, still less should it be asserted that peaceful co-existence is mankind's road to socialism. The reason is that it is one thing to practise peaceful co-existence between countries with different social systems. It is absolutely impermissible and impossible for countries practising peaceful co-existence to touch even a hair of each other's social system. . . . The class struggle, the struggle for national liberation and the transition from capitalism to socialism in various countries are quite another thing. They are all bitter, life-and-death revolutionary struggles which aim at changing the social system. Peaceful coexistence cannot replace the revolutionary struggles of the people. The transition from capitalism to socialism in any country can only be brought about through the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat in that country. In the application of the policy of peaceful co-existence, struggles between the socialist and imperialist countries are unavoidable in the political, economic and ideological spheres, and it is absolutely impossible to have "all-round-cooperation." 6 997 Since struggle, antagonism and contradiction must have a specific opposite, Maoism has singled out the United States, particularly since 1960, as the "enemy" of socialism and Communist China. This is the cardinal thesis, always expressed in violent terms. For example, the Chinese Communist party stated in another letter to the Soviet party during their polemics of 1963 that "the United States imperialists are the wildest militarists of modern times, the wildest plotters of a new world war and the most ferocious enemy of world peace." In March 1966 the Chinese Communist party again accused the Soviet Union of aligning itself with "United States imperialism, the main enemy of the people of the world," while the party's Central Committee officially declared in August that "U.S. imperialism is the most ferocious common enemy of the peoples of the whole world." 8 In November, disregarding President Johnson's appeals for better relations, Chou En-lai repeated this label. This Maoist image of the United States has been well summed up by Professor Franz Schurmann: Given China's revolutionary status and role in the world, the Chinese Communists regard the enmity between the United States and China as fundamental. This does not mean that they believe a major war between these two countries is necessarily in the offing. Following their own experiences which gave them victory only after decades of struggle, they see this enmity lasting for years and William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1964), pp. 275-276. 7 Same, p. 481. 8 The New York Times, March 24, 1966, and August 14, 1966. Peking Review, Vol. IX, No. 47, November 18, 1966. decades. Periods of peace and even collaboration between the two The man from Peking evidently negotiates in the conviction that the United States government and "United States imperialism" constitute the unchanging enemy of the People's Republic of China to be beaten in negotiations, and destroyed in fact. With this ideology, Maoist diplomacy and negotiating style completely express Mao's political philosophy stated in his simple, notorious phrase that "political power comes out of the barrel of a gun." Glorifying martial virtues and military tactics, the Sinocentric, Maoist and revolutionary diplomat considers negotiation, at least with Americans, an eventual death struggle for the adversary and not a joint benefit for both parties. He has no feeling for his American adversary nor any interest in his case. He indulges in the language of invective and exhausts the vocabulary of the extreme.† Such negotiation resembles a classical military campaign and a conventional military maneuver. The goal is total defeat of the adversary by complete victory. The mission of revolutionary diplomacy is unremitting, implacable effort by diplomatic guerrilla warfare to secure this ultimate triumph no matter how long stalemate and capitulation may take. Tactically, this kind of negotiator tries to outflank his opponent, demoralize and weaken him by every conceivable means at every possible point, take over his strategic position, separate him from allies, leave him no exit, and give him no quarter. Such militant and militaristic diplomacy makes short shrift of mutual confidence, truthful exchange, or fair dealing. Capitulation for the adversary replaces compromise in the revolutionary diplomacy, which views an adversary's concession as a step toward his inevitable defeat rather than a way of accommodation toward a mutual settlement. Where adjustments by bargaining and compromise to reach a durable understanding are scorned, extremes instead of middle points are prized. Mao's martial ideology is difficult and even impossible to deal with not only because of the uncompromising thesis of struggle and doom, but also because of his rigid and unchanging beliefs. Biographers or observers of Mao Tse-tung over the past decades concur on the static quality of his opinions and attitudes. He has remained "the prisoner of his own history," according to Robert Payne in his biography of Mao." Mark Gayn, who has interviewed Mao, described this key 10 Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p. 44. +His vocabulary can include any or all of the following words to attack the American position: absurd, audacious, fantastic, ridiculous, deceitful, dishonest, distorted, shameful, insincere, intolerable, invidious, impertinent, mendacious, malicious, rapacious, slanderous, preposterous, lecherous, scandalous, vicious, stupid, nonsensical, treacherous, perfidious, etc., through the thesaurus. In the Ambassadorial Talks, Peking's Ambassador has labeled serious American proposals as a "trick," "conspiracy," "fraud," "swindle," and "sham." 11 Robert Payne, Portrait of a Revolutionary: Mao Tse-tung (New York: AbelardSchuman, rev. ed., 1961), p. 277. Arthur A. Cohen in The Communism of Mao Tse-tung (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Edition, 1966) describes Mao's thought as tedious, unoriginal, childish, and platitudinous. factor for understanding the lack of ideological change or dialogue in Communist China: This unchanged doctrinal approach is an essential fact in any new assessment of Mao Tse-tung. It is as if time had stood still for him and his companions, and they were still totally isolated from all reality except that of their own limited domain." 12 In short, the United States government and the American negotiator are dealing with a closed mind in which conceptual thinking and logical analysis have not developed or matured for over a generation. The world has changed but Maoist ideology has enclosed China within a new ideological wall. It is designed to keep out change and to preserve the pristine state of mind shaped by Mao in his early days. Maoist ideology thus insulates Chinese negotiators from understanding the rapidly evolving modern world while it reinforces their ability to repeat the doctrine endlessly in dealings and negotiations with the United States. PEKING'S DUALISTIC CONCEPT OF NEGOTIATIONS If China's aging and revolutionary ideologists view the United States government so belligerently and absolutely, how can they possibly negotiate with Washington on anything? Is it not a total contradiction in terms for Peking to treat with "the main enemy of the people," or negotiate for "peaceful negotiations" with this "ferocious" adversary as Peking tried to do in the 1955-56 exchanges over renunciation of force? Peking's theory and practice of negotiating with the United States have indeed seemed contradictory, and this is part of the problem of having to reconcile ideology and national interest. Peking's policy-makers and negotiators, as in the case of all governments, have had to handle both these determinants. Even for such ideologically and historically minded men as the revolutionary leaders of Communist China, these components of foreign policy are full of variables and vagaries. The leaders have shown a considerable capacity in operating practically and flexibly without becoming totally trapped in the dogmas and rigidities of either Maoist ideology or national interest. A. M. Halpern, an authority on Communist China's foreign policy, is inclined to believe that Peking does tend to formulate its actions in foreign policy in terms of a long-range judgment "of how they will contribute to the complete liquidation of imperialism." With long-range objectives in mind, the Chinese Communists tend to emphasize the potential long-term development of situations much more than current relationships. Moreover, they appear to favor courses of action which will realize maximum long-range gains even at the expense of losing or deferring immediate advantages. In a word, the Peking policy-makers are "mini-max" operators. Accordingly, they deal with the United States on both a minimum basis of gaining some tactical immediate advantage at the same time that they seek the maximum long-range objective of major concessions from Washington. 12 Mark Gayn, "Peking Has a Yenan Complex," The New York Times Magazine, January 30, 1966. See also Mark Gayn, "Mao Tse-tung Reassessed," a working paper for the China Conference (Chicago, February 8-12, 1966), in Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, eds., Communist China: Revolutionary Reconstruction and International Confrontation, 1949 to the Present (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1967), p. 92-108. An illustration of this dualistic concept of negotiations and "minimax" treatment of the United States appeared in the secret work bulletins issued to the Chinese army in 1961. Prepared and circulated only for Chinese with a relatively high level of education and sophistication, these instructions are cited here to show this differentiated treatment: We should have no illusions about imperialism. With regard to the The present situation is to stand firm against the United States At present, there is a note in international affairs sounding a call The policy of our country towards the United States must also be 13 Indeed, a long series of public Chinese Communist statements made over many years likewise have implied this qualified kind of coexistence, which theoretically is, of course, unconditional. The explanation for this lies in the Maoist differentiation of two different sorts of coexistence and negotiation. Among various Socialist governments and peoples the resolution of basic contradictions and the reaching of "allaround agreements" are desirable and necessary. This is strategic or general negotiation and coexistence in the Maoist sense. On the other hand, coexistence and negotiation with the United States and other "imperialistic and reactionary forces" are purely tactical, only possible in a limited, highly qualified sense. They are exclusively tactical and expedient strategems in the long-range strategy of bringing about the inevitable extinction and disappearance of United States "imperialism." Peking's statements must be interpreted in the total context of Marxist-Maoist ideology in order to avoid confusion over seemingly contradictory semantics. For example, a Chinese Communist leader can declare that antagonism toward the imperialists is a "life-anddeath matter" because there can be no "live and let live or actual co-existence and friendly cooperation." But, on the other hand, Peking 13 J. Chester Cheng, ed., The Politics of the Chinese Red Army (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1966), pp. 480-2. |