reviewed and recommended some twenty years later by Secretary Weinberger and other American specialists in defense and national security, foremost were priorit measures to upgrade the system's efficiency. On July 17, 1984 the White House annoured that American-Soviet agreement on both instantaneous and facsimile transmission had been achieved: the United States and Soviet Union would be able to transmit maps and pictures that could play a crucial role in resolving certain types of crises or misAll that remained was implementation by American and Soviet technical

understandings.

experts.

It would be difficult to fault the singular importance of the Hotline's operations. With neither fanfare nor criticism since its inception in 1963, it has functioned as a stabilizing element in American-Soviet relations. More recently, it was agreed that the superpowers would use the system if either obtains information on the possible use of nuclear weapons by a third country or by terrorists.7 Requiring precise,

dependable, technical collaboration of the highest order, the record of cooperation appears exemplary, especially in view of deep and abiding hostilities that have continued with scant letup.

Momentum toward accident prevention has also augured well for the future of confidence-building in fields other than military emergencies. When a private plane

went down in British Columbia in September 1982, the nearest help was straight up-600 miles away. A Soviet navigation satellite COSPAS (cooperative rescue) relayed the plane's emergency signal to Ontario, 2,500 miles from the crash, facilitating a rescue that saved three lives. The Soviet COSPAS, a link in the joint U.S.-Soviet-CanadianFrench satellite search-and-rescue program consisting of four orbiters is geared to receiving emergency signals from any part of the earth. Initiated in the aftermath of the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz mission, the COSPAS/SARSAT system attracted Canada and France to a formal memorandum of understanding in 1979. Ever since, it has been a productive venture without political undertones or technology transfer adversely affecting U.S.

national security.

The project's goal has been to save the lives of aviators and mariners who transmit emergency signals to the satellites passing above them.

Both the Hotline and COSPAS/SARSAT emergency rescue system are parts of an extensive network of agreements in science, technology, education, and culture dating from the 1970s. Cooperative programs, expanded and diversified during the summits in Moscow (1972 and 1974) and Washington (1973), provide for eleven speciaIncluded are:

lized agreements.

A twelfth agreement in 1973 covered cooperation in education, performing arts, publications, exhibits, and exchanges of political leaders, educational experts, writers, and publishers. The March 1985 Soviet delegation to Washington, led by Soviet Politburo member Shcherbitsky, included appearances at the Congress, State Department and the White House, as part of the 1973 agreement. These wide-ranging accords increased significantly U.S.-Soviet exchanges in non-military fields since the early 1970s.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 caused U.S. support for cooperation in science and technology to lag. In response to the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981, collaborative enterprises were scaled back still further with the lapse of three agreements in space, energy, and science and The transportation agreement fell victim to the Soviet shoot down of Korean Flight 007 in September 1983. In June 1984, however, President Reagan piecged to revive and strengthen efforts in environmental protection, housing, agriculture.

technology.

and health. Even though the relevant treaty has lapsed, he agreed to consider joint space ventures to capitalize on American and Soviet scientific strengths.

Prospects for scientific cooperation were also enhanced significantly when Washington and Moscow agreed to resume cooperation in agriculture which had been dormant for several years, even though the formal agreement had been automatically extended on schedule. In earlier years, the agreement supported plant, animal and soil science research (germ plasm studies) and exchanges of information on grain culture. Under a new pledge to reinvigorate these programs, announced in June 1985. U.S. experts are to help boost Soviet grain production. Young farmers from each side will spend three months in the other's country.

Joint activities in environmental protection have supported seminars, joint publications, exchange visits, and cooperative projects focusing on endangered species, modeling of long-range air pollution, and earthquake prediction. Plans in the fall 1985 included convening the first joint environmental control committee meeting in more than seven years.

President Reagan has directed that cooperation be strengthened under the Agreement on Cooperation in Artificial Heart and the Agreement on Medical Science and Public Health. Envisioned are a renewal of high level visits and the initiation of fresh projects. Extant agreements provide for joint research on glaucoma, congenital heart disease, mechanically assisted circulation in artificial hearts, and cancer treatment and prevention.

Besides seven active inter-governmental cooperative agreements as of fall 1985, there are formal exchange programs between the National Academy of Sciences and its Soviet counterpart plus programs of the International Research and Exchange Board (IREX). The 1984-85 academic year saw some 25 graduate students and young professors scheduled for exchange in each direction. Overall, about three hundred scholars a year from each

Past inter

tions

side engage in academic study, parallel research, and scholarly symposia, academy exchanges in particular have suffered from the general chill generated by Soviet actions in Poland and Afghanistan and more particula pleasure of American scientists over the harsh treatment of Soviet Academian Andrei Sakharov and other dissidents.

by the dis

Unquestionably, dramatic high politics has inhibited, and on occasion closed down, cooperative programs very quickly. Yet fields in which the United States has benefited substantially include basic physics, advanced electroslag remelt techniques, laser treatment of glaucoma, studies of air pollution, light-weight concrete construction technology, and the effects of long-term space flight on cosmonauts. Cooperative programs have provided American scientists with unique geological and environmental conditions, large research vessels for experiments, and exceptional opportunities to conduct joint research with Soviet scientists in their own laboratories. American space projects stand to gain valuable scientific knowledge, now that the Soviets have established themselves as a formidable space faring power.

Moreover,

Superpower cooperation in the interests of safer aviation also goes or, most of it very technical and lacking in glowing press coverage. For example, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan have worked to avoid repetition of the KAL 007 8

incident. Talks on a new civil aviation accord that would restore mutual landing

rights for U.S. and Soviet airlines included provisions to establish a new mini-hotline-most likely a telephone network linking air traffic control centers in Anchorage, Tokyo, and Khabarovsk in the Soviet Far East. As reported in July 1985 by the U.S. Department of Transportation, the special network would be available when civil

aircraft assigned to North Pacific routes encounter life-threatening difficulties.9

Concerning sea safety, there has been a setback. For the first time since the 1972 bilateral agreement on preventing dangerous incidents at sea, the two nations cancelled their annual meeting in 1985. The cancellation resulted from Defense Secretary Weinberger's decision to abbreviate the trip by Soviet naval officers to the United States and to eliminate the customary social engagements in retaliation for the 10 killing of a U.S. officer by a Soviet soldier in the GDR. Senator John Warner, one of the negotiators of the accord, argued that the continuation of regular meetings is imperative. All along, the purpose has been to reduce the number of dangerous confrontations during contacts between the two navies at sea. Other than negotiations

between U.S. and Soviet delegations to current arms control conferences and the Special Consultative Commission (SALT), the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement provides the only regular institutionalized exchanges between U.S. and Soviet officials on specific military topics.

Following up their 1983 recommendations, Senators John Warner and Sam Nunn 7:ve outlined proposals to lessen the chances of armed conflict and accidental nuclear war. In a release published by Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, they supported the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers in Washington and Moscow, to be staffed with officials of both sides who would monitor crisis situations. Through informal exchanges of information, bi-national officials would act to guard against nuclear accidents and terrorism. In addition to their obvious roles during crises, risk reduction centers would provide for a variety of negotiations and exchanges during normal times, all in the interest of reinforcing habits of coRecommendations also included expanded

operation and preventing nuclear disaster.11

contacts between superpower military leaders and the placement of small tamper-proof early-warning radars on each other's territory. Agreement to exchange such black boxes could lead to their placement near missile bases to provide speedy verification

of silo launches.

While not critical to the orchestration of peaceful U.S.-Soviet relations, these inter-governmental agreements, inter-academy exchanges, and the surprisingly wide variety of problem-solving projects and proposals have yielded meritorious results in and of themselves, apart from what they might have accomplished for the easement of tensions. What comes through unmistakably from the catalogue of agreements is that carefully defined cooperative arrangements have worked. And they can work even better, if given the chance. If the superpowers genuinely wish to extract greater benefits from their relationships, politics must be made to give way a little. Politics must moderate, accommodate, and on select occasions assume a subordinate role in favor of expanding joint enterprises with transcendent values of their own.