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The wave of publicity has been coupled with almost equally enthusiatic reporting on the ratification of the west German treaties of nonaggression with the Soviet Union and Poland. The Supreme Soviet formally ratified the Moscow-Bonn treaty yesterday.

In a speech to the Supreme Soviet, an alternate member of the Politburo, Pyotr Y. Masherov, party leader in Byelorussia, paid tribute to Mr. Brezhnev for the success of the negotiations.

The Soviet party leader's enthusiastic support of accommodation with Washington attracted interest because of his reputation as a hard-liner on the basis of several tough articles and speeches last fall.

The discussion on the West German treaty included the first indication that Moscow had abandoned hopes of holding a European security conference this year.

Although the United States is getting generally more favorable coverage of its official policy in the Soviet press than in years, Tass has resumed coverage of the trial of Angela Davis, long a major news attraction that was ignored during Mr. Nixon's visit. Articles about the Vietnam war, given modest display and neutral headlines during the visit, seemed slightly more sharply worded. In comparison with several months ago, the items are still receiving low-key treatment.

[From the Federal Times, June 7, 1972]

CASE BILL WOULD LIMIT EXECUTIVE PACTS TO BASES, NUCLEAR STORAGE

Washington.-Although the Nixon administration is opposed to congressional veto of executive pacts, a Republican senator wants to limit their use to those involving military bases and the storage of nuclear weapons.

Sen. Clifford P. Case, R-N.J., has introduced a bill to cut off funds needed to carry out these agreements unless the Senate approves them as treaties.

Sen. Case declared that he was "deeply pleased" by the State Department's decision not to oppose his older bill which merely requires the transmittal of executive agreements for congressional review.

That bill, S. 596, passed the Senate in February by an 81-0 vote. It requires executive agreements to be sent to Congress within 60 days of their enactment. Case said that the State Department's guarded endorsement, on the eve of the President's trip to Moscow, "seems to me to be of great potential significance to the future relations between these two co-equal branches of government."

John Stevenson, legal adviser at the State Department, told Sen. Sam Ervin's subcommittee on separation of powers that the administration “will not oppose that bill (Case's) if Congress truly feels this is the wisest manner in which to proceed."

Earlier administration officials testified before Sen. Ervin's panel that they oppose an Ervin bill to require review of all executive agreements in 60 days, subject to veto by concurrent resolution.

Senator Case then introduced his new bill, S. 3637, focusing on executive agreements involving military bases and nuclear weapons. It would apply to agreements previously made.

The Ervin bill, S. 3475, "would put the United States at a disadvantage in international negotiations," Stevenson declared. "The ability to make firm agreements with immediate binding effect is frequently of critical importance in obtaining and formalizing concessions from other governments."

For good measure, Stevenson said he is opposed to another Case bill which demands that Congress must approve last year's agreements with Portugal for a military base in the Azores and for facilities at Bahrain.

"I do not believe the approach is based upon a sound constitutional premise. and I must regretfully state our opposition to that bill,” the State Department official said.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, attornty general and deputy under secretary of State in the Johnson administration, testified that he could not support the Ervin bill in its present form.

"I think Congress is entitled to know, if it wishes, every formal obligation of the United States," Katzenbach said. "I think the discipline of having to submit such agreements would be healthy.

"I do not believe, however, that Congress can constitutionally qualify the power of the executive to enter into such agreements when they are within his own traditional constitutional prerogatives, at least not by concurrent resolution," he said.

Those types of resolutions, unlike bills passed by Congress, are not subject to a presidential veto.

Katzenbach said, "There is merit in not forcing every issue to a vote, and in allowing the President some latitude. Ordinarily he wants and needs that broad underlying consensus, knowing that our policy cannot be successful without it."

Opposition also came from the Pentagon's J. Fred Buzhardt, general counsel of the Defense Department. He declared that the Congress "is already intimately involved in the overwhelming majority" of executive agreements that are of interest to Defense.

The 60-day grace period given Congress to approve agreements under the Ervin bill "would constitute a severe impairment and, in some cases, would preclude the consummation of agreements which could otherwise be obtained to advance the interest of the United States," Buzhardt testified.

Moreover, under the supremacy clause in Article VI of the Constitution," Congress has no authority by concurrent resolution to repeal or amend the laws of the United States or treaties made under the authority of the United States," he declared.

Ralph E. Erickson, assistant attorney general at the Justice Department, also spoke against the Ervin measure. It presents substantial constitutional problems of its own," he noted. He said. "The very source of the President's powers suggests that determination of whether an international arrangement is to be effected by treaty or executive agreement should be resolved by the existing sound and traditional constitutional process."

The President has independent power under the Constitution to conclude executive agreements, Erickson said. This includes the power to "receive ambassadors," and thus to recognize foreign governments. Also, the President can make operational arrangements, such as cease-fire agreements to insure the safety of troops.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

U.S. COURT CASES

U.S. v. Belmont, 301 US 324, 81 L ed. 1134–1143.
U.S. v. Guy W. Capps, 348 US 296, 99 L ed 329-337.

U.S. v. Pink, 315 US 203, 86 L ed 796-832.

Reid v. Covert, 354 US 1, 1 L ed 2d 1148-1204.

Seery v. U.S., 127 F Supp 601-606 (Court of Claims, 1955).

Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. U.S., 169 F Supp 268-288 (Customs Court, First Division, 1958); F 2d 472-484 (Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 1959). Wilson v. Girard, 354 US 524, 1 L ed 2d 1544-1557.

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

Akzin, Benjamin. "The Use of the Executive Agreement in American Foreign
Relations." April 1944. (A typescript report; listing of agreements).
Brewer, Virginia W. "Executive Agreements and the Congress Since World
War II" 7 p. (A typescript report prepared in the Legislative Reference
Service, Foreign Affairs Division, October, 4, 1968).

Browne, Marjorie Ann. "The Bricker Amendment: A Brief History with Em-
phasis on the Period Since 1955." 13 p. (A typescript report prepared in the
Legislative Reference Service, Foreign Affairs Division, November 10, 1970).
Collier, Ellen C. "The Meaning of 'Advice and Consent of the Senate' in the
Treaty-making Process." 50 p. (A multilith report prepared in the Legisla-
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The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation. (88th Cong., 1st Sess. Senate Document No. 39). See pages 484-497. [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] (1964).

Hoskins, Halford L. "Treaties and Executive Agreements in International Law." 11 p. (A multilith report prepared in the Legislative Reference Service, February 26, 1953).

The Law Librarian. "Treaties in Simplified Form (Executive Agreements) Under the Legislation and Practice of Various European Countries," November 14, 1969 (A typescript report).

"Treaties in Simplified Form (Executive Agreements) Under the Legislation and Practice of France," November 24, 1969. (A typescript report). "Treaty Making in Great Britain," December 19, 1969.

"Treaties in Simplified Form (Executive Agreements) Under the Legislation and Practice of Italy," December 24, 1969 (A typescript report).

"Executive Agreements: What They Are and the Authority for Making Them: Views and Selected Authorities." prepared by Daniel Hill Zafren, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division, April 5, 1972.

Legislative Reference Service. "The Constitution of the United States of America Analysis and Interpretation." Senate Document No. 39, 88th Congress, 1st session. U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1964.

Price, Hugh P., "The Bricker Amendment and Similar Proposals for Amending the Treaty Provisions of the Constitution." 37 p. (A Multilith report prepared in the Legislative Reference Service, American Law Division, December 2, 1964).

Ramsey, Mary Louise. "Authority for Certain Executive Agreements." 32 p. (A typescript report prepared in the Legislative Reference Service, American Law Division, May 30, 1969).

Sarkissian, Arshag O., "Secret International Agreements in which the United States Was a Party," 11 p. (A typescript report prepared in the Legislative Reference Service, Foreign Affairs Division, August 28, 1961).

GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allen, Florence Ellinwood. The Treaty as an Instrument of Legislation. New York, Macmillan, 1952. 114 p.

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"Our Constitution and the Dangers of the Bricker Proposals." & The Record of the Bar of the City of New York (New York), December 1953: 454-85. "Continued Defense of the Constitution Against the Bricker Proposals.” 10 The Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. (New York), March 1955: 114-42.

"Reports of the 1957 Bricker Amendment." 12 Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. (New York) June 1957: 320. Backus, Dana C. (See under Pearson, Theodore).

Barnett, James F. "International Agreements Without the Advice and Consent of the Senate." 15 Yale Law Journal, November 1905: 18-27 and December 1905: 63-82.

Bershtein, Edward M. "The 'Bricker' Movement to Amend the Constitution." Chicago Library, Department of Photographic Reproduction, University of Chicago, 1955.

Bielitsky, Frank, "The Danger in the Treaty Making Power-A Mirage." 25 Temple Law Quarterly. (Phila.), April 1952: 463-471.

Bishop, William W., Jr. International Law, Cases and Materials, 3rd ed. Boston, Little Brown, 1971. 1122 p. See pages 92-112.

Borchard, Edwin. "The Attorney General's Opinion on the Exchange of Destroyers for Naval Bases." 34 American Journal of International Law, October 1940: 690-697.

Opinion on the Question Whether the St. Lawrence Waterway and Power Project Can Be Concluded by Executive Agreement with Canada or Requires a Treaty. Rev. ed. Washington, D.C., Press of Byron S. Adams. 1946. 81 p.

Borchard, Edwin. "The St. Lawrence Waterway and Power Project" 43 American Journal of International Law, July 1949: 411-434.

"Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?" 53 Yale Law Journal, 1944; 664-683 (Also in 38 American Journal of International Law, October 1944: 637-643).

"Treaties and Executive Agreements." 40 American Political Science Review, August 1946: 729–739.

"Treaties and Executive Agreements-A Reply." 54 Yale Law Journal, 1945: 616-664.

"Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?" 53 Yale Law Journal, 1944: 664-683) also in 38 American Journal of International Law, October 1944: 637-643).

"Treaties and Executive Agreements." 40 American Political Science Review, August 1946: 729–739.

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Brandon, Michael "Analysis of the Terms Treaty' and 'International Agreement' for Purposes of Registration Under Article 102 of the United Nations Charter." 47 American Journal of International Law, January 1953: 49-69. Brandt, Henry J. "Issue Raised by the Bricker Amendment." 36 Chicago Bar Record (Chicago), June 1955: 398.

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"Making Treaties and Other International Agreements." 289 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Phila.), Sept. 1953: 134-144. Bricker, John W. (and Webb, Charles A.; MacChesney, Brunson). "Bricker Amendment: Pro and Con. Treaty Law vs. Domestic Constitutional Law." 29 Notre Dame Lawyer (Notre Dame), August 1954: 529-82.

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"The UNRRA Agreement and Congress" 38 American Journal of International Law, October 1944: 650–659.

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Brown, Walter L. "Substitute for the Bricker Amendment." 40 Virginia Law Review (Charlottesville), February 1954: 113–159.

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Cardozo, Michael H. "Attempts to Transmute Indemnity Into Discharge of Claims in Executive Agreements." 39 American Journal of International Law, October 1955: 560–563.

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Deutsch, Eberhard P. (Finch, George A.; Call, Joseph L.; Dillard, Hardy C.; and Wright, Quincy). "Should the Constitution be Amended to Limit the Treaty-making Power." 26 Southern California Law Review (Los Angeles), July 1953: 347-395.

Deutsch, Eberhard P. "Legislating by Treaty." 31 Michigan State Bar Journal (Lansing), May 1952: 19-25.

"The Need for a Treaty Amendment: A Restatement and a Reply." 38 American Bar Association Journal (Chicago), Sept. 1952: 735-738, 793–796. "Proposed Changes in United States Treaty-making Power," an address before the Louisiana Bar Association. 1 Louisiana Bar Journal (New Or leans), July 1953: 3-11.

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Dulles, John F. "The Making of Treaties and Executive Agreements." 28 Department of State Bulletin (Washington), April 20, 1953: 591-595. Also appears in: 102 New York Times, April 7, 1953: 14.

Ely, Robert B. III. "Hidden Hole in the Fifth Amendment: Treaty Power Versus Property Rights: A Substitute for the Bricker Amendment." 59 Dickinson Law Review (Carlisle, Pa.), June 1955: 299.

"Executive Agreements and the Proposed Constitutional Amendments to the Treaty Power." 51 Michigan Law Review (Ann Arbor), June 1953: 1202-17. "Executive Agreements and the Treaty Power." 42 Columbia Law Review, May 1942: 831-843.

"Executive Agreement Cannot Withdraw Consent to be Sued; Just Compensation Clause Given Extra-territorial Operation." (Seery v. U.S. 127 F Supp. 601) v. 55, June 1955: 926-930.

"Executive Agreements: Senate Seeks Review Power." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, February 26, 1972: 458-459.

Fensterwald, Bernard, Jr. "Amending the Treaty-making Power: Trojan Horse or Don Quixote's Windmill." 13 Federal Bar Journal (Washington), Decem ber 1952: 85-98.

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