and inadequate to the task of effectively fighting the North Vietnamese," according to Rep. Clement J. Zablocki (D-Wis.)

The report also disclosed that the United States was financing the construction of three training centers for Cambodian troops within Cambodia.

Rep. Wayne L. Hays (D-Ohio) informed Seignious that the report found that "a good part of the 200,000 army you are talking about is a phantom army, that they are not there."

Hays also questioned the planned delivery to Cambodia of C-119 transport planes. Speaking of assistance to the Lon Nol government, Hays added: "I don't know how they are going to use this stuff except as this report indicates, to buy Mercedes and television sets and what-have-you."

[From the POST, Washington, D.C., April 25, 1972]

GOLDBERG HITS LACK OF TREATIES

(By Spencer Rich, Washington Post Staff Writer)

Former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford and former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg yesterday strongly endorsed a bill giving Congress veto power over international executive agreements concluded by the President.

Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr. (D-N.C.), chairman of the Senate Subcommittee of the Separation of Powers, opened hearings on the bill with the assertion that presidents are increasingly using executive agreements in place of treaties to conclude major international understandings because such agreements don't require congressional approval. Treaties, on the other hand, require a two-thirds Senate vote to become effective.

Asserting that executive agreements had always been intended only for minor matters, Ervin called their increasing use a signal of presidential desire to "circumvent the treaty-making provisions of the Constitution" and to "usurp legislative power both in the domestic and foreign affairs arenas."

"As recently as 1930," said Ervin, "the U.S. concluded 25 treaties and only nine executive agreements. In contrast, in 1968 the U.S. concluded 16 treaties and 266 executive agreements, and by Jan. 1, 1972, the U.S. had a total of 947 treaties and 4,359 executive agreements."

Goldberg, a former Secretary of Labor and ambassador to the United Nations as well as Surpeme Court justice, used language almost as sweeping in endorsing the Ervin bill, which would allow Conngress to veto any executive agreement by a negative vote of both chambers within 60 days of its submission to Congress.

Goldberg said the nation is approaching a "constitutional crisis in the relations between the executive and Congress" because of executive assertions of power to act independently which are threatening to disrupt the system of checks and balances. He said these assertions involve not only the treaty powers, but also the war powers.

Goldberg specifically criticized the administration for concluding military base agreements with Portugal and Bahrain as executive agreements instead of treaties.

Clifford was far less sweeping in his comments on misuse of executive agreements, saying he saw no "important legal distinction" between a treaty and an executive agreement, and emphasizing "my own belief in a strong presidency." Nevertheless, he endorsed the bill with some proposed changes, saying that while "it will be an impediment" to completely free any flexible action by the President in concluding agreements, "It is not in my opinion, an undue impediment" because it will bring Congress and thereby the public back into the decision-making process on foreign affairs.

He said concluding international executive agreements which aren't agreements which aren't subject to congressional review and disapproval carries two practical disadvantages: It leads to excessive secrecy in policy-making, and it can lead to implied military commitments to other nations even though such commitments cannot really be considered valid without congressional sanction.

Clifford proposed changing the wording of the bill to make clear that agreements in areas where the Constitution clearly gives the President power to act

alone (recognition of a foreign government, settlement of claims, cessation of hostilities were examples he cited) shouldn't be subject to the congressional veto.

Dr. Elbert M. Byrd Jr., author and educator, called the bill a quest for "automatic" solutions to problems, and said the congressional power of the purse would be a more effective way to restrain the executive if necessary. Dr. James A. Robinson, president of MacAlester college in Minnesota, supported the general objectives of the bill but said he feared it wouldn't do what is generally intended in it: Only a real revival of congressional activism in foreign affairs could.

Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) supported the thrust of the bill, saying Presidents were submitting minor matters as treaties like enlarging the size of one international agency from 24 to 35 members-while making major international commitments through executive agreements.

[From the New York Times, Tuesday, April 25, 1972]

CONGRESS URGED TO CURB USE OF EXECUTIVE ACCORDS

(Special to The New York Times)

Washington, April 24-Two Johnson Administration officials and the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee called on Congress today to assert control on executive agreements with foreign countries.

Testifying at a hearing conducted by a Senate Judiciary subcommittee, former Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford said that there had been an excessive use of executive agreements, which do not require Senate approval. This, he said, has resulted in "undue secrecy" and too many "assurances of support" to foreign countries.

Arthur J. Goldberg, who was United States delegate at the United Nations and previously had served as a Supreme Court justice, said that Congress had a clear responsibility to take back the "powers which it has abandoned too long."

FULBRIGHT ASKS ACTION

Senator J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, called for strong action to stop "the erosion and evasion of legislative power" in foreign policy.

The testimony was on a bill that would give Congress power to veto executive agreements. The subcommittee, headed by Senator Sam J. Ervin Jr., Democrat of North Carolina, the sponsor, began three days of hearing on the proposal.

Mr. Ervin said that as of Jan. 1 the United States had entered into 4.359 executive agreements which do not require Senate approval, and 947 treaties, which call for concurrence by two-thirds of the Senate.

"During the past few decades," Senator Ervin said, "the executive branch has found irresistable the temptation to dispose of what it considered routine matters through the short-cut method of entering into executive agreements rather than the constitutional method of making formal treaties."

Senator Fulbright urged stronger legislation than Ervin bill, saying that ei ther house should be able to override an executive agreement.

Also testifying at the hearing were Dr. James Robinson, president of Macalester College, and Dr. Elbert M. Byrd Jr., former professor of government at the University of Maryland. The two men, who have written books on foreign policy agreements, urged other methods such as control on appropriations-instead of the Ervin proposal to assert the role of Congress in foreign policy.

On Feb. 16, the Senate approved, by a vote of 81 to 0, and sent to the House a measure that would require all international agreements to be submitted to Congress for its information. Mr. Ervin's proposal would go far beyond that bill, now awaiting House action, by providing that Congress could override any executive agreement within 60 days after its transmittal.

[From the New York Times, May 1, 1972]

THE TREATY POWERS

The tendency of Presidents to circumvent the Constitutional requirement for Senate approval of treaties by concluding executive agreements has reached extraordinary proportions in recent years. In the 150 years prior to 1939, the United States entered in 799 treaties and 1,182 executive agreements, one-andone-half times as many. In the last 26 years, according to State Department compilations, 368 treaties have been concluded but fifteen times that many executive agreements have been signed-a total of 5,590. In addition, there are over 400 secret agreements, the nature of which the State Department declines to reveal. Moreover, thousands of other executive agreements evidently have been concluded by other governmental agencies, particularly the Defense Department, which reportedly refuses to disclose the details even to Congressional committees.

The Senate demonstrated its dislike for this state of affairs in February when it voted 81-to-0 for the Case Bill, which would require all international agreements to be sent to the Congress for its information. Senator Ervin of North Carolina has now gone much further with a bill that would empower the Congress to veto any executive agreement within sixty days of its transmittal, if a majority of both houses voted against it.

The Senate's concern is primarily with executive agreements, negotiated without consulting Congress, on such matters as the stationing of American troops abroad and the establishment of military bases. Such steps can commit the nation to war in some circumstances as thoroughly as a treaty of alliance. The same concern has already led the Senate, by overwhelming majority, to approve the Javits-Spong War Powers Bill, which would forbid the use of American armed forces in combat for longer than thirty days unless the President had obtained the consent of Congress.

A further objective that would be achieved by the Ervin bill, in the opinion of former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford, is that it would discourage "undue secrecy" and too many "assurances of support" to foreign countries. Where there is a valid reason for secrecy, the Ervin bill would permit closed Congressional hearings and action by both houses in executive session.

Some executive agreements, of course, merely implement treaties approved by the Senate. The Congress could be swamped and the conduct of foreign policy hamstrung if every minor contract on economic aid or construction of military facilities abroad required extended hearings and Congressional debate. The late Secretary of State Dulles told a Senate Judiciary subcommittee on April 6, 1953, that 10,000 agreements had been concluded to implement the NATO treaty.

The Ervin bill would not require every executive agreement to be debated. It would simply enable the Congress to debate those it felt deserved such scrutiny. Most important, it would force the executive branch to revive the kind of close consultation with key Congressional committees-in advance of signing important international engagements-that has existed in the past.

Such consultation would not guarantee the nation against another Vietnam. The Congress is no more immune to error than the Executive. But it would restore a safeguard that too long has been absent.

[From Time (Magazine), May 15, 1972]

ARMS CONTROL-AGREEMENT ON ENOUGH

The White House last week announced a "major advance" in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, which have been going on since 1969. The advance-a compromise worked out in a secret exchange of letters between President Nixon and Soviet Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev-represents an important milestone in U.S.-Soviet relations and reflects a long-term change in Washington's policy. Where once the U.S. sought to maintain overall nuclear superiority, Washington has now settled for what Nixon has called "sufficiency"—that is, enough arms to deter any Russian attack by promising a devastating retaliatory strike.

Though many difficult details must still be worked out by SALT negotiators, now meeting in Helsinki, the overall shape of the nuclear accommodation between the superpowers was beginning to emerge. The U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to a series of ceilings and freezes in which Washington has consented to Soviet parity-and in several cases numerical superiority-in every major category of defensive and offensive strategic nuclear weaponry (see chart). In return, the Soviets made two important concessions. They agreed to place limits on the number of missile subs. But more important, they agreed to exclude from the present freeze U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and aboard the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. Hence the U.S. was able to avoid unnerving its European NATO allies, who would look askance at any unilateral dealing with the Soviets over American weaponry that is committed to the defense of Western Europe.

The compromise virtually ensures that Nixon and Brezhnev will be able to have a historic signing ceremony if and when the President visits Moscow later this month. They will probably have two documents to sign. One is a full-fledged treaty, already agreed upon, limiting the number of defensive ABMs, or anti-ballistic missiles, that each side may install. The second, barring any last-minute snag, will be an executive agreement setting informal ceilings on offensive strategic missiles until the SALT negotiators can come up with a formal pact. The major points of the two documents:

ABMS. The U.S. and the Soviet Union will each be permitted to maintain only two ABM complexes of 100 missiles each. The Soviets, who have chosen to defend populated areas, will probably add new missiles to the 64 ABMS that now ring Moscow. They may also convert the Tallin Line of antiaircraft missiles near Leningrad to ABMS. The U.S., which by contrast has chosen to use the allotted ABMS to protect its land-based missile force, originally had announced its intention to build 14 Safeguard ABM complexes. Now it will complete only the two sites at Grand Forks, N. Dak., and the Malmstrom, Mont. ICBMS. Pending a formal treaty, both superpowers will freeze the number of ICBMS at the present level, which leaves the U.S. at a 2-to-3 disadvantage (1.054 v. 1.550). Both sides will be free to replace older missiles with newer ones. More important, no ceiling has been placed on nuclear megatonnage, a category in which the Soviets already have far outdistanced the U.S. and which helps them overcome their disadvantage of having less accurate missiles. In fact, some Pentagon experts expect the Russians to install new monster ICBMS in the big empty silos that have recently been detected by U.S. surveil lance satellites. The U.S. has more warheads on its missiles-5,700 to the Soviets' 2,500 though Moscow will be allowed to draw even on that score. At present, the U.S. has a considerable technological lead. Its MIRV (multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle) warheads can be steered to widely separated targets. By comparison, the Russian MRVS (multiple re-entry vehi cles) simply fall in a prearranged cluster.

MISSILE SUBS. Under the ceiling, the Soviets who have lagged far behind the U.S. in the development of undersea nuclear missiles will be permitted to complete the 17 submarines now abuilding; within the next couple of years Moscow's missile-packing submarine force will outnumber by one the 41-ship U.S. undersea missile fleet.

Even though the compromise on offensive weapons allows for technological improvement-the U.S., for instance, may eventually replace its missile submarines with the undersea long-range missile system (ULMS), at $165 million per sub without armament-it nevertheless promises to bring the nuclear numbers race to a halt. It also, it is hoped, will serve as a guideline for a full-fledged treaty that will regulate offensive missiles in the same manner in which the ABMS have been brought under control. When and if that happens, the strategic arms pact will rank historically with the nuclear test-ban treaty (1963) and the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (1968).

[From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 25, 1972]
Moscow AGREEMENTS

By every visible sign, President Nixon's hope that his summit meeting with Soviet leaders will be memorable for its substance as well as its spirit is hap

pily being fulfilled. A number of technical agreements have been reached, inIcluding an important arrangement to co-operate in space exploration; but the truly momentous event reported from the Kremlin is that the two nations have agreed to place limitations on both defensive and offensive nuclear weapons.

There is yet no indication of what is transpiring in Mr. Nixon's private talks with Communist Party Secretary Brezhnev, no suggestion that progress is being made in such areas as trade, the Middle East, Indochina or European security. Yet even if Mr. Nixon leaves Moscow without a commitment from the Russians in any of these matters an agreement on strategic arms alone would make his trip a success.

The details of the technical and scientific agreements were worked out before Mr. Nixon left Washington, which suggests that the two countries not only are serious about enlarging their areas of co-operation but that both were concerned that the agreements would be ready to be announced dramatically at the summit. In the relationship between the U.S. and the USSR, it is almost as important to be perceived by the world as being in agreement as it is actually to be in co-operation.

Except for the agreement to conduct a joint manned space mission in 1975, the other accords are as much significant for their symbolic value as for what they may accomplish. Cooperation in solving medical and environmental problems and the exchange of personnel and information in space research should stand as predecessors for other joint efforts at solving problems faced by both nations. And it should go without saying that the more both countries pursue common objectives together, the more they ought to trust each other and the less likely they should be to resort to rash belligerency.

The reported terms of the strategic arms agreement are themselves little surprise. It was known that the two nations were close to a treaty that would cover not only antiballistic missile systems but also land and submarine-based intercontinental missiles. If the treaty is signed as expected tomorrow, it will stand as a crowning tribute to the long and patient work of the negotiators at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks-and also to the sensible realization by both countries that a continued weapons race was not only financially absurd but also potentially suicidal.

One puzzle in the agreement is that the ABM section will be the object of a formal treaty while the offensive weapons will be covered by an executive agreement between Mr. Nixon and Soviet President Podgorny. It would have been preferable to include both parts in a single treaty, but an executive agreement in this instance does not alter a Senate-ratified policy of arms control that previously has been expressed in the treaties for a limited test ban, nuclear nonproliferation, prohibition of nuclear weapons in space and the nonmilitary use of the Antarctic.

Even this treaty, however, provides only a starting point for an effective international system of controlling nuclear weapons; and it will fail in its objective if the race for a quantitative edge in strategic arms is replaced by a race for a qualitative advantage. Nonetheless, it is an essential first step toward any possible elimination of the nuclear menace. As such, the beneficiaries of this treaty will not only be the citizens and economies of the U.S. and Russia. They will be all the people of the world.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Thursday, May 25, 1972]

SPRING THAW IN MOSCOW

The cool formality and diplomatic correctness that marked President Nixon's reception in Moscow on Monday appears to have given way to a warmer atmosphere. Doubtless the sunwashed Russian spring weather helped. But the most effective thawing agent was the apparent desire on the part of both Americans and Russians to signal the world that they were serious about cooperative efforts to reduce world tensions.

That intent explains the early and elaborately ceremonial signing of two pacts. The one promises future cooperation by both promises future cooperation by both countries in research on environmental problems. The second formally acknowledges an earlier accord on mutual cooperation in medical research, including environmental health problems. To note that both agreements