as Presidents have done many times, because the sending of such forces does not necessarily involve or threaten involvement in war. Such forces can be easily withdrawn in case an attack is made upon the country. There is no question about their remaining there and becoming involved in a war, if our country determines that it does not wish to become involved in a war.

But it seems clear to me that the sending of troops without authorization by Congress to a country under attack, as was done in Korea, is clearly prohibited. The sending of troops under the Atlantic Pact as a part of a defensive operation against Russia without previous authority from Congress appears to me to be also prohibited, because the fact that these countries are threatened by an actual attack is the very justification and reason for sending the troops. The only reason for sending troops is to defend a country against a threatened military attack which would necessarily involve the United States in war.

As I am sure most Members of the Senate know, Senator Taft believed that a strict conclusion of the Constitution in respect to warmaking powers is essential to protecting the rights of the American people in the maintenance of a system of constitutional checks and balances.

Starting on page 35 of the book, he writes as follows:

The proponents of executive power have referred to many statements from the writings of Professor Edward S. Corwin of Princeton, a noted authority on constitutional law, but on this subject, he says:

"The outstanding fact about the Administration's proposal from the point of view of constitutional law is that it raises a question of first impression. The proposal is novel, unprecedented and consequently the precedents do not apply to it, except perhaps in the case of Iceland in 1941. The Administration's present proposal incurs the danger of precipitating war, and it raises vast questions regarding finance and the internal welfare of the country. Congress has the right to safeguard its war-declaring power, and it is duty bound to protect the domestic interests to which its other powers extend. In fact, the right of the President to merge American forces with an army, which he cannot exclusively command, seems very dubious. Congressional authorization under the necessary and proper clause would seem to be essential."

Throughout the 1951 delegate the Administration tried to avoid this question of setting up an international army, but there can be no doubt that that was in fact the project, as I point out in Chapter Five.

Under that project the President actually appointed General Eisenhower, in a letter in which he stated:

"The North Atlantic Treaty nations have agreed on the defense organization for Europe and at their request I have designated you as supreme allied commander, Europe. I view their request as a pledge that their support of your efforts will be complete and unequivocal."

When the President of the United States went that far he exceeded his authority. Up to that point, what was done at Brussells was a recommendation of the Council under the Atlantic Pact. When the President undertook to carry out that recommendation he usurped the powers of Congress. He had no authority to carry out that particular agreement made at Brussels, without submitting it to Congress.

Apparently the Administration is afraid that there was such an exceeding of authority, for it has represented the whole project now as merely the sending to Europe of a few divisions, which we can withdraw at any moment, but only to co-operate with the other nations in case war comes in a general defense under the terms of the Atlantic Pact.

But whether there is to be an American army or an international army, I do not believe the President has the power without congressional approval to send troops to one country to defend it against a possible or probable attack by another country.

Such action may perhaps be authorized by treaty, but it has not been authorized by treaty, but it has not been authorized either by the United Nations Charter, as I have shown, or by the Atlantic Pact.

In my opinion, the Senate resolution and the concurrent resolution adopted by the Senate on April 4, 1951, was a clear statement by the Senate that it has the right to pass on any question of sending troops to Europe to implement the Atlantic Pact, that it is unconstitutional for the President to send any troops abroad to implement that pact without congressional approval, at

least until war comes and Article 5 takes effect. It has been said that this resolution is not a law, and, of course, that is true, but the declaration can be implemented by the Appropriations Committee and by other legislation when legislation becomes appropriate. There can be no doubt that it is a legislative act and that it clearly asserts the power of Congress and the Senate.

No one can prevent the President continuing to assert his power as President, and it may be that he does have the ability to involve the United States in war even when he has no right to do so; but I think a great forward step in defense of constitutional law has been taken by the definite position now asserted by the Senate.

The President acts at his own peril, if he chooses to usurp authority which the representatives of the people have asserted that he does not possess.

I share Taft's major views on the limitations of the separation of powers doctrine as far as Presidential power is concerned. I have fought for those views on the floor of the Senate from 1955, when I started to argue against this erosion of constitutional checks that involved violation of the separation of powers doctrine in the Formosa resolution. And I have consistently fought for this constitutional doctrine time and time again, to my great political disadvantage.

But I would rather be judged by my stand on constitutional law than by yielding to the political expediency of executive administrations which time and time again have succeeded in persuading Members of Congress to surrender their clear duty to uphold our system of constitutional checks upon the executive branch of our Federal system of self government by a supposedly free people.

I think a great step has been taken here by the checking resolution of the Senator from Arkansas because all it says, in effect, is that it is time that we return to the checking power that the Constitution vests in the Senate of the United States including-noting the reference of Taft to the Appropriations Committee the power of the purse strings.

Mr. President, because it is not a long chapter, I ask unanimous consent that the entire chapter of Senator Taft entitled, "The Place of the President and Congress in Foreign Policy," be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MORSE. I submit that the chapter as a whole is a cogent argument in support of the resolution of the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. President, I am completely impersonal about this. I make no reference to any individual President, but I say that the Senate has permitted the Office of the Presidency to usurp the constitutional powers of the Senate time and time again because we have refused to carry out our trust to check the executive branch of the Government in respect to foreign policy commitments.

It is about time that we return to the Constitution and make clear that boys are not going to be sent to die on battlefields anywhere in the world unless our Presidents follow constitutitnal processes.

Passing an unconstitutional resolution such as the Tonkin Gulf joint resolution does not meet constitutional processes.

I would, therefore, go further than the resolution of the Senator. I would seek to rescind some of the action already taken in resolutions such as the Tonkin Gulf, Formosa, Middle East and other unwarranted commitments in order to correct some past mistakes. The time has come when we ought to make perfectly clear to the executive branch of the Government that no longer are we going to give support to past mistakes that the Senate of the United States has unwisely yielded to under presidential urgings but which have had the effect of eroding way the protecting shield of the constitutional rights of all of the American people.

EXHIBIT 1

THE PLACE OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY

No one can question the fact that the initiative in American foreign policy lies with the President. But, if I can judge from my mail and from many considered editorial expressions, the American people certainly do not believe or intend that his power shall be arbitrary and unrestrained. They want a voice in the more important features of that policy, particularly those relating to

peace and war. They expect their Senators and Congressmen to be their voice. Before discussing the correctness of the principles of foreign policy, therefore, I shall try to define the place of Congress and the President under our Constitution. The debates in the Senate in early 1951 had even more to do with the question of who shall determine policy than with policy itself.

There can be no question that the executive departments have claimed more and more power over the field of foreign policy at the same time that the importance of foreign policy and its effect on every feature of American life has steadily increased. If the present trend continues its seems to me obvious that the President will be become a complete dictator in the entire field of foreign policy and thereby acquire power to force upon Congress all kinds of domestic policies which must necessarily follow.

The fundamental issue in the "great debate" was, and is, whether the President shall decide when the United States shall go to war or whether the people of the United States themselves shall make that decision. Also, for many years the State Department has been developing a theory that almost any action can be taken by executive agreement, which does not absolutely require any congressional approval at all, instead of by the treaty method prescribed in the Constitution. Undoubtedly, the necessity of obtaining a two-thirds vote in the Senate is very difficult and has encouraged many people to think that this development was necessary. But if the treaty method is not satisfactory, then the Constitution should be amended to provide for the approval of all executive agreements and to define the scope of and effect of such agreements much more clearly than at present.

More and more the State Department has assumed to do many things which are beyond its power in the field of trade, by an executive agreement known as the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT). It has insisted that the Executive have the power to raise and lower tariffs, through reciprocal trade agreements, within constantly widening limits and without the slightest shadow of a standard prescribed by law. Political agreements as important as those made at Yalta have never been submitted to Congress at all.

The execution of international agreements, such as the United Nations Charter and the Atlantic Pact, has now given rise to extended claims that the President can do anything which can be related to those treaties and anything recommended by the international commissions there created, without any consultation whatever with Congress.

I think it is fair to say that the State Department has adopted an attitude of hostility toward Congress and an unwillingness to submit any matter to Congress if it thinks it can possibly carry it through without such submission. It shown a complete distrust of the opinion of the people, unless carefully nursed by State Department propaganda.

The matter was brought to an issue by the intervention of the President in the Korean War without even telling Congress what he was doing for several weeks. And it was brought still further to the fore by the proposal that we commit troops to an international army under the control of a council of twelve nations. I do not think that the American people have ever faced a more serious constitutional issue or one which in the end may present threat to their freedom.

In the long run, the question which the country must decide involves vitally not only the freedom of the people of the United States but the peace of the people of the United States. More and more, as the world grows smaller, we are involved in problems of foreign policy. If in the great field of foreign policy the President has the arbitrary and unlimited powers he now claims, then there is an end to freedom in the United States not only in the foreign field but in the great realm of domestic activity which necessarily follows any foreign commitments. The area of freedom at home becomes very circumscribed indeed.

If the President has unlimited power to involve us in war, then I believe that the consensus of opinion is that war is more likely. History shows that when the people have the opportunity to speak they as a rule decide for peace if possible. It shows that arbitrary rulers are more inclined to favor war than are the people at any time. This question has become of tremendous importance, perhaps greater than any particular problem of troops to Europe or the manner in which the Korean War shall be conducted. The claims made by the President of the United States and by various documents presented to the Sen

ate by the executive representatives far exceed the powers claimed by President Roosevelt during World War II, those claimed by President Truman when the United Nations Charter was passed, and those claimed by President Truman when the Atlantic Pact was adopted.

On January 4, last, President Truman, commenting on the Coudert resolution to bar him from sending more troops to Europe without the consent of Congress, said emphatically that he did not need the permission of Congress to take such action.

On January 11, at a press interview, according to the Washington Post:

"Mr. Truman, whose right to send troops to Europe recently was challenged by Senator Taft, said he had the power to send them any place in the world. This, he said, had been repeatedly recognized by Congress and the Supreme Court.

"A reporter asked Mr. Truman in effect what would happen if Congress tried to tie his hands by putting restrictions in the appropriation bills for the forces to be sent to Europe.

"That, said the President, was up to Congress. If they wanted to go to the country about it, he said, he would go with them-and he recalled that he licked them once."

At the President's conference a week later, on January 18, according to the press:

"He repeated that his constitutional authrity to send American forces to Europe to take up their positions in an integrated European army was clear and did not depend upon the consent of Congress. What he would be glad to have, he said in substance, was a Senate expression that affirmed his constitutional authority."

Furthermore, a document was submitted to Congress, entitled Powers of the President to Send the Armed Forces Outside the United States, dated February 28, 1951, which was printed, though not endorsed, by the Joint Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate. This document contains the most unbridled claims for the authority of the President that I have ever seen written in cold print. In effect, the document asserts that whenever in his opinion American foreign policy requires he may send troops to any point whatosever in the world, no matter what the war in which the action may involve us. The document also claims that in sending armed forces to carry out a treaty the President does not require any statutory authority whatever, and it does not recognize the difference between a self-executing treaty and one which requires, even by its own true terms, congressional authority. It ends with the most sweeping claims for power:

"As this discussion of the respective powers of the President and the Congress in this field, has made clear, constitutional doctrine has been largely molded by practical necessities. Use of the Congressional power to declare war, for example, has fallen into abeyance because wars are no longer declared in advance. The Constitutional power of the Commander in Chief has been exercised more often, because the need for armed international action has grown more acute. The long delays occasioned by the slowness of communications in the eighteenth century have given place to breathtaking rapidity in the tempo of history. Repelling aggression in Korea or Europe cannot wait upon Congressional debate. However, while the need for speed and the growth in the size and complexity of the armed forces enlarged the area in which the powers of the Commander in Chief are to be wielded, the magnitude of present-day military operations and international policies requires a degree of Congressional support that was unnecessary in the days of the nineteenth century.'

That seems a very gracious concession to Congress. Congress no longer has any power to act. It is simply given the right to support the President after the President has acted. I was shocked in the very beginning of this controversy by the speed with which blind partisans in the administration rushed to the defense of the proposition that the President can make war and warlike commitments. Senator Connally, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, made this extraordinary assertion on the floor of the Senate:

The scope of the authority of the President as Commander in Chief to send the Armed Forces to any place required by the security interests of the United States has often questioned, but never denied by authoritative opinion.

That certainly is a complete misrepresentation of the discussion of these constitutional powers which has taken place since the foundation of the na

tion.

As soon as I made my speech of January 5, 1951, the New York Times rushed to get Professor Henry Steele Commager to throw together in a day or two a superficial article, published in its Sunday magazine at that time, in which he asserts that the President has the right to start war whenever he sees fit to do so.

Editors of many newspapers and magazines accepted without question the State Department's claims, made without any basis, that history books have listed more than one hundred and thirty cases where United States Presidents sent United States armed troops into action "to defend the national interest." The most interesting but alarming thing is that there seem to be so many responsible people in the country who follow the party line of the State Department in foreigh policy with complete blindness as to where it may lead, in spite of the fact that it has led us a long way toward disaster recently and in spite of the fact that it may be the opposite of a policy adopted six months earlier. In so doing, they blithely dismiss all interest in the maintenance of popular government under the Constition. They are obviously afraid of popular government, thinking that the people are too dumb to understand foreign policy and might oppose policies which these blind followers favor but which the people think may lead to war.

Of course, the President has wide powers in foreign policy, but the framers of the Constitution provided expressly that only Congress could do certain things. Those powers are expressed in Section 8 of Article I. Of course, Congress is given the power, and the exclusive power

"To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water.

To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years."

That reflects a certain and definite suspicion of a possible desire on the part of some President to set up a great permanent military force. Further powers of Congress as stated in Section 8:

"To provide and maintain a navy.

"To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and nava! forces."

There are other powers, such as calling forth the militia and disciplining the militia.

The Constitution also provides that the President shall have the power to make treaties, but only by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur. The President's relationship to the armed forces is stated only in Section 2 of Article II of the Constitution:

"The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States . . ."

There is one very definite limit-and I think it is admitted by every responsible authority who has discussed the problem-on the President's power to send troops abroad: he cannot send troops abroad if the sending of such troops amounts to the making of war. I think that has been frequently asserted; and whenever any broad statements have been made as to the Presi dent's power as Commander in Chief to send troops anywhere in the world the point has been made that it is always subject to that particular condition.

Perhaps no one has been quoted more on this general subject than has my father, who discussed this question in various lectures, articles, and books. My father had wide experience, as governor general of the Philippines, Secretary of War, and President of the United States. He never served in a legislative body, and, if anything, I think he leaned toward the power of the Executive. The clearest statement of the question, I believe, is contained in his article in the June 6, 1916, number of the Yale Law Journal, from which I quote:

"When we come to the power of the President as Commander in Chief, it seems perfectly clear that Congress could not order battles to be fought on a certain plan, and could not direct parts of the Army to be moved from one part of the country to another. The power to declare war is given to Congress. . . This is necessarily a limitation on the power of the President to order the Army and the Navy to commit an act of war. It was charged against President Polk that he had carried on a foreign war against Mexico before Congress had authorized it or declared it, and it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the act of President Wilson in seizing Veracruz was an act of war