Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist WarRoutledge, 2007年4月16日 - 256 頁 This well-researched volume examines the Sino-Vietnamese hostilities of the late 1970s and 1980s, attempting to understand them as strategic, operational and tactical events. The Sino-Vietnamese War was the third Indochina war, and contemporary Southeast Asia cannot be properly understood unless we acknowledge that the Vietnamese fought three, not two, wars to establish their current role in the region. The war was not about the Sino-Vietnamese border, as frequently claimed, but about China’s support for its Cambodian ally, the Khmer Rouge, and the book addresses US and ASEAN involvement in the effort to support the regime. Although the Chinese completed their troop withdrawal in March 1979, they retained their strategic goal of driving Vietnam out of Cambodia at least until 1988, but it was evident by 1984-85 that the PLA, held back by the drag of its ‘Maoist’ organization, doctrine, equipment, and personnel, was not an effective instrument of coercion. Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War will be of great interest to all students of the Third Indochina War, Asian political history, Chinese security and strategic studies in general. |
搜尋書籍內容
第 1 到 5 筆結果,共 87 筆
... to war 33 4 The 1979 campaign 45 5 The Battle of Lang Son, February–March 1979 74 6 Artillery diplomacy: waiting for the “second lesson” 89 PART IV Explorations 109 7 Crisis in command: the cadre system under stress in.
... battle comparison: 1979 48 5 Military regions and the Cau River defensive line 50 6 The Lang Son Front (1979) 56 7 The Cao Bang Front (1979) 58 8 The Lao Cai Front (1979) 61 9 The Battle of Lang Son (1979) 75 10 80 The northern approach ...
... battles along the border. At other times, China pursued a strategy of “artillery diplomacy,” firing massive artillery barrages at Vietnamese villages to draw Vietnamese reinforcements to the border to face the threat of a “second lesson ...
... battles and barrages of the 1980s that kept the region in turmoil for almost ten years. Even the name the Chinese coined to identify the war is misleading. Western scholars have not been any more helpful than their Chinese colleagues ...
... battles? Did the Chinese focus their attacks on a few cities or did they attack all the provincial capitals they could reach? The Chinese claim the engagements were minor encounters in which Chinese border guards defeated Vietnamese ...
內容
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4 | |
6 | |
Guangzhou Military Region 111 | |
the legacy of an incredible shrinking war | |
Appendix principles of the political work system 167 | |