tical, we need to formulate a new understanding and strategy to cope with Peking's adversary negotiations. The Chinese Communists adversary style can indeed be "foxy" and "wolfish" in treating with the "imperialist" negotiator as a carefullydefined expedient or a well-timed temporary retreat. According to Mao Tse-tung: "First to go back and then get a better run for a bigger leap for- The line and the movement have a single objective: total and final victory. The Chinese negotiators and policy-makers do not seem to consider cooperative negotiations and concessions as valid bargaining devices to find a common ground for genuine and lasting agreement, or for seeking a compromise of principles in order to conclude a basic agreement. For example, the Agreement on prisoners in 1955 was a short-term tactical link in the long-range design to surround Taiwan, while the refusal after 1960 to make any more such tactical or expedient agreements on newsmen or bilateral contacts undoubtedly reflected Peking's changed estimate of the limited value of short-term gains. As our experience has shown, the Chinese Communists have not negotiated or signed agreements, whether on prisoners, renunciation of force, the offshore islands, disarmament or Vietnam, which precluded Peking from ever reaching the top of the mountain, i.e., total victory, to paraphrase Lenin. Dogmatically and fanatically, the Chinese Maoist negotiator appears to assume that the American negotiator is similarly motivated in viewing China as the adversary to be beaten, destroyed, and never appeased. Thus, in the typical Chinese Communist martial and adversary outlook, neither representative is seen as regarding the other as a negotiator on equal and acceptable terms. Nor is the other side a "party to negotiations" in a normal framework on a bona fide basis, as Westerners put it. Only hostile motives and irrevocable goals determine the strategy and techniques of both sides according to Peking's views. In any such contest of categorical extremes and ideological ultimates, if the ground rules are not modified by both parties, concessions will never be made by either side. The United States negotiator will get nowhere with unilateral expressions of good will, sincere intentions, and conciliatory assurances. His honest efforts to achieve "a negotiated settlement" in good faith will seem fraudulent and deceitful to the Peking negotiator, who is preconditioned to consider American overtures and genuine compromises inconsistent with imperative struggle and inevitable defeat of the United States government. He takes for granted from incessant indoctrination that any concession or conciliatory gesture by Washington is nothing but sham and evidence of weakness. In such mortal combat, the United States could 19 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works. not conceivably and voluntarily yield any advantage except by force. An American concession in Peking's usual view would only be a "trick" or "conspiracy" on Washington's part to weaken and overturn Peking. To make the normal cooperative negotiating process more rational and a concession more credible, the American negotiator often appeals to the law of nations, the standard principles of international negotiations or the general ethic and comity of interstate relations. None of them works in adversary negotiation with Peking. Unfortunately, no shared basis of international equity or relationship exists in negotiations with the Chinese Communists. Instead, the man from Peking applies the "immutable sanctity" of the "morality" of Marxist-Maoism, which justifies all expedients and concessions necessary to bring about the eventual destruction of the non-Communist system and the establishment of a world classless society at the final stage of communism. According to this fundamental premise, the negotiation or execution of any form of diplomatic agreement with the United States or other non-Communist governments is not a contract or obligation which needs to be fulfilled fully or faithfully under any "bourgeois" law of equity. A revolutionary ethic is Peking's only guide. That is non-negotiable. No amount of empirical argumentation, marshalling of data, and bargaining concessions has yet moderated the irreconcilable difference between Peking's style and ours. Communist China typifies a new kind of state, organized and moti- Two totally different versions of the facts and two utterly opposite standards of truth are opposed across the negotiating table. Mistrust and suspicion becloud any gesture of accommodation. Consequently, the Chinese Communist negotiator easily and subtly applies a double standard of Marxist-Maoist morality. This is more than the technique of negotiating the same issue twice. Whatever promotes the interests of the People's Republic of China or the "international proletarian movement"-that is, the Communist Party-is correct and necessary. What promotes "imperialism" or capitalism is wrong. Thus, it was normal and logical for Peking to hold Americans in prison despite the Joint Agreement, while denouncing Washington for detaining Chinese in the United States despite American efforts to satisfy Peking's demands. It was right for Peking to reject American approaches on disarmament and the Test-Ban Treaty while proceeding to manufacture nuclear weapons. Yet it was entirely wrong for "United States imperialism" to have any atomic bombs at all. Peking blandly denounced the United States for violations of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 regarding Vietnam, but concealed its own (from Washington's viewpoint) flagrant violations of 20 E. L. Katzenbach, Jr., and Hanrahan, G. Z., "The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tsetung," reprint from Political Science Quarterly, September 1955. both. It is wholly permissible for Peking to send ultimatums to Washington, as in 1956 on an arrangement in two months for a bilateral ministerial conference, or in 1958 for an answer in fifteen days to resume the Talks, but it is wholly unacceptable for Washington to reject them or to make similar demands. The Chinese Communist style of adversary negotiations closely correlates the timing and other phases of the "struggle with the enemy." With the negotiation just one part, and usually a small part, of a grand strategy, expedient concessions and tactical trading cannot be hurried or fragmented in Peking's protracted time frame. As far as the problems of timing and bargaining are concerned: Perhaps one of the clearest measures of the influence of underlying attitudes is the Chinese method of calculation of the relative values of immediate and distant-future advantages. The Chinese are less inclined to accept immediate advantages at the potential cost of future disadvantages and more inclined to make present sacrifices in the hope of future gains than are most countries. Furthermore, the Chinese apparently see this kind of calculus as applicable in situations where others do not.2 21 Moreover, all aspects of the negotiation are linked together in the light of the total world situation in which current and future internal and international developments, both in the Chinese People's Republic and in the United States, as well as elsewhere, are taken into consideration with comprehensive doctrinal analysis which sometimes seems unrealistic when these developments appear to have little association with the subjects under negotiation. In particular, developments within the Communist world can have a more important bearing on negotiations with the United States than a direct encounter over Taiwan or trade, for example. This aspect of totality in dealing with the Chinese Communists helps to explain the shift from a negotiating stance in Warsaw to the diplomacy of stalemate in 1959 when the Sino-Soviet split began to becloud Washington-Peking negotiations. The bitter break between Peking and Moscow may do more than that in the future. The American negotiator is often at a disadvantage in negotiating with the Chinese Communists not only because of their divergent sense of time but also because of the totality of their approach on the nature and timing of concessions. The customary style of the United States government and the American negotiator is to negotiate on one subject at a time. It is easier for the pragmatic American mind to deal with an individual subject on its merits, separated from the endless complex of international relations. Where the MarxistMaoist is timeless and total, the American tends to be instant and particular. Unfortunately, however, in an ironic twist, negotiating with the Chinese Communists becomes increasingly complex because they assume that the "imperialists" likewise follow a total, longterm strategy and a correlation of effort within the "imperialist camp." The Chinese Communist, who adheres faithfully to his special process of analysis, cannot easily envisage the contingency that his opposite number might act quite differently. Nor can he accept 21 A. M. Halpern, "The Influence of Revolutionary Experience on Communist China's Foreign_Outlook," in Werner Klatt, ed., The Chinese Model (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1965), p. 152. the reality or appraise the implication of such contrary behavior. And equally unfortunate is the "deviant" readiness of the American to make concessions in bargaining, for this has not yet helped to modify the molded mind of the Chinese Communist negotiator. Of course, American negotiators, in making concessions, must also make a correlation in a total context of diplomatic relations. Concerning critical issues such at Taiwan, disarmament, Vietnam, and bilateral contacts, Washington always has to consider potential reactions in Taipei and calculate possible effects on other Asian governments and its European allies. If some of their responses are likely to be too unfavorable, the Americans have to hold back. Nevertheless, the circumstantial evidence indicates that Washington is conducting its part in the Ambassadorial Talks primarily on a unilateral basis without drawing on any "general diplomatic strategy." Washington has looked upon its contact and negotiation with Peking as its own private dialogue and not as a diplomatic chorus for many parts in a world-wide strategy of a "common camp." Nor indeed is it part of any triangular relationship involving the Peking-Moscow rupture or some imagined Moscow-Washington "collusion." On the other hand, Peking appears to have followed a completely correlated strategy. Peking, in the 1960s, has challenged Washington to leave the Asian continent, Moscow to forfeit Communist leadership, the "underdeveloped" world to follow the Maoist model and the Chinese people to adopt a strident anti-American fanaticism in preparation for some forthcoming cataclysm-domestic or foreign. The combined impact of these several challenges on the Ambassadorial Talks has been to reduce the opportunity of negotiating any concessions to virtually nothing. It is not surprising, then, that the characteristic feature of adversary negotiations with the Chinese Communists has been their manipulation of the agenda to place their opposites in an unfavorable trading position and to fix the substance of negotiations by the way an item is phrased or listed on the agenda. This is more than a hard bargaining technique; it is designed to get two concessions from the American negotiators for the price of one agreement. The Chinese Communists used this technique in the Panmunjom meetings and again during the Ambassadorial Talks. American negotiators should be particularly wary of agendas which can represent this potential danger. Arguments over a "prejudicial" versus a "neutral" agenda are usually misunderstood by the public. American negotiators are frequently criticized because they will not concede what seems to be a trivial or technical point of sequence or semantics in the agenda. But the whole outcome of the negotiation may be at stake and the entire issue won or lost in the initial process of battling over a "neutral" agenda. Chinese Communist negotiators are tough, adroit, and persistent in that stage. Ambassador Arthur Dean, a veteran of negotiations with Peking, has precisely made this point: "The battle for the agenda is fundamental to Communist negotiators, because they believe they can humilate the other side and win or lose a conference in this first battle. . . . Quite often, they are correct." 22 Only if the Americans stand firm and insist on an equitable com 22 Arthur H. Dean, "What It's Like to Negotiate With the Chinese," The New York Times Magazine, October 30, 1966. 26-365-69-6 promise will the Chinese Communists come to an agreement. At this initial stage, they know they can bring public pressure to bear on the Americans, and, therefore, they will try to build the real issue which they wish to win into a "prejudicial" agenda. If their agenda is accepted, they can assume that their issue is no longer in dispute. In 1955, they apparently wanted the agenda of the Ambassadorial Talks specifically to include discussions for arranging a Foreign Ministers' conference and ending the American embargo. If Washington had accepted some such agenda in the belief that these two items were merely topical headings, the Americans would have discovered that from the Chinese point of view Washington had already conceded the principle of the ministerial meeting and the lifting of the embargo. Only the details of definition and arrangements would have been left to discuss and negotiate. The issue of "withdrawal from Taiwan in principle" would have been a similar case. Perhaps the American reaction to the agenda has become somewhat "gun-shy" because of several disagreeable experiences such as these. Nevertheless, it remains true that American negotiators should be on their guard concerning the agenda, the manipulation of the negotiating atmosphere, and the exploitation of the press. Perhaps our experience in negotiating with the Chinese Communists and taking their own public and private definitions of negotiations at face value portray too sharp and critical a picture of their "adversary" style. Indeed, we might well focus on their own more moderate versions of dealing with us. For example, Chou En-lai in 1956 said that the negotiations should be advantageous for both sides and not for just one side, although he never explained what he meant by "advantageous." 23 Then Peking's Bulletin of 1961 spoke of “a bridge between China and the United States" to which Peking did not object, provided others built the bridge, and apparently if the United States took the first step to cross it by withdrawing from Taiwan "so that we shall meet at the center of the bridge, and neither one will have an advantage over the other." 24 "23 Accordingly, it can be suggested that an American strategy for adapting adversary negotiations with Peking can use this idea of the bridge for mutual advantage as a logical point of departure for formulating and conducting adversary negotiations within the restricted framework of limited coexistence by expedient diplomacy. American dealings with Peking support the basic theorem in this case that adversary negotiations as defined and described above consist of three different but related methods or processes: convergent bargaining, elusive communicating, and tacit maneuvering. The various phases and divergent proposals covered in the Ambassadorial Talks have involved each of these processes. CONVERGENT BARGAINING In at least two cases the issues of prisoners and renunciation of force-Washington and Peking have practiced what might be called convergent bargaining, or what Professor Schelling calls "pure bargaining." In brief, each party was strongly interested in obtaining a 23 People's China. No. 14, July 16, 1956, Supplement, p. 12. 24 J. Chester Cheng, cited, p. 481. |