Others in the U.S.A. tend toward favoring exchange restrictions by supporting wide definitions of strategic controls and tight control on American as well as Soviet participants in exchanges. Some in the Soviet Union would promote exchanges by favoring closer and broader ties with the United States and joint research efforts in a more open environment. Others would limit exchanges by arguing for enhanced restrictions, close supervision of personnel involved in exchanges, and use of only secure channels for transferring information. Bridging Systems Some Americans argue for promoting broad exchanges with acceptance of a substantial government role on both sides as necessary for bridging systems. In the United States the Government role is important in focusing and coordinating the mix of private and Government initiatives, particularly because the exchanges are with a country whose participation is exclusively government-selected and guided. These American exchange promoters would contend that openness through interaction provides the Soviets with insights into our political system and cultural heritage that need not endanger our security by unintended transfer of specific technical information and would provide Americans with useful insights as well for better understanding the Soviet system. Others, who favor restrictions, argue that Americans must gain more than the Soviets and that any gain to them that strengthens their system erodes our security. In this restrictive view, access to our system by any Soviet government officials is seen as akin to inviting in foreign agents. Espionage and exchanges may thus be closely related; in this view, close and continuous control of citizens of our major adversary would thus not only be prudent but necessary. Some Soviets promoting exchanges are looking for new forms of legal and political institutions that would fit more closely with effective Western transfer mechanisms. Accepting openness and some risk to system control in view of enhanced gain, these Soviets would, in the tradition of Peter the Great, stress the advantages of exchange to overcome Soviet technological backwardness and would welcome foreign influences and challenges to those many elements of backwardness and noncompetitiveness in their system. Some more restrictive and traditional Soviets, however, do not wish to make their system and their citizens in any way more accessible or more open to Western ideas and culture. The traditional Russian xenophobia of these people may be reinforced by self-interest which leads them to guard against Westernizing effects on their system and their personal positions of influence. Like their Slavophile ancestors, these Soviets would call attention to the dangers and vulnerability in foreign dependence, i.e. argue that interdependence is primarily dependency and entails the risk of foreign "blockades." Moreover, Soviets concerned about the openness of exchanges would find the "cultural pollution" of American "materialism" unacceptable in ideological, political, and cultural terms. Exchanges and Diplomacy Some Americans argue that the value of exchanges is greatly enhanced by continuity and some degree of insulation from the ups and downs of bilateral political relations. These proponents of exchange would support some parallelism between exchanges and negotiations on political, military, commercial and human rights issues but would tend to favor positive linkage (more "carrots") and the avoidance of negative linkages (fewer "sticks") such as the use of embargos, sanctions, and interruptions of exchanges. Others, however, favor close relationships between foreign policy issues and exchanges, and favor giving the President many useful diplomatic levers designed for restrictive use. Some Soviets who view exchanges favorably argue that only by adopting the system of education, scientific research and technological experience from the West can the Soviets meet their needs and begin to function as an industrially developed society and economy should. This group would oppose the interrruption of exchanges for foreign policy purposes as negative to Soviet self-interest. Others, more restrictive in their view, would stress that the Soviets should not foster exchanges for fear that they lose more from the interruptibility of exchange than the U.S., e.g. they would become impicit hostages to good Soviet-American relations on a wide range of foreign policy issues. This concern about interrruption is the counterpart of U.S. use of foreign policy restraints in commercial relations. Implicitly these Soviets would also oppose a degree of openness and comity between U.S. and Soviet counterparts that exceeds what exists in their own system. Building foreign peer networks and "invisible colleges that go beyond domestic developments would, in this view, be inappropriate and uncertain. A balance of exchanges Soviets and Americans alike may view the principle of exchanges as similar to commerical relations. The short-term exchange of people may be likened to the current account in commercial relations; the long-term programs, the capital account. As in commercial relations, the key criteria is mutual each side should receive benefits greater than the costs borne benefit: in the exchanges. Risks of security--national security and competitiveness--are relevant costs that must be considered; net benefit may be likened to an interest rate. In human investment, as contrasted with capital goods transfer, control and ownership does not transfer in the exchange, but external factors, the broader effects involving the undermining of each others systems and cultures, altogether difficult to assess, may be more consequential with people than with goods transfers. There are, nonetheless, many commonalities that make the letter and the spirit of controls and stimulants on exports and imports of goods germane for assessing people exchanges. To the extent that balance of exchange measurements are comparable to balance of payment accounts in commercial relations, commercial legislation whereby trade is promoted or restricted may be relevant for developing a framework of congressional oversight for exchange. In the past, the congressional role in initiating, implementing, or overseeing U.S.-Soviet exchange has been minimal both during periods of expansion as well as under conditions of restriction. One notable exception was the interagency report prepared in 1975 at the request of Congress to assess the progress of U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperative programs prior to renewal of the bilateral science and technology agreement. 1/ Nevertheless, legislation such as the Export Administration Act and the Trade Act (including the Jackson-Vanik amendment) may be relevant to the determination of favorable balances of exchange. As new legislation proceeds through Congress, should it be made more explicitly relevant to the consideration of human as well as goods exchange and trade, it would provide for more orderly and effective congressional oversight in the process of development and management of U.S.-Soviet exchange. During this early phase of U.S.-Soviet exchange, few agreements were signed but those that were served as a basis for the expansion of bilateral contacts that occurred in the 1970s. In fact, several of the programs initiated in this period are still continuing today. In 1955, the United States and Soviet Union signed their first governmental cultural exchange agreement providing for general student and personnel exchanges, including those in science and technology. This agreement led to establishment of the first American National 1/ The author, John P. Hardt, was a member of the "Garwin Commission," as the interagency group was known, which produced the 1975 exchange assessment. Exhibit in the U.S.S.R., the first exchanges of university graduate students and faculty, and exchanges in the arts, professional, and musical fields. A year later, in 1956, the two governments agreed to exchange America magazine (published by the U.S. Information Agency) and Soviet Life (published by the Soviet government), to provide information to the citizens of each country about life in the other. In 1959, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the science academies of the Soviet Union and the East European countries signed a scientific exchange agreement. B. Pattern of Exchanges: Detente to Afghanistan, 1972-1979 With the advent of detente, U.S.-Soviet exchanges expanded rapidly from the limited base of the earlier years, with increasing activities and the extension of contacts into new areas. In this period, the exchange relationship grew and its focus changed from merely "getting acquainted" to an emphasis on solving common problems through joint projects. A series of bilateral agreements were signed to establish exchanges in education, culture, science and technology, and other fields. Educational and cultural programs of the period included the 1974 Fulbright scholars and lecturers program; direct university-to-university agreements; joint projects in the social sciences and humanities between the American Council for Learned Societies and the Soviet Academy of Sciences, the expansion of private contacts; and regular exchanges of first-rank performing arts groups, such as the Bolshoi Ballet and the New York Philharmonic Orchestra. The agreement on cooperation in the fields of science and technology, signed in 1972, served as the main scientific exchange agreement The and the model for other scientific agreements. A joint commission com- C. Low-Level, Low-Visibility Exchange, 1980-1985 With the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, a clear and sharp change took place in the process of U.S.-Soviet exchange. The general umbrella agreement for U.S.-Soviet exchange was allowed to expire, leading to the reduction in educational exchanges and complete cessation of government-sponsored cultural exchange. In science and technology, some activities were terminated, while others were sharply curtailed for both national security and foreign policy reasons. In some cases, funding and operations were cut 75% from the level preceding Afghanistan. Although activities were limited in this period, three agreements that were due to expire in late 1981, were renewed--the agreements on cooperation on ocean matters, the environment, and public health. However, as a result of additional sanctions imposed by the Reagan Administration after the introduction of martial law in Poland, the agreements on space, energy, |