Politics and Rationality: Rational Choice in ApplicationWilliam James Booth, Patrick James, Hudson Meadwell Cambridge University Press, 1993 - 307 頁 Rational choice approaches to the study of politics are of great and growing prominence in political science. There are an increasing number of collections devoted to the methods of rational choice theory and specialized monographs applying it to individual topics. The present volume is unique in that it is a collection of substantive applications of rational choice theory in three of the main fields of political inquiry: comparative politics, international relations and political theory. The essays gathered here represent work by many of the most outstanding scholars in the discipline showing how rational choice theory may be employed in the analysis of fundamental political questions. |
內容
Introduction | 1 |
Political theory | 9 |
Liberty and social choice | 11 |
The contractarian explanation of the state | 33 |
Marxs two logics of capitalism | 61 |
Comparative politics | 87 |
Structure culture and action in the explanation of social change | 89 |
Wages strikes and power An equilibrium analysis | 132 |
Transitions to independence and ethnic nationalist mobilization | 191 |
International politics | 215 |
Economic nationalism and economic progress | 217 |
Comparative advantage and public security perceptions in Western alliance security policies | 240 |
Mediators allies and opportunists Third parties in international crises | 266 |
Rational choice in the crisis domain An appraisal of superpower interactions 19481979 | 281 |
| 305 | |
A gametheoretic model of reform in Latin American democracies | 165 |
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常見字詞
actors alliance analysis argued argument bargaining behavior Brams and Kilgour Capital capitalist causal choice theory coalition collective action Colombia comparative advantage competition conflict constraints contract contractarian convention coordination coordination game costs countries crises crisis culture defense desires and beliefs discount factor economic electoral equilibrium ethnic example explanation explanatory exports game-theoretic important increase independence individual institutional intentional issue leadership convention legislators liberty manufacturing Marx Marx's Marxism Meadwell mediator nations normative beliefs obshchina offer option outcome Paretian liberal Pareto Pareto principle patronage payoffs peasant percent personal sphere player position Prisoner's Dilemma probability problem production propositions protection rational choice rational choice theory relations relatively result revolution risk aversion ruler situation social choice social choice theory social contract social structures strategy strikes Strong Labor superpower third party tion trade union United Uruguay USSR Weak Labor