Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Senator from Colorado for his remarks.

Mr. President, I shall not delay the Senate much longer, but I have a few examples which I merely wish to put in the RECORD for the information of the Senators. They illustrate some of the things I have in mind and which I think are pertinent to the resolution.

For example, on April 19, 1966, in a television appearance, the Vice President described the Honolulu declaration as follows:

. . . a pledge to ourselves and to posterity to defeat aggression, to defeat social misery, to build viable, free political institutions and to achieve peace. Now, those are broad terms, but these are great commitments. I think there is a tremendous new opening here for realizing the dream of the Great Society in the great area of Asia, not just here at home.

On that same date, during the television program, Eric Severeid summarized the interview with the Vice President with a question as follows:

a

You seem to be saying that the Johnson doctrine, if we may call it that, is proposing a realtionship between this country and Asia far away as it is. relationship as fundamental, as long lasting, intimate and possibly expensive as our historic association with Europe. It is of this scale, of this magnitude? The Vice President answered:

I think so.

I cite that simply as an example of words which are used in the midst of statements that are cited as great commitments. I personally do not consider them commitments. They are sort of proposals. They are statements of general policy, which are not to be considered commitments, although he uses that word. Perhaps he thinks they are, and perhaps we will be confronted with implementing legislation. If so, I shall not consider them as commitments. I shall consider that I am quite free to judge them upon their merits.

U.S. intervention in the Congo recently exemplifies an involvement abroad which began as a short-term international undertaking and seems to have become unilateral and open-ended. Secretary Rusk expressed surprise that the Congress was upset about the United States sending a few planes in 1967 when there was no concerted protest about the sending of planes in November of 1964 to rescue white hostages at Stanleyville. But the circumstances were entirely different then: the U.N. had just pulled out its forces, Gizengists had moved in to take over the northeastern Congo, there was absolutely no question about the perilous position of the Europeans in that area, and the airlift was not a solitary United States operation. In any case, the events of 1960 to 1964 did not give the administration and ad infinitum right to intervene in the Congo without congressional sanction.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. I might say there was quite a difference between sending troop carriers into the Congo 2 years ago and sending them a month ago. Two years ago they actually went in there to save a large number of people whose lives were threatened. There are people who have confided to me that the last time, a month or so ago, it is their belief that the troop carriers were sent into the Congo to save investments rather than people.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Senator makes a very good point.

Mr. AIKEN. I am not making a point. I am merely repeating what I was told.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator makes a distinction. There has always been an unexpressed policy when it came to saving lives of our citizens and we have on many occasions done that as an emergency operation without prior commitment.

I wish to cite an example that upset me more than any other during the past couple of years which arose out of a statement made by the Secretary of State on this subject. I want to quote it for the RECORD to show what I have in mind.

On January 28, 1966, Secretary Rusk, during the hearings on Vietnam, was asked: Are we obligated to do this-he was referring to what we are doing in Vietnam-under the SEATO Treaty?

He replied that, in addition to the SEATO Treaty:

We have bilateral assistance agreements with South Vietnam. We have had several actions of the Congress. We have had the annual aid appropriations in which the purposes of aid have been fully set out before the Congress. We

have had special resolutions such as the one of August, 1964, and we have had the most important policy declarations by successive Presidents with respect to the protection of South Vietnam against Communist aggression.

Without quarreling with the reference to SEATO or the congressional resolution of August 1964, this is a very significant statement, it seems to me, be cause of its casual reference to other acts. Thus, so far as I know, none of the bilateral assistance agreements referred to has ever been submitted to the Congress. They were quite informal executive agreements signed, I presume, by our ambassador or Secretary, and a representative of the South Vietnamese Government. I do not think they should be considered national commitments— if that is the proper word-commitments which involve the use of our Armed Forces in Southeast Asia.

The Secretary of State went on to refer to annual aid authorizations as if they were indications of national commitments.

Certainly, those aid authorizations were not considered in the context of sending U.S. troops. Having participated in aid bills year after year, I realize that they contain policy statements which no one takes too seriously. They usually express a hope. This year, incidentally, the committee was wise in striking most of these policy statements from the bill. We do not want them to be used as excuses for future commitments. We did that in the Committee. and I hope the Senate will sustain that action.

So to consider the annual aid authorizations as remotely authorizing the making of commitments for the use of American Armed Forces in a country receiving aid is, it seems to me, rather farfetched. But this is the kind of problem I have in mind that the committee should examine and endeavor to make it very clear, for the information of the Executive and everybody in the future, that we are not to consider this type of action as authorization for carrying on war, sending troops, or anything of that kind.

The Secretary mentioned "Policy declarations by successive Presidents," as a source of commitment. That is a very broad statement. There have been many policy declarations in speeches on the Fourth of July, on many occasions, or on a visit of a dignitary from a foreign country. They are often referred to as commitments. This is the type of thing I wish to clarity.

On January 3, 1966, the Department of State issued its 14 points. Under the heading "The U. S. Commitment," there appears the following:

The United States has a clear and direct commitment to the security of South Vietnam against external attack. This commitment is based upon bilateral agreements between the United States and South Vietnam.

This is a reiteration of the same point I read previously. None of these was approved by the Congress

and upon annual actions by the Congress in providing aid to South VietnamThe same statement was made by the Secretary of State-and, continuing the quotation from the State Department publication of January 3, 1966:

This commitment is based * ** upon the policy expressed in such Congres sional action as the August 1964 resolution, and upon the solemn declarations of three U.S. presidents. At stake is not just South Vietnam, nor even Southeast Asia, there is also at stake the integrity of U.S. commitment and the importance of that commitment to the peace right around the globe.

Let me interjet that my point is not directly related to Vietnam, but rather to the methods by which we seem to involve the Nation in a commitment. On August 20, 1965, in a State Department publication entitled "Why Vietnam?" the following statement appears:

The Roots of Commitment

In the historic documents that follow, two American Presidents define and affirm the commitment of the United States to the people of South Vietnam. In letters to Prime Minister Churchill in 1954 and to President Diem in 1954 and 1960, President Eisenhower describes the issues at stake and pledges United States assistance in South Vietnam's resistance to subversion and aggression.

And in December 1961 President Kennedy reaffirms that pledge.

The Eisenhower letters referred to in this statement contain the following language:

To Churchill, April 4, 1954, referring to the need for a Southeast Asia coalition of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines: ". . . The important thing is that the coalition

must be strong and it must be willing to join the fight if necessary. I do not envisage the need of any appreciable ground forces on your or our part. . .”

That is the end of the quotation from that letter to Churchill.

Then the letter to President Diem from Eisenhower on October 1, 1954, stated:

The purpose of this offer-("an intelligent program of American aid") is to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means.

Then, the letter from President Eisenhower to President Diem on October 26, 1960, stated:

Although the main responsibility for guarding that independence will always, as it has in the past, belong to the Vitenamese people and their government, I want to assure you that for so long as our strength can be useful, the United States will continue to assist Vietnam in the difficult yet hopeful struggle ahead.

These are given in illustration of the type of thing I have in mind in bringing this resolution to the attention of the Senate. And let me reiterate-it is this technique of broadening statements and letters into national commitments that is disturbing.

Mr. President, I shall not delay this matter further. I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD, an excerpt from a speech of the Secretary of State on February 16, 1966, before the National Convention of the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, at Las Vegas, Nev., calling attention to his expression of our commitment in the speech at that time. There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Both Peiping and Hanoi have proclaimed South Viet-Nam to be a critical test for the so-called "war of liberation".

We are committed to assist South Viet-Nam to resist aggression by the SEATO Treaty, which was approved by the Senate with only one dissenting vote by the pledges of three successive Presidents; by the aid approved by bipartisan majorities in Congress over a period of 12 years; by joint declarations with our allies in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific; and by the Resolution which Congress adopted in August 1964, with only two dissenting votes.

I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from a Department of State bulletin of March 14, 1966, entitled "Vice President Reviews Asian Problems with Thai Premier." The excerpt includes a communique which the Vice President issued on his visit to Bangkok, and shows clearly how general statements become national commitments without collaboration with the Congress.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

VICE PRESIDENT REVIEWS ASIAN PROBLEMS WITH THAI PREMIER Vice President Humphrey was in Thailand February 13-15 during a special mission to Asia for President Johnson.1 Following is the text of a joint communique released at Bangkok on February 15 at the conclusion of talks between the Vice President and the Prime Minister of Thailand, Thanom Kittikachorn.

The Vice President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Thailand have concluded a most useful discussion and review of the common struggle against Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, including the results of the recntly concluded conference in Hawaii.2

The Vice President paid tribute to the strong and unhesitating stand which Thailand and her leaders have taken against the many forms of Communist aggression, the disguised as well as the blatant ones. He expressed the gratitude of his Government for Thailand's initiatives in seeking a larger regional framework for the peaceful achievement of social and economic progress. He emphasized the determination of the United States to provide all necessary assistance to enable Thailand and the other countries of Southeast Asia threatened by Communist aggression to defend themselves and to achieve in peace their just economic and social aims.

1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. I (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), p. 265.

2 Edwin S. Corwin, The President, Office and Powers, 1787-1948, History and Analysis of Practice and Opinion (New York: New York University Press, 1948), p. 208.

The Prime Minister concurred with the principle underlying the Declaration of Honolulu: that the war in Southeast Asia must be waged on two fronts simultaneously—the military front and the struggle to improve the social, economic, and physical well-being of the people.

Recognizing Thailand's commitment to defend itself against Communist aggression both from within and from without, the Vice President reaffirmed the United States pledge to assist in programs for the improvement of individual well-being and security in Thailand. Despite the progress already made in the development of rural areas, a need was clearly identified for greater efforts to provide more ample water supply, further expansion of rural credit for agriculture and related small industry, irrigation of farmlands, expansion of rural electrification, an expanded road system to connect outlying areas to markets, better medical care extended to presently isolated villages, and the provision of more schools to educate the populace and to insure that they will be better equipped to share in the progress of their country and contribute to its strength and stability.

It was agreed that the steps taken to improve the security in certain areas had proved their worth, but that further strengthening of security forces was an urgent necessity. Both Governments would provide additional resources to achieve this end, so that villages would be freed from the threat of Communist terrorism and harrassment. At the same time further assistance beyond ongoing programs for the improvement and modernization of the Thai Armed Forces was a pressing requirement which would be met by the United States with the flexibility and promptness required by the current emergency.

Thailand's present contributions in regional affairs were jointly reviewed with specific reference to the constructive role Thailand has played in the Mekong Committee, its leadership in the recent regional educational conference, its strong support for the Asian Development Bank,3 and leadership in forming a highly competent regional council for exchange and coordination of development plans. The Prime Minister stressed the need for Asian initiative and innovation in achieving more rapid progress in economic development so as to improve the lives of the Asian peoples. This is one of the objectives underlying the renewed interest in the Association of Southeast Asia. The Vice President recalled President Johnson's pledge in April 19654 of a $1 billion American contribution to such a program following its organization by Asian leadership. In this context the Vice President noted the visit of Mr. Eugene Black for discussions with the Prime Minister,5 which have resulted in the necessary engineering or other survey actions for all the 13 projects proposed by the Prime Minister.

It was agreed that organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asia could play a valuable role in fostering new cooperative institutions and stimulating the ideas that would make dramatic economic transformations possible. Mr. President, I conclude by stating that I appreciate very much the expres sions of support which have been given me by me fellow Senators.

Mr. ELLENDER subsequently said: Mr. President, I was quite busy this afternoon holding hearings in the Subcommittee on Public Works. I was very anxious to be present when the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] submitted his resolution on commitments.

Following my trip to Africa in 1962, I pointed out to the Senate that the State Department, without any sanction from Congress or anybody else, bound us to a contribution of $225 million to Nigeria without consulting anyone.

This was done on November 24, 1962, and my visit there was in August, I believe, of 1962.

In 1962 I also discovered in Tunisia that the State Department, or someone from the State Department, had bound us to a $180 million commitment.

I also discovered that the State Department had bound us to a commitment of $390 million to the United Arab Republic.

I also found that grants had been made to Trinidad in the amount of $30 million.

Recently someone agreed to let Korea have $150 million in development

3 Ruhl Jacob Bartlett. American Foreign Policy: Revolution and Crisis, Oglethorpe Trustee Lecture Series, Oglethorpe College, Atlanta, Georgia, May 1966, Lecture One, pp. 21-22. 1 For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

2 Ibid.

For background, See ibid., Mar. 7, 1966, p. 379.

Ibid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

For background, see ibid., Aug. 2, 1965, p. 215.

loans. There was also an agreement to let South Vietnam have 750,000 tons of rice for the crop year 1967-68.

All this was done without consulting Congress or anybody connected with the Appropriations Committee.

I am very hopeful that the resolution that the Senator from Arkansas has submitted will cover these situations and that it will not be possible in the future for the President, the State Department, or any other department to bind Congress with respect to such large appropriations without consulting those who have to vote and hold hearings on the appropriation of these enormous amounts of money.

[Statement of April 25, 1972]

VIETNAM-MISSUNDERSTOOD UNDERSTANDINGS

(Senator Stuart Symington)

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 17 and 18. the Secretaries of State and Defense placed great emphasis on what they characterized as violations by the North Vietnamese of "understandings" which had been arrived in discussions between representatives of the United States and North Vietnam in Paris in September and October, 1968. It was in these discussions that the groundwork was laid for the total cessation of United States bombing of North Vietnam, as announced by the previous Administration on October 31, 1968; and the subsequent expansion of the Paris talks to include representatives of the Saigon Government and the National Liberation Front.

Since Obtober, 1968, there has been continuing public controversy concerning the nature and particulars of these "understandings." Both the United States and North Vietnam have charged the other with not having lived up to whatever was agreed or "understood" in the course of the September-October, 1968, talks in Paris; and both sides have now placed their own selected and fragmentary versions of those talks before the public.

The most recent instance of this was the release by the North Vietnamese delegations in Paris on April 20 of a document describing the 1968 negotiations and containing selected quotations from the "minutes" of the 1968 discussions; and the effect of this North Vietnamese action has been to complicate futher the question of determining what was or was not said or "understood" in 1968. Because both sides have now made an issue of the 1968 discussions, and because this issue is central to current actions being taken by the United States, as well to the prospect for possible future negitiations, it is clear that the full record of these talks should now be made available to the public.

During his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on April 18, Secretary of Defense Laird expressed the view that the "minutes" of the 1968 discussions should be available to anyone to read. He added that the Committee had already been given the "minutes" by the Executive Branch: while we are convinced the latter statement was made in good faith, it was nevertheless

erroneous.

Given Secretary Laird's view that both the Committee and the public should have the record of the meetings, we are hopeful that steps can now be taken to promptly make public the full record of the 1968 talks.

Toward that end, we have spoken to both Secretary Larid and Secretary Rogers, and have written to them urging that the minutes of the 1968 discussions be transmitted to the Committee; also that they be promptly declassified. In addition, I have asked the Secretary of State to declassify the transcripts of background briefings which were held by high Executive Branch officials on the evening of October 31, 1968.

These meetings with the press were obviously held to explain to the public, via the news media, the basis on which the United States agreed to stop its bombing of North Vietnam and on which the North Vietnamese agreed to expanded peace talks. As such, they provide an invaluable insight into the content of United States policy at the time.