A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty should by all means be put at the top of whatever new agenda Washington and Moscow have in the cards. The groundwork of at least some seeming mutual trust now has been laid for it, and it would be a tragedy not to push ahead.

[From The Washington Post, Washington, D.C., May 28, 1972]

THE PROMISE IN MOSCOW

There is little that is either spectacular or new in the three agreements on space, scientific cooperation and pollution signed this week in Moscow but there is a great deal in each of them that is worth applauding. Underlying all three agreements is an acknowledgment by the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union that the problems in these area run beyond national boundaries and that the solutions to them are more likely to be achieved through joint efforts than through nationalistic enterprise. Thus, the long-range impact of these agreements can be far more substantial than the showmanship surrounding their signing may suggest. They are not the product of brief negotiations but the result of prolonged and sustained effort. If the agreements can be implemented in the years ahead in the same spirit that has prevailed in Moscow this week, they can improve not only the relations between the two governments but also the conditions under which life is lived on this planet.

The space agreement, for example, consist largely in one concrete projecta docking in earth orbit of an American and a Soviet space ship-and a promise. The promise is that this first docking and the steps that lead to it may be the key to a coordinated joint effort to explore and exploit those parts of the universe within man's reach. If it is possible for the two countries to work closely enough and to share enough information so that the docking exercise goes smoothly, it ought to be possible for them to cooperate on most other aspects of space operations. The benefits to each country from such an arrangement would be great. By curtailing both competition and duplication in space activities, scientists on both sides would be able to do in good time the things that ought to be done without straining the financial resources of their governments nearly as much in the process.

The agreement on scientific cooperation contains similar promise. Everybody agrees that the most rapid scientific advances are made when the largest number of scientists are free to exchange knowledge and technology with their counterparts wherever they may be. Indeed, there has been an increasing amount of sharing between Russians and Americans in some scientific fields in recent year, perhaps most notably in the efforts to convert to peaceful uses the energy of hydrogen fusion. The problems in this area and others are so enormous and the need for successful development so great that the interests of each country, as in space, are better furthered by cooperation than competition.

The pollution agreement stands on a somewhat different footing, and its announcement this week was more of a surprise than either of the other two. This is true, we suppose, because many of those interested in antipollution programs have been focusing so much attention on next month's international conference in Stockholm that the possibility of American-Soviet bilateral negotiations was overlooked. Indeed, this new agreement could simplify the tasks at Stockholm by helping to cut through or circumvent some of the political entanglements that are threatening the success of that meeting. Pollution is clearly a world-wide problem that cannot be solved by any one nation or any two, even if the two are the United States and the Soviet Union. But if we and the Soviets fulfill this new promise to work together on the problem the chances of getting others to join should be increased. And, as in space and science, the sharing of information and technology as well as the development of joint programs can reduce the cost and speed the pace of protecting the world's environment.

None of these things, of course, is mandated by these agreements. Each is, as it stands, a short-term arrangement which-in the main-calls for more talk and more consultation. But it seems to us that the more consultation and cooperation there is now, the more there is likely to be in the future, and

therein lies the promise and the real meaning of these accords. They are a milepost on the road toward solving some of the world's pressing but admittedly "nonpolitical" problems. Still, along the way to finding joint solutions to them, it is possible that we will also develop the joint trust necessary to solve many of our larger political problems as well.

[From the New York Times, May 28, 1972]

THE MOSCOW SUMMIT

Both the American and the Soviet people have good reason to be happy about the developments at the Moscow summit. The gains made go beyond the specific agreements that were concluded, notably the historic Nixon-Brezhnev accords on limiting defensive and offensive missiles. More important for the long run may well be the personal contacts between the leaders of the two nations and the positive images of the two nations transmitted by both Soviet and American media to their audiences. President Nixon underscored this aspect when he told the Soviet leaders at Friday's banquet: "We look forward to the time when we shall be able to welcome you in our country and in some way respond in an effective manner to the way in which you have received us so generously in your country."

Nevertheless, the millennium has not arrived in Soviet-American relations. The deep division between the two countries over Vietnam and the Middle East remain unresolved. The Soviet leaders have not surrendered their ideological ambitions. And even as cordiality reigned in Moscow, American planes were pounding North Vietnam, while frantic Soviet efforts were under way to ship still more military supplies to Hanoi despite the mining of North Vietnam's harbors. These unresolved tensions were reflected at the summit in the failure to reach concrete agreement on trade and credits, a setback that was partially mitigated by the decision to set up a joint commission to negotiate a comprehensive trade agreement.

The summit and its accomplishments would have been impossible if, on both sides, there had not been a cooling of earlier ideological passions and a new primacy of national self-interest. A key to making this development possible was undoubtedly the new relationship forged last February in Peking between the United States and the Chinese People's Republic. Mr. Nixon discovered there that it was possible to do mutually beneficial business with even such Communist zealots as Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, a realization that implied still greater possibilities in negotiations with the more moderate Communists in Moscow.

For the Soviet leaders, the emergence of the new-and still ambiguous-Peking-Washington relationship made it a matter of primary importance to improve Moscow-Washington relations. A Soviet refusal to receive Mr. Nixon would have raised the danger of driving the United States and the Chinese Peoples Republic closer together, perhaps leading to the dread possibility of a Chinese-American alliance against the Soviet Union. It was to prevent such a development that the Soviet doves-against the vigorous opposition of their hawkish colleagues-decided not to make an immediate issue of Mr. Nixon's Vietnam escalation and to go ahead with the summit as planned.

For a stable world in which peace is more secure than it is now, all three great powers must have good relations while the temperature in areas of greatest tension-Indochina and the Middle East-is lowered by accords acceptable to all sides. That desirable situation is still elusive, despite the progress made in Peking last February and now in Moscow. It is encouraging, however, that some of the venom has left Soviet-Chinese relations in recent weeks, while Peking has taken the Nixon-Brezhnev talks more calmly than it took the Eisenhower-Khrushchev meetings in 1959.

President Nixon, aided by both Mao Tse-tung and Leonid I. Brezhnev, has improved the atmosphere of international relations. The task ahead is twofold: to continue the progress achieved among the great powers and to utilize the greater warmth that has entered their relations as a lever to bring just and lasting peace to Vietnam and the Middle East.

[From the Washington Star, Monday, May 29, 1972]

MESSAGE FROM MOSCOW

More than anything else, the world needs a little hope. In recent years, a great many people have come to fear that the forces of destruction may well be inexorable. But those who have felt such despair must have felt something quite different yesterday, as they heard President Nixon speaking from Moscow. For he was trying, as mightily as any leader ever has, to tell a new vision of peace to the world. And to back him up, he had one of the most momentous diplomatic achievements of modern times.

It was a fine, warm speech-quite possibly, when all is said and done, the most important one he ever will make. That will be the case if indeed it marks the beginning of an era of concord, and even cooperation, between the world's two greatest powers. If a firm mutual understanding really should materialize out of the Moscow meetings to study war no more, as the old song puts it, then Richard M. Nixon is assured of a high historic pedestal.

The upshot of that will not be apparent for some time-until we've seen how the nuclear arms limitation treaty works out, and how the general climate of cordiality bears up under future stresses and strains. All this was implicitly recognized in Mr. Nixon's remarks. He is not naive. The United States and the Soviet Union, he said, "have taken a historic first step" toward ending the arms race. In the past week they've made some good strides on "the long journey," but there is recognition that stumbles are possible: "It is important to both of our peoples that we continue those strides."

Assuredly Mr. Nixon went the full mile, and further, in reaching agreement with the Russians on nuclear arms limitations. Here at home, he will face some criticism for allowing the Soviets numerical superiority in weapons. It is an experiment in hope that will give a good many people the shivers, and not altogether without reason. But it is defensible in light of the awesome destructive capacities that will be unaffected by it, and because the alternative is a run-away nuclear weapons race that would be much more chilling and maybe bankrupting in the bargain. It clearly was time for a bold initiative for nuclear deceleration, which the President now has taken, and not without incurring some risks. The country must go along with him, and hope that the Soviets' zeal for strict controls prove equal to his.

In any event, he gave the world a most appealing picture of what it could become: "Let our goal now be a world free of fear-a world in which nation will no longer prey upon nation, in which human energies will be turned away from production for war and toward production for peace, away from conquest and toward invention, development, creation. . . ." The agreements reached in Moscow for cooperation in the fields of medicine, science, pollution control, trade and space flight are, he hopes, the beginnings of constructive cooperation. And while some of these still are more symbolic than substantial, they nonetheless are heartening symbols.

We're glad that the first potential stumbling block-Vietnam-was dealt with firmly, though not by name, in the address. The reminder that large nations can be sucked into war by conflicts between smaller nations, and the admonition that this be prevented-clearly aimed at his Soviet hosts-was well stated. This may, however, indicate failure in the talks to reach any understanding on Vietnam. We can only hope that events will reveal what words have not, in a salutary way.

The marvel, of course, was that Mr. Nixon was speaking at all there in the Kremlin, pushing his ideas and promoting America to possibly 100 millon Russian TV viewers. Not many years ago it would have been unthinkable—even a month ago it seemed unlikely because of Vietnam war developments. We've seen that wonders still are possible; now we must hope that this one endures and improves.

[From The Evening Star, Washington, D.C., May 30, 1972]

RUSSIA GETS N-SUPERIORITY ON A SILVER PLATTER

(By Crosby S. Noyes)

It is now only too obvious why the Moscow summit meeting came off as scheduled. Considering what they are likely to achieve as a result of it, no 80-847-7243

other problems, including the outcome of the war in Vietnam, are even approximately on the same magnitude of importance to the leaders of the Soviet Union.

It was of major importance, of course, to Richard Nixon as well. The series of agreements-the whole atmosphere of the Moscow meeting-was of very great value in an election year. The fact that most of the agreements were prepared months ahead of time and would have come into effect anyway is largely beside the point. The fact that it may take months for the American public to understand the price that was paid for a few hours of Kremlin cordiality is an essential part of the meeting's success.

The Russians played hardball in Moscow and they won. The crowning achievement of the meeting is said to have been an agreement on the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear arms. And it probably is the most disadvantageous agreement of its kind that the United States has ever entered into.

As most Americans had understood the strategic arms limitations talks that have been dragging on for nearly three years in Vienna and Helsinki, the objective was to work out an agreement that would freeze the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union at a rough parity that would diminish both the danger of war and the cost of continuing unrestricted competition. As a concept, it was sound enough.

But the agreement reached in Moscow, in fact, does no such thing. On the contrary, it virtually assures the Soviet Union a very significant superiority in every important area of nuclear weaponry within the next five years. Far from being a freeze on anything, it permits the development of the Russian nuclear arenal well beyond the capacity which most American experts believe they will be able to achieve.

To the extent that parity has been established in the SALT agreement, it applies only to defensive missiles, which the Russians from the outset were anxious to limit. Under the terms of the agreement, both sides, essentially, would remain vulnerable to the other. We would not have a credible defense against a first strike aimed at our land-based missile sites; the Russians would not be able to defend themselves against retaliation against their major cities. But the apparent trade-off here is obviously not equal. Each side, under this formula, would be equally vulnerable to a first-strike nuclear attack against its offensive missile force and to a retaliatory blow to its cities. But since, under this formula, a nuclear first-strike could offer a strong probability of wiping out a very major part of the retaliatory force, the odds are clearly stacked in favor of the side that launches the first, all-out nuclear assault.

So it is in the area of offensive weapons that the Moscow agreement counts most. And in this area the Russians have won a very significant, if not decisive advantage, consecrated in a formal agreement between the two countries. As administration spokesmen have been explaining the agreement, there is a kind of trade-off between quantity and quality in offensive weaponry between this country and the Soviet Union.

It is conceded that the Russians, under the provisions of the agreement, will be permitted to have more land-based missiles (at least 1,600) than we have (1,050). It also is conceded that if the Russians take advantage of all the options offered them, they also would have a substantial numerical advantage in submarine-launched missiles (about 950 to 700).

It is being argued, however, that because the United States has developed multiple warheads that can be independently targeted (MIRV), the Russian numerical superiority is offset. As of today, for instance, it is pointed out that we have 5,700 deliverable warheads on our existing missile as against 2,500 for the Soviet Union. Furthermore, we are being told, it is unlikely that the Russians will take advantage assumed by adminis-- offered to them under the SALT agreement.

Both arguments are highly suspect. The qualitative advantage assumed by administration spokesmen must be rated as temporary and highly misleading. There is nothing in the agreement that would prevent the Russians from developing multiple warheads of their own in the near future, and indeed it is almost a dead certainty that they will.

The qualitative argument, furthermore, cuts both ways. The largest Soviet warheads, MIRV-ed or not, are immensely more powerful than the largest American weapons. For example, the 313 SS-9 (or larger) weapons that the

Russians will be permitted under the agreement represent at least the equivalent in explosive power of 4,725 of the largest American weapons.

To assume that the Russians will not take advantage of the options offered them under the SALT agreements is incredible. For the last 10 years, they have maintained a staggering momentum (17 new submarines and 25 new missile sites presently under construction) in an effort to achieve nuclear superiority over the United States. They can surely be counted on to take every advantage of an agreement which, in effect, hands them that superiority on a silver platter.

[From the New York Times, June 2, 1972]

KREMLIN TERMS ACCORDS TRIUMPH-BREZHNEV IS REAPING PRAISE
FOR TALKS WITH NIXON

(By Hedrick Smith, Special to The New York Times)

Moscow, June 1-The new Soviet-American agreements on strategic-arms limitation and other issues, formally approved today by leading Communist party and Government bodies, are being hailed here as triumphs of major significance, altering the world political climate.

The Communist party leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, is reaping public praise for his week of talks with President Nixon. And some people, in letters published by the controlled press, are saying they expect the civilian sector to benefit from the savings realized through the arms-control measures.

Privately, however, highly placed Soviet sources have expressed disappointment that the Moscow talks did not yield a major breakthrough on trade.

Despite White House denials that trade concessions are being withheld pending progress on the Vietnam negotiations, the Soviet sources said they suspected that the impasse on trade was linked to Vietnam and reflected President Nixon's disappointment over his inability to get explicit Soviet promises of help in working out a settlement.

Such an appraoch, the Russians assert, overestimates Moscow's capacity to influence the North Vietnamese as well as the importance it attaches to increased trade.

Nonetheless, the Soviet leadership was reported to have been hopeful that the talks with Mr. Nixon and his aides would produce clear-cut American decisions on such central issues as the outstanding Soviet Lend-Lease debt, the granting of equal tariff treatment for Soviet imports and the approval of Governmentbacked credits for Soviet purchases-all requisites of expanded trade.

Moscow, which regards these more as political than as economic issues, had hoped to see them move forward in the high-level political talks, it was explained.

The importance that the Soviet leaders attach to trade prospects was underscored by Tass, the Soviet press agency, in reporting formal approval of the results of the American-Soviet meeting by the government 15-man Politburo of the Communist party, the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, or parliament.

Tass reported that the results had been "entirely approved," but it did not say the action was unanimous, as is customary for such events.

"The Soviet Union comes out for developing trade and broad economic relations with the United States, believing that reciprocally advantageous solutions can be found in this sphere too," the dispatch said.

In a passage designed to reassure allies as well as to project the prospects for long-term stability in Soviet-American relations, Tass quoted the ruling bodies as asserting that the joint declaration of principles signed Monday by Mr. Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev "creates the prerequisites under international law for building ties and cooperation in all fields of mutual interest, on a firm and long-term basis, by no means to the detriment of third countries."

The dispatch not only hailed the arms agreements as "the most important measure" to date for avoiding nuclear war and curbing the arms race but also emphasized the importance of American acceptance of "the principle of parity and equal security" between two countries.

A front-page commentary in Pravda yesterday went further, declaring that "the crowning success" of the Moscow talks and agreements would have "great significance in changing the political climate in the world for the better."