United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Hearings, Ninety-first Congress, First [and Second] Session[s].U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971 |
常見字詞
activities air force alliance allies American arms arms-control Asia attack bases bilateral billion buildup Cambodia capability CARL KAYSEN Chairman China Chinese commitment communist continue countries Czechoslovakia defense deployed deterrence discussion divisions economic European fiscal foreign policy further Germans goal going important increase interests internal political involved Japan KAYSEN major means ment military budgets military force military policy MIRVS missiles mutual nations NATO negotiations offensive possible pre-Vietnam President probably problems prospect purpose forces question Radio Free Europe reduction relations role SALT talks Secretary Senator FULBRIGHT Senator JAVITS Senator SYMINGTON Seventh Fleet side significant situation South Korea South Vietnam Soviet Union statement strategic forces strategic nuclear forces strategic superiority strategic weapons subcommittee tactical nuclear weapons Taiwan things tion Treaty troops U.S. forces U.S. military U.S. strategic United warheads Warsaw Pact West Berlin withdrawal
熱門章節
第 31 頁 - Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the Senate Armed Forces Committee on the Fiscal Year 1969-73 Defense Program and 1969 Budget," Table 1 ("Financial Summary"), p.
第 28 頁 - ... it must warn the Arab states and their Soviet supporters to stop their military action immediately and return the conflict to the political and diplomatic level. As long as we maintain sizable naval forces in the Mediterranean, we will have that capability; it seems most unlikely that it will be necessary in advance to deploy forces to do more. Further, the likelihood of renewed major conflict in the Middle East appears to depend to a great extent on the general state of relations between the...
第 17 頁 - It is from this assumption that the international relations and security interests of the United States in South and East Asia will be discussed. A major feature of the Asian scene will continue to be the presence and voice of Communist China, by far the largest power in the area or the world in terms of population, located centrally and thus bordering on a great number of other states, the strongest militarily of all states in the region and the only one possessing even a few nuclear weapons. Yet,...
第 29 頁 - Within this general reserve force, of course, were tactical air and naval units. The size of this force was rationalized in terms of the need to meet, on short notice, the contingency of three military involvements at once: one in Europe, one in South or East Asia, both on a substantial scale, and a small third one elsewhere in the world. The foregoing discussion suggests that we should determine our force needs on the basis of more modest plans. These plans would include the capability of meeting...
第 24 頁 - ... international sense of forward motion in this area, as well as have some significance in themselves. Especially worth considering are a cutoff in the production of fissionable material, a complete test-ban treaty, a ban on placing nuclear weapons in the seabed, and a declaration against the first use of nuclear weapons, either in unconditional form or limited to use against nonnuclear powers. Each has its dilemma. For the first two. it is the difficulties of negotiating meaningful inspection...
第 6 頁 - Our military strategy in the past has been shaped by three chief goals, all interrelated, but nonetheless of different importance. The first was to deter and defend against a direct attack on the United States. The second was to deter and defend against both a direct attack on Western Europe and the use of the threat of military force, including the threat of attack on the United States, as a weapon in the indirect conquest by political means of some or all of Western Europe. The third, and both...
第 22 頁 - If one side's destructive capacity grows while the other's remains constant at a high level, does this reduce the effectiveness of the latter's deterrence? Questions such as these clearly have no unique, well-defined answers for all decision makers in all circumstances. What is clear is that constant or slowly changing force structures, whose technical performance characteristics are reasonably well understood— subject, of course, to the important fundamental limitation that no one has experienced...
第 32 頁 - Soviet benevolence and good faith that docs not correspond to the facts? The answer to this is that reliance on neither benevolence nor good faith— in the sense of sheer moral obligation— is involved. Rather, it is expected that both the Soviet Union and the United States are capable of recognizing a mutual interest in an increase in international stability, a decrease in the prospect of the use of force, especially when either of them is involved, and a relief from the economic burdens of rising...
第 21 頁 - Union's original force goals in 1961-432 were as modest as our estimates of them at the time — or even more so — and whether their rapid recent buildup, discussed immediately below, was a response to the tremendous acceleration in growth of our long-range striking forces brought about by the Kennedy administration. In any event, until 1967 it was possible for the administration to deny any wider aim for its strategic posture than deterrence, to argue the futility of seeking to achieve a first-strike...
第 22 頁 - ... satisfied" with its new position in relation to the adversary. Each, accordingly, feels it must anticipate such a response. And so the arms race goes on. The expected result of the process can be no more than a new balance at higher force levels, larger expenditures, and most likely, unthinkably higher levels of destruction in the event that the forces were ever used. The other and even more troubling consequence of following the competitive path is that the stability of mutual deterrence becomes...