Mr. HAMILTON. Well, we have had a good session this morning. We appreciate your participation greatly, and the subcommittee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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APPENDIX 1

CRS STUDY ENTITLED "U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGES: PERSPECTIVES AND PROSPECTS" BY JOHN P. HARDT, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR SENIOR SPECIALISTS, AND JEAN F. BOONE, SENIOR RESEARCH ASSISTANT, CRS

From the Eisenhower and Khrushchev administrations to date, successive American and Soviet leaders have followed a policy of supporting bilateral relations by expanding, in periods of accommodation, exchanges of citizens, such as students, performers, professional scientists, and educators. These formal exchanges have facilitated selective contacts between the open society of the United States and the relatively closed Soviet society. Exchanges favored by each country have varied according to differing assessments of likely net gain. As an instrument of overall bilateral relations, exchanges changed in volume and composition as the Great Power relationship waxed and waned. During the period of detente, 1971-1979, exchange relationships were developed across a wide range of fields through a series of intergovernmental agreements. This remarkable proliferation of programs changed the bilateral exchange relationship from one of merely "getting acquainted" to one of joint projects aimed at solving specific, common problems. With the invasion of Afghanistan, however, the relationship was reduced to a hollow framework, as projects were terminated and funding cut by as much as 75%. Although several of the agreements were renewed and some low-level communication continued, exchange activity in the period 1980-85 was only 20% of that preceding Afghanistan. Resumption of the summit process in 1985 signaled a possible new upswing in exchanges, one that holds potential for expanding exchanges both quantitatively and qualitatively. As the Reagan and Gorbachev administrations both are on record as favoring exchanges in principle, the debate over future exchanges will likely focus on the composition of the exchange programs.

The Reagan Administration, in approving and implementing the exchange agreements emanating from the Geneva Summit in 1985, has lent support to the

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principle of exchange, continuing and expanding on the long term,
bi-partisan U.S. view of exchange programs. The President's U.S.-Soviet
Exchange Initiative, by emphasizing direct contact between citizens of
both countries, particularly the young, represents a qualitative change
in exchange, a broadening of interaction beyond the parameters of past
exchanges which tended to be narrowly focused on specific fields and
specialists in those fields. Moreover, as the Reagan Administration
consciously kept open the framework of exchanges despite their
interruption by the Afghanistan sanctions, the full pattern of pre-
Afghanistan exchanges was revivable without lengthy new discussions.
U.S. proponents and opponents alike agreed that any revisions in the
exchanges should be the based on a reappraisal of past programs, profiting
from the earlier experience in order to maximize U.S. benefits and minimize
costs to U.S. security in future exchanges.

The Gorbachev regime, for its part, has called for more openness to Western economies and societies than any prior Soviet administration and openness -(glasnost') at home. The virtues of interdependence have been personally ratified by the top Soviet leader in an unprecedented fashion in rhetoric and practice. Moreover, domestic reform in the economic, educational, cultural, and scientific systems all appear intended to move toward openness and greater interactio with the world community. In order to move in this direction of reform

at home, Gorbachev apparently feels that the U.S.S.R. would profit from more
exposure to Western norms of efficiency and dynamism through expanded exchanges.
Still, the Soviet system retains, and is likely to continue, its system of
central political control, secrecy, and restricted foreign access- involving
limited emigration of people and immigration of ideas. The limits of human
and civil rights, especially efforts of ethnic and religious minorities
to identify with the cultural heritage of their choice, have become even

more narrow under Gorbachev than before. Still, the pressure on the

leadership to motivate citizens the principle of equality of opportunity implied in Gorbachev's emphasis on the "human factor"- and the need to compete in the technological-information revolution common to other industrial societies, logically implies that Gorbachev's rhetoric should be translated into systemic changes that move the Soviet Union toward a new, Western-type environment. This strongly felt need of Soviet leaders for modernization would appear to be conducive to expanded, productive, bilateral exchanges.

Indeed,

These factors on both sides suggest an interest in the development and expansion of exchange. In the past, the two countries have appeared to use expanded exchanges as a part of agendas for overall accommodation. when arms and political negotiations are most limited, exchanges may receive greater support as a means of establishing some initial basis for agreement. The general exchanges agreement signed in Geneva by Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, and the people-to-people initiative approved by President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev, if fully implemented, would together represent a bilateral exchange relationship of substantially greater scope and breadth than any established in the past.

Nevertheless, while acceptable in principle in both the United

States and the Soviet Union, expanded exchanges may meet both support and strong, even heated, opposition in both countries.

These domestic differences

tend to reinforce disagreements between the two countries on specific projects that may be considered in the bilateral exchange agenda. A number of issues are at the center of disagreements on specifics that have or will surface in both countries.

Scientific Communication

Some in the United States argue for exchange promotion by supporting narrow controls in many key security areas - "tall fences around narrow areas" and reliance on "security through accomplishments."