On the agreed day on which power is transferred to the transitional administration (para. 10 above), a cease-fire will come into effect within Rhodesia and measures will be taken to lift sanctions.

12. An outline of the Transitional Constitution is at Annex B.

The Zimbabwe Development Fund

13. The Zimbabwe Development Fund, jointly sponsored by the British and United States Governments, will have as a target a minimum approaching U.S. $1,000 million and a maximum rather less than U.S. $1,500 million to which Governments in many parts of the world will be asked to contribute. Its purpose will be to provide funds for the economic stability and development of an independent Zimbabwe through assistance to various sectors and programs such as rural development, education, health, social and economic infrastructure, and resettlement and training schemes for Africans, including those affected by the present conflict. The operations of the Fund would help to ensure that the obligations of the Zimbabwe Government under the settlement will not inhibit economic development in Zimbabwe for lack of foreign exchange and would thereby also help to reassure those who might fear that the new Government might be unable to carry out these obligations. The establishment and continued operation of the Fund are predicated upon the acceptance and implementation of the terms of the settlement as a whole. A more detailed account of the proposed Fund is at Annex C.

Conclusion

14. The British and United States Governments believe that the above proposals provide for all the citizens of the independent Zimbabwe security, but not privilege, under the rule of law, equal political rights without discrimination, and the right to be governed by a government of their own choice. They also believe that the proposed arrangements for the transfer of power are calculated to ensure a quick, orderly and peaceful transition to independence. They have agreed to use their joint influence to the full to put the proposals into effect. But a lasting settlement cannot be imposed from outside: it is the people of Zimbabwe who must achieve their own independence. These proposals offer them a way. The two Governments urge them to seize the opportunity.

Any citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies who surrenders his citizenship in order to retain or acquire the citizenship of another member of the Commonwealth is entitled to regain United Kingdom citizenship subsequently under the British Nationality Act 1964.

77 Dept. of State Bulletin 424–427. The text of Annex A, B, and C is reproduced in 77 Dept. of State Bulletin 427–439.

For further information concerning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, see ante, Ch. 3, § 6, pp. 174-175.

For further information concerning the Zimbabwe Development fund, see post, Ch. 14, § 9, p. 987.

In Sept. 1977, the United Kingdom requested the U.N. Security Council to appoint a representative to enter into the negotiations concerning Southern Rhodesia. On Sept. 29, 1977, the Security Council adopted by a vote of 13 in favor, none against, the Soviet Union abstaining, the People's Republic of China not participating Res. 415, which reads in part as follows:

The Security Council,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council members, a representative to enter into discussions, with the British Resident Commissioner designate and with all the parties, concerning the military and associated arrangements that are considered necessary to effect the transition to majority rule in Southern Rhodesia;

On October 14, 1977, representatives of the United States and Canada signed a Joint Report concerning negotiations on maritime boundaries and related resource issues, which, inter alia, recommended the establishment of a joint fisheries commission for the cooperative management of fish stocks of common concern and a procedure for binding arbitration of outstanding differences. The Governments directed the negotiators of the Joint Report, Ambassador Marcel Cadieux for Canada and Ambassador Lloyd N. Cutler for the United States, to continue their negotiations with a view to recommending detailed terms for a comprehensive settlement.

The fisheries commission proposed by the negotiators would be composed of separate Atlantic and Pacific Coast panels with members appointed by the two governments. Each fisheries panel would review annually and, as appropriate, recommend to the two governments regulatory measures for the stocks of fish under joint management. If either of the two governments did not agree with the panel recommendations, a procedure would be established for prompt conciliation and, if necessary, binding arbitration of outstanding issues. Differences over interpretation and application of the agreement would also be subject to the arbitration procedure.

Dept. of State Press Release 478 (Oct. 21, 1978).

Portions of the Joint Report of Ambassador Cadieux and Ambassador Cutler to the Governments of Canada and the United States follow:

I. 1. On August 1, 1977, the Governments of Canada and the United States appointed special chief negotiators to conduct maritime boundary and resource negotiations. The chief negotiators were instructed to report by October 15, 1977, on the principles of a comprehensive settlement encompassing delimitation of maritime boundaries, appropriate complementary fishery and hydrocarbon arrangements and other related matters. The terms of reference also directed the chief negotiators to develop the substance of a comprehensive settlement for submission to governments by December 1, 1977. This Joint Report of the chief negotiators to their governments sets forth principles recommended by them for a comprehensive maritime boundaries and resource settlement.

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3. The two negotiators consulted with their respective fishing communities on both coasts.

4. During the first phase of the negotiations, the two sides directed their attention to the basic principles of long term resource

arrangements for fisheries and hydrocarbons as a basis for reaching detailed agreement on these issues and on boundary delimitations during the second phase.

II. FISHERIES

5. The two sides agreed on a text of "Proposed Principles for a Joint Fisheries Commission to be Established by Convention between Canada and the United States" (Attachment I). The negotiators agreed that these principles should be the basis for further discussion of the substantive details of such an arrangement during the more detailed negotiations to be carried out in the next few months.

6. The agreed approach involves the following:

7. General Framework

There would be three categories of fish stocks covered in the Agreement, to be listed in annexes A, B and C to Attachment I. These Annexes would also contain agreed entitlements to these stocks as defined in the annex for fishermen of either country, as appropriate. The stocks listed in each annex would be managed on a different basis.

8. Annex A stocks would include transboundary stocks to be subject to joint management by a Fisheries Commission (see 13 below). The Commission would annually recommend appropriate regulatory measures for these stocks under procedures including provisions for disputes settlement described in section V.

9. Annex B stocks would be stocks considered appropriate for jointly agreed management as a unit. Management of such stocks, as defined in the annex, would be based on proposals submitted by the country with the primary interest, as designated in the annex. In these cases, the Commission would recommend to governments agreed regulations following the submission of proposals by the country designated in the annex. In making such proposals, the proposing country would be obligated to observe certain criteria, or management standards. The management standards would relate to such matters as criteria for determining optimum sustainable yield, the avoidance of adverse impact on other fisheries, and the need for nondiscrimination in regulations. These management standards have not yet been fully developed. If agreement were not reached, the proposals of the country of primary interest would take effect subject to the review procedure described below.

10. Annex C stocks would be those occurring clearly off the coast of only one country. For these stocks, the coastal state would manage the fishery, but consultations on stock assessment and regulations would take place within the Commission forum.

11. Under the aegis of the Commission, the two countries would coordinate the collection of statistics, carry out cooperative research, jointly assess the status of category A and B stocks, and discuss the disposition of their respective "surpluses" to third countries or to one another.

12. The two sides agreed that further discussion is required with regard to the disposition of surpluses and the areas in which entitlements may be fished.

III. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

13.

Fisheries Commission

A Fisheries Commission would be established consisting of an Atlantic coast and Pacific coast panel. Each panel would consist of twelve members, six members appointed by each side. In addition, there would be two impartial cochairmen on each panel (who might, for example, be retired judges from the senior domestic courts of each side or other distinguished persons), one appointed by each side subject to the concurrence of the other. The cochairmen would attend and preside over meetings of each panel, but would not be members of their delegations and would not be entitled to vote with the members of the panels on the adoption of regulations. The major responsibility of the cochairmen would be to act as conciliators and arbitrators should a dispute arise concerning the interpretation and application of the Agreement or the adoption of regulations for the management of certain stocks of fish, as set out below in paragraphs 20 and 21.

14. The Commission would also have power to recommend to governments the addition of particular stocks to annex A, B or C, or the transfer of stocks from one annex to another, or changes in the agreed reciprocal fishing entitlements set out in annexes A, B and C.

15. During the second phase, the negotiations will address the categorization of the fish stocks, management criteria and reciprocal entitlements for inclusion in a long term fisheries agreement, as well as interim arrangements for the 1978 season. The two sides also agreed to look into the possibility of incorporating the existing International Pacific Halibut Commission into the new structure being developed for bilateral fisheries relations.

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V. DISPUTES SETTLEMENT

19. The two sides agreed that there should be a dispute settlement procedure in the resource agreements to be negotiated.

20. With respect to the fisheries agreement, it was agreed that there should be one procedure for the settlement of all disputes under the Agreement, whether they be economic or policy disputes or legal disputes concerning the interpretation of the Agreement. 21. Any such dispute or any other dispute concerning the interpretation of the Agreement would be referred to the two cochairmen who would endeavor to settle it. If their conciliation efforts fail, they would endeavor to agree between themselves and their agreement would become final and binding on both governments. If they do not agree on a settlement, they would refer the matter to a previously agreed neutral arbitrator.

22. The arbitrator would be empowered to decide disputes concerning the management of annex A stocks. With respect to disputes

concerning annex B stocks, the arbitrator's jurisdiction would be limited to the case where a proposed plan submitted by the country designated in the annex is clearly erroneous under an applicable standard set forth in the Agreement. The arbitration would be conducted under an agreed timetable designed to produce a decision before the start of the fishing season to which the dispute relates.

ATTACHMENT I

PRINCIPLES FOR A JOINT FISHERIES COMMISSION TO BE ESTABLISHED BY A CONVENTION BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

I. MEMBERSHIP

A) The Commission shall consist of an East coast panel and a West coast panel. The two panels may conduct joint sessions from time to time in order to consider problems of common concern. B) Each panel shall consist of twelve members, six members appointed by each side.

C) In addition to the twelve members on each panel, there shall be two impartial cochairmen who shall be jointly agreed by both sides. The cochairmen shall not be nationals of the same party and shall not be part of their respective delegations. They shall attend all meetings and shall alternate in the chair and shall perform the functions described in article V.

D) Panel members shall serve at the pleasure of the appointing side. The cochairmen shall serve for a term of five years, subject to the right of either side to withdraw its consent to the service of either cochairman upon 90 days prior written notice, in which event a successor cochairman shall be jointly agreed by both sides prior to the expiration of that 90-day period.

II. POWERS

Each panel shall have the following powers:

A) With respect to annex A stocks, each panel shall have power to propose annual management measures designed to achieve the optimum yield within the 200-mile zones of both countries. Such management measures shall be brought into force in the following

manner:

(1) If a panel agrees on the management measures to be proposed to the two governments, then:

(a) If neither government objects within days of the transmittal of the proposals, the proposals shall become final and binding on both governments.

(b) If either government objects, the procedure set forth in article V shall be utilized, and the decisions of the cochairmen or of the arbitrator shall be final and binding upon both governments.

(2) If a panel does not agree on the management measures to be proposed, it shall report to the two governments on the measure of agreement and disagreement. The two governments shall consider the matter, in consultation with each other and with their respective members on the panel. After days, the panel