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The Prime Minister concurred with the principle underlying the Declaration of Honolulu: that the war in Southeast Asia must be waged on two fronts simultaneously—the military front and the struggle to improve the social, economic, and physical well-being of the people.
Recognizing Thailand's commitment to defend itself against Communist aggression both from within and from without, the Vice President reaffirmed the United States pledge to assist in programs for the improvement of individual well-being and security in Thailand. Despite the progress already made in the development of rural areas, a need was clearly identified for greater efforts to provide more ample water supply, further expansion of rural credit for agriculture and related small industry, irrigation of farmlands, expansion of rural electrification, an expanded road system to connect outlying areas to markets, better medical care extended to presently isolated villages, and the provision of more schools to educate the populace and to insure that they will be better equipped to share in the progress of their country and contribute to its strength and stability.
It was agreed that the steps taken to improve the security in certain areas had proved their worth, but that further strengthening of security forces was an urgent necessity. Both Governments would provide additional resources to achieve this end, so that villages would be freed from the threat of Communist terrorism and harrassment. At the same time further assistance beyond ongoing programs for the improvement and modernization of the Thai Armed Forces was a pressing requirement which would be met by the United States with the flexibility and promptness required by the current emergency.
Thailand's present contributions in regional affairs were jointly reviewed with specific reference to the constructive role Thailand has played in the vekong Committee, its leadership in the recent regional educational conference, its strong support for the Asian Development Bank,3 and leadership in forming a highly competent regional council for exchange and coordination of development plans. The Prime Minister stressed the need for Asian initiative and innovation in achieving more rapid progress in economic development so as to improve the lives of the Asian peoples. This is one of the objectives underlying the renewed interest in the Association of Southeast Asia. The Vice President recalled President Johnson's pledge in April 1965 4 of a $1 billion American contribution to such a program following its organization by Asian leadership, In this context the Vice President noted the visit of Mr. Eugene Black for discussions with the Prime Minister,5 which have resulted in the necessary engineering or other survey actions for all the 13 projects proposed by the Prime Minister.
It was agreed that organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asia could play a valuable role in fostering new cooperative institutions and stimulating the ideas that would make dramatic economic transformations possible.
Mr. President, I conclude by stating that I appreciate very much the expressions of support which have been given me by me fellow Senators.
Mr. ELLENDER subsequently said: Mr. President, I was quite busy this afternoon holding hearings in the Subcommittee on Public Works. I was very anxious to be present when the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] submitted his resolution on commitments.
Following my trip to Africa in 1962, I pointed out to the Senate that the State Department, without any sanction from Congress or anybody else, bound us to a contribution of $225 million to Nigeria without consulting anyone.
This was done on November 24, 1962, and my visit there was in August, I believe, of 1962.
In 1962 I also discovered in Tunisia that the State Department, or someone from the State Department, had bound us to a $180 million commitment.
I also discovered that the State Department had bound us to a commitment of $390 million to the United Arab Republic.
Talso found that grants had been made to Trinidad in the amount of $30 million.
Recently someone agreed to let Korea have $150 million in development
3 Ruhl Jacob Bartlett, American Foreign Policy: Revolution and Crisis, Oglethorpe Trustee Lecture Series, Oglethorpe College, Atlanta, Georgia, May 1966, Lecture One. pp. 21 22
1 For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.
* For background, See ibid., Mar. 7, 1966, p. 379.
loans. There was also an agreement to let South Vietnam have 750,000 tons of rice for the crop year 1967–68.
All this was done without consulting Congress or anybody connected with the Appropriations Committee.
I am very hopeful that the resolution that the Senator from Arkansas has submitted will cover these situations and that it will not be possible in the future for the President, the State Department, or any other department to bind Congress with respect to such large appropriations without consulting those who have to vote and hold hearings on the appropriation of these enormous amounts of money.
[Statement of April 25, 1972)
(Senator Stuart Symington) In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 17 and 18. the Secretaries of State and Defense placed great emphasis on what they characterized as violations by the North Vietnamese of “understandings" which had been arrived in discussions between representatives of the United States and North Vietnam in Paris in September and October, 1968. It was in these discussions that the groundwork was laid for the total cessation of United States bombing of North Vietnam, as announced by the previous Administration on October 31, 1968; and the subsequent expansion of the Paris talks to include representatives of the Saigon Government and the National Liberation Front.
Since Obtober, 1968, there has been continuing public controversy concerning the nature and particulars of these "understandings.” Both the United States and North Vietnam have charged the other with not having lived up to whaterer was agreed or “understood" in the course of the September-October, 1968 talks in Paris; and both sides have now placed their own selected and fragmentary versions of those talks before the public.
The most recent instance of this was the release by the North Vietnamese delegations in Paris on April 20 of a document describing the 1968 negotiations and containing selected quotations from the "minutes" of the 1968 discussions; and the effect of this North Vietnamese action has been to complicate futher the question of determining what was or was not said or “understood" in 1968.
Because both sides have now made an issue of the 1968 discussions, and because this issue is central to current actions being taken by the United States, as well to the prospect for possible future negitiations, it is clear that the full record of these talks should now be made available to the public.
During his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on April 18, Secretary of Defense Laird expressed the view that the "minutes" of the 1968 discussions should be available to anyone to read. He added that the Committee had already been given the "minutes" by the Executive Branch: while we are convinced the latter statement was made in good faith, it was nevertheless erroneous.
Given Secretary Laird's view that both the Committee and the public should have the record of the meetings, we are hopeful that steps can now be taken to promptly make public the full record of the 1968 talks.
Toward that end, we have spoken to both Secretary Larid and Secretary Rogers, and have written to them urging that the minutes of the 1968 discussions be transmitted to the Committee; also that they be promptly declassified. In addition, I have asked the Secretary of State to declassify the transcripts of background briefings which were held by high Executive Branch officials on the evening of October 31, 1968.
These meetings with the press were obviously held to explain to the public, via the news media, the basis on which the United States agreed to stop its bombing of North Vietnam and on which the North Vietnamese agreed to expanded peace talks. As such, they provide an invaluable insight into the content of United States policy at the time.
At present, the Committee on Foreign Relations has copies of the two backgrounders in question, both of which bear a "confidential" security classification. It is impossible to justify any such classification, however, in view of the fact that documents in question are a record of conversations between public officials no longer in office and members of the press representing the public. This situation should be corrected at the same time the minutes are released. In this way the public will be able to gain a full understanding of what its responsibilities thought was was being "understood" in October, 1.165.
In calling upon the Executive Branch to take these actions, we are not prejudging any of the issues involved, implying any criticism of the manner in which the 1968 discussions were handled, or the manner in which they are now being interpreted. Rather we are pursuing the fundamental right of the Congress to know the facts, so they in turn can participate in an informed manner in the formulation of policies which profoundly affect the security and welfare of this nation.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., April 10, 1972. Hon. SAM J. ERVIN, JR., Chairman, Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, U.S. Senate, Washington D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I refer to your letter of March 10, 1972, requesting an updating of the analysis embodied in the compilation entitled “International Agreements Other Than Treaties 1916-1968 : A List With Citations of Their Legal Bases" which was prepared in the office of The Legal Adviser in response to your request.
In the acknowledgment addressed to you by the Acting Legal Adviser, Jr. Carl F. Salans, on March 17, 1972, you were informed that the research neces. sary to assemble the information desired was being conducted and that the information would be sent to you at the earliest possible time.
I enclose an Addendum to the above-mentioned compilation to cover the pe. riod to April 1972. Please continue to call on us whenever you believe we might be helpful. Sincerely yours,
John R. STEVENSON, Legal Adriser.
APRIL 20, 1972. Hon. SAM J. ERVIN, JR., Chairman, Subcominittee on Separation of Pouers, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have received your letter of April 4, 1972, in which you refer to a statement in the Foreword of the Department's publication Treaties in Force, A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 1972 concerning, among other things. agreements made “under and in accordance with the President's Constitutional power.” You request information as to which of the agreements listed in the publication were made under that authority and inquire specifically under what legal or Constitutional authority each of the agreements was made.
I believe that material heretofore sent to you presents information of the kind which you desire, not only with respect to agreements in force on January 1, 1972, as listed in the publication to which you refer, but with respect to all international agreements other than treaties entered into since 1997). (in January 17, 1969, in reply to a letter from you dated September 20, 1968, there was sent to you by Nr. Leonard C. Meeker, The Legal Adviser, a 290-page compilation dated January 10, 1969 and entitled “International Agreements Other Than Treaties 19946–1968: A List With Citations of Their Legal Bases". in which all such a greements were classified according to the legal autorii! on the basis of which they were made or became effective.
In a letter which you addressed to me on March 10, 1972, you requested 'n woating of the analysis embodied in the January 10, 199 compilation. I 4.5page addendum to cover agreements to April 1972 was completed on April 3, an was transmitted t you with a letter dated April 10, 1972. I understand you have now received those documents.
In the January 10, 1969 compilation, 4,926 agreements are classified in six categories according to their underlying authority : (A) prior legislation; (B) subsequent legislation; (C) legislation and treaty; (D) treaty ; (E) partly leg. islation and/or treaty and partly constitutional authority; and (F) constitutional authority only. The material in the April 3 addendum is presented in the same format as the 1969 compilation.
The agreements in category (F) are listed on pages 261-273 of the 1969 compilation and pages 36–38 of the addendum. Each of the documents contains a tabulated year-by-year summary showing the totals in each of the six categories. The summary in the addendum (page 39) gives consolidated totals indicating that a total of 5,589 international agreements other than treaties made during the period 1946-April 1972, 64 are classified as “Constitutional authority only”. Those agreements are grouped under 23 headings by subject matter, with citations of the relevant provisions of the Constitution in each case. In regard to 15 of the 23 subject headings, the citation is to section 1 of Article II of the Constitution relating to “executive Power" and in the other 8 cases, in addition to the citation of section 1, section 2 of Article II of the Constitution relating to the President's authority as “Commander in Chief" is cited since the agreements deal with matters pertaining to the Armed Forces. Similarly, in the case of the 376 agreements listed in category (E) on pages 186-260 of the 1969 compilation and pages 30–35 of the addendum, either section 1 or both sections 1 and 2 of Article II of the Constitution are cited in addition to various statutory or treaty citations.
The character and purposes of the agreements listed in category (F), i.e., agreements entered into in pursuance of, and deriving their effectiveness from, the authority and powers of the President under the Constitution, are indicated by the material given in the 1969 compilation and the addendum thereto. Reference should also be made to item 2 in the General Notes on page 1 of the 1969 compilation relating to “Exercise of constitutional authority".
It is the position of the Department that the President has the authority to enter into certain agreements solely on the basis of his independent constitutional powers. The pertinent provisions are contained in the following clauses of Article II of the Constitution :
“Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.
*Section 2. The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several states, when called into the actual Service of the United States; .
“He shall have the Power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur;.
“Section 3. ... [H]e shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. ..."
Since these are broad and general powers, the conclusion of a given agreement may involve more than one of them. For this reason, it is difficult to classify them more specifically than is done in the studies referred to above. However, the general character of the agreement-making authority derived from these various provisions can perhaps be summarized as follows:
Agreements concerning military matters are, of course, based at least in part on the President's power as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. This includes not only purely military matters, such as practical arrangements for cooperation with other nations in defense matters, but also, for example, agreements on conditions of armistice including the administration of occupied territory pending conclusion of a peace treaty.
The President's authority to conclude executive agreements may also derive from his treaty powers. Although he can make treaties only by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, it is the President alone who negotiates, and the process of negotiation may entail the conclusion of protocols, which represent stages in those negotiations, or a modus virendi in limited terms designed to serve as a temporary measure pending conclusion of a treaty.
The power to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers" has been involved in, for example, the case of agreements incident to recognition of foreign governments, including such matters as the settlement of foreign claims.
The provision empowering the President to “take Care that all the Laws be faithfully executed" provides a basis for agreements designed to implement provisions of the Constitution, statutes, and treaties, as well as other international obligations of the United States.
More generalls, and under the authority of the "executive Power” clause, the President acts as "the sole organ of the nation in its internal relations, and its sole represeniatire with foreign nations." The normal conduct of foreign relations continually requires the conclusion of agreements of various sorts to compose differences with other gorernments, or regulate matters of mutual concern, and thus ensure the satisfactors continuation of diplomatic relations, these are the executive agreements which Professor Corwin has described as the “ordinary daily grist of the diplomatic mill."
While the powers referred to are obviously quite broad, I do not mean to suggest that the i resident has independent constitutional authority to conclude all agreements on these subjects without limitation. The President's power is certainly subject to the express restrictions and prohibitions of the Constitution. Moreover, the President's responsibility in many of these areas is shared with the Legislative Branch, and his authority in such matters depends in some measure on whether and in what manner Congress has previously acted with respect to the specific suloject matter involved. If I can be of any further assistance, please to not hesitate to call on me. Sincerely,
JOHN R. STEVENSOX, Legal Adriser. [Excerpts from International Agreements Other Than Treaties 1916–1968 : A List with
Citations of Their Legal Bases, Department of State, Jan. 10, 1969] CITATIONS OF AGREEMENTS MADE CYDER THE PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
F. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY ONLY (Note: Under this heading are agreements entered into in pursuance of, and deriving their effectiveness from, the authority and powers of the President under the Constitution. See also note number 2 under the General Notes, Page 1.) Armistice or surrender
Vote: TIAS 2781 is a Joint Policy Declaration by “the United Nations Members whose military forces are participating in the Korean action" supporting the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the l'nited Nations Command to conclude an armistice agreement. TIAS 2782 contains the "Agreement Between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, concerning a military armistice in Korea" and contains also a temporary supplemental agreement.
(a) Authority.—U.S. Constitution, Art. II, sec. 1 (executive Power") and sec. 2 (“Commander in Chief").
(b) Agreements-3. 1953–3. TIAS 2781 (Multilateral), 2782 (Korean Peso ple's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers, 2 agreements). Brazil-maritime transportation-consultations
Note: This agreement establishes procedures for direct communication be tween the authorities of the two Governments for the "exchange of points of view and the adoption of appropriate measures on common problems of maritime transportation." The authorities to participate in the consultations are specified. “In the case of the United Staes, for this purpose, they are the Department of State, and, in appropriate cases, depending upon the matters under consideration, the Department of Transportation, the Maritime Administration, and the Federal Maritime Commission." It is provided further: “In (ase any measures agreed upon are of such character that might require decisions on higher level, the maritime authorities shall make the necessary recommendations to their respective Governments."
(a) Authorityj.-C.S. Constitution, Art. II, sec. 1 ("executive Power"). See also laws relating to the powers and duties of the respective departments and agencies: Secretary of State_5 C.S.C. 156; Department of Transportation-49 U.S.C. 1651 et seq.; Varitime Administration and Federal Maritime Commis. sion–5 U.S.C. 597, 599: Reorganization Plan No. 21 of 1950, effective May 24, 1950, 1.5 FR 3175. 64 Stat. 1273 (amended by Plan, No. 7 of 1961, see helow): 4; U.S.C. 1111 note, Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1961, effective August 12,