Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist WarRoutledge, 2007年4月16日 - 256 頁 This well-researched volume examines the Sino-Vietnamese hostilities of the late 1970s and 1980s, attempting to understand them as strategic, operational and tactical events. The Sino-Vietnamese War was the third Indochina war, and contemporary Southeast Asia cannot be properly understood unless we acknowledge that the Vietnamese fought three, not two, wars to establish their current role in the region. The war was not about the Sino-Vietnamese border, as frequently claimed, but about China’s support for its Cambodian ally, the Khmer Rouge, and the book addresses US and ASEAN involvement in the effort to support the regime. Although the Chinese completed their troop withdrawal in March 1979, they retained their strategic goal of driving Vietnam out of Cambodia at least until 1988, but it was evident by 1984-85 that the PLA, held back by the drag of its ‘Maoist’ organization, doctrine, equipment, and personnel, was not an effective instrument of coercion. Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War will be of great interest to all students of the Third Indochina War, Asian political history, Chinese security and strategic studies in general. |
搜尋書籍內容
第 1 到 5 筆結果,共 36 筆
... Mao Zedong had died in 1976, the policy of “politics in command” continued to define almost every aspect of Chinese ... Mao to motivate conscripts. At the highest level, the Selected Military Writings of Mao Zedong influenced every ...
... Mao Zedong devised during the early years of the Chinese Civil War. The PLA's strategic concepts, operational plans, and tactical schemes may have been similar to those of the other armies, but in the eyes of its leadership it had an ...
... Mao Zedong devised these concepts to define the functions of the PLA and its relationship to society, to define the nature of relationships within the army, and to define the PLA's relationship with the enemy. They interconnect and ...
... Mao Zedong had begun to call for party members and soldiers to spend more time on agricultural work, in an effort to make the communist base more self-sufficient. More importantly, this program enabled officials to improve their ...
... Mao Zedong. On September 29, 1958, during the Great Leap Forward, Mao called for a campaign to “make everyone a soldier” (quan min jie bing). 58 The campaign consisted of propaganda and basic military training for residents of the newly ...
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Guangzhou Military Region 111 | |
the legacy of an incredible shrinking war | |
Appendix principles of the political work system 167 | |