outside the framework of the exchange program. It has been acknowledged by the Reagan Administration that "U.S. information about Soviet agricultural production was set back" when bilateral cooperation was curtailed after 1979. 5/ Although the closed nature of the Soviet system increases the value of even limited access gained through exchange, the question of reciprocity has been of concern since the 1970s when U.S. officals began to feel that the Soviet Union was benefitting more from bilateral exchange than the United States. Soviets in the United States have access not only to all kinds of information for research but also have access to the American public both on an individual level and through the media. In the Soviet Union, however, Americans must often work under much greater restrictions and within a narrower range of contacts. It was recently noted that student exchanges between the United State and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have progressed far beyond U.S.-Soviet interaction; an exchange project in the PRC now envisions Chinese and American students living together as roommates, teaching provided by faculty from both countries, the inclusion of sensitive subjects such as recent history, structure of both economies, and political institutions, and a creation of a library made up of half American and European books and half Chinese books, available on open shelves. It is this kind of interaction and openness that U.S.-Soviet exchange continues to lack. Given the current imbalance, some would argue that exchange should occur only if benefits are symmetrical and equal in each aspect of exchange number of particpants, number of visits, access to libraries, media resources, etc. Others, however, contend that exchanges can be asymmetrical on the detailed level as long as there is a net gain for the United States in the overall balance of exchange. 5/ Administration response. Dialog, p. 30. From the Soviet side, as from the U.S., there are likely various views on the desirability of and criteria for interdependence in exchange. Concerns about the destabilizing influence of Western ideas and the danger of overdependence on the West conflict with the desire of some to open the Soviet system for the purposes of economic modernization. C. Exchanges in Diplomacy What role should U.S.-Soviet exchange play in U.S. foreign policy-can it or should it be an effective tool of diplomacy? As in the use of foreign policy controls in trade, the curtailment or termination of exchange programs has been utilized in the past to achieve foreign policy objectives, e.g. to penalize the Soviet Union for its invasion of Afghanistan. The negative use of exchange its revocation for diplomatic ends has been opposed by many in the United States who argue that 1) people-to-people contacts are built over time and cannot be effective or productive if they are subject to unpredictable disruption; 2) that the United States loses access to valuable information and opportunities when exchanges are terminated; and 3) that in a time of superpower conflict or crisis, these human contacts and non-governmental channels of communication take on even greater importance and value. Concern about the interruptibility of exchanges is felt by the Soviets as well. To some degree, Soviet views on the question of diplomatic use of exchange are divided along the same lines as on the question of bridging systems - some believe that the benefits of interdependence and cooperation are of sufficient value to the U.S.S.R. to make the risks of diplomatic pressures tolerable; others would emphasize the vulnerability of dependence and fear of being used as a tool for Western foreign policy gains. On the other hand, exchanges can be useful as positive leverage in diplomacy; an expansion of contacts may result from the resolution of certain areas of U.S.-Soviet dispute. As noted during one conference on U.S.-Soviet exchange, human rights issues are among the most sensitive areas affecting bilateral exchange. Some Americans would argue that the United States "cannot and should not ignore moral and human rights concerns in the interest of maintaining exchange programs with the Soviet Union" and acceptable Soviet behavior should be a prerequisite of exchange. Others, though, suggest that making human rights conditions a prerequisite for exchange could prevent its occurrence althogether. In this view, U.S. exchange organizations should use their leverage to modify Soviet behavior but in a carefully planned and measured way. Still others would contend that scholarly and scientific exchanges should be entirely "off-limits" as diplomatic tools in order to prevent their politicization. 6/ Many argue that exchanges have, in fact, produced some positive influence on Soviet actions. For example, the new exchange agreement between the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and Soviet Academy of Sciences, signed in April 1986, allows the NAS to invite by name individual Soviet scientists to the United States. Such a provision may help to ensure the participation in exchanges of even those scientists not favored by the Soviet government. It has been argued, too, that protests by the NAS to the Soviet Academy of Sciences on behalf of Andrei Sakharov have had a significant impact on how Sakharov has been treated, despite their failure to win his freedom. 6/ U.S.-Soviet Exchanges: A Conference Report: Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies. Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1985, p. 7. In a broader context, bilateral agreements on cooperation and exchange may lead to the strengthening of Soviet compliance with international norms of behavior. Areas where there exists such potential for diplomatic gains in exchange include air safety, nuclear safety, and accidents at sea. VI. BALANCE OF EXCHANGE If bilateral exchanges are to broaden and expand over the long-term, the issues of contention described above--scientific communications, interaction between systems, and the relationship of exchange to diplomacy-will have to be resolved within the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as between them. Both sides need to be assured that the benefits gained through exchange will outweigh the costs and risks that such interrelations might incur. While the benefits may not be completely symmetrical for the United States and U.S.S.R., the final balance must show some net gain for each side if each country is to remain committed to exchange. How might the benefits and costs be assessed and balanced? As the principles underlying human exchange are comparable to those of commercial relations, or the exchange of goods, the criteria used to control selectively and facilitate trade might be applied to exchanges as well. In this context, the short-term gains and costs of exchange may be compared to the current account of commercial relations; the long-term progress in cooperation may be seen as the capital account. The objective of a successful relationship, as in trade, would be mutual benefit and for each side; gains must outweigh losses. From the American perspective, the costs of exchange may include some of the issues raised above: risks to national security, competition, disruption from political events, and, in addition, the actual cost of financing exchange programs. Unlike the exchange of goods, where the transfer is more tangible and permanent, the exchange of people and ideas raises questions of cost and benefit that are difficult to evaluate. "Balancing the account" must take into consideration both the immediate costs and benefits of each program and the longer-term contribution and role of exchange within the U.S.-Soviet relationship. As in commercial relations, stable expansion of exchange is unlikely to occur without concomitant improvement in overall bilateral relations. In order to determine a favorable balance of exchange, consensus within the United States among those interests that argue for exchange promotion and those that argue for exchange restriction may be developed within the framework used to govern U.S.-Soviet trade. Congress may wish to consider if the balance of controls and stimulants to trade contained in current legislation the Export Administration Act and the Trade Act, primarily could perhaps be broadened to become relevant for human exchange and interaction as well as commercial exchange: Whether the concept of contract sanctity, for example, could be made applicable to exchange by establishing conditions under which exchange programs may be interrupted for foreign policy purposes; Whether the framework of national security controls based on militarily critical technology may be extended to the applicable areas of risk in the spheres of scientific communications and educational exchange; Whether the flexible approach of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment may serve as a model |