anxiety; nay, even too much of it was shown concerning the approaching danger of Russian aggression. But, as is usually the case with a danger of long standing, the fire gradually slackened until it came quite recently to a final extinction, wrapping the vital interests of Great Britain in that ominous darkness in which she is now actually groping.

When, in the beginning of the present century, Napoleon I. united with Russia, and the plan of crippling England through an attack on India first appeared, the Anglo-Indian statesmen of that day had shown sufficient vigour in grasping the importance of the situation. The building of the English rule in India rested on a ricketty base, and the danger was serious, considering the intentions of the Emperor, Paul I., made afterwards public through his autograph letters directed to Prince Orloff, the chief of the Cossacks (January 12, 1801): "The English are preparing to make an attack with their fleet and army against me and my allies, the Swedes and Danes. We must attack them ourselves, and that at a spot where the blow should be felt most and be least expected. From Orenburg to India there is but three months' (?) marching, and from us to Orenburg one month-total, four months. I place this expedition in your hands and those of your troops. enterprise may procure glory for all of you, may

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obtain wealth for us, and open a new outlet for the disposal of our merchandise, thus striking at the enemy's heart." And further on :-" We must liberate the natives (subject to England); as to the soil it must be placed in the same dependence upon Russia in which it now is as to England, we must take the entire commerce into our hands." In the letter of January 13, 1801, we read :-"I send you a new map of India, which enters quite into details. On your march make sure of Bokhara for Russia, in order that the Chinese may not get hold of it." (W. Danewsky, "La Russie et L'Angleterre dans L'Asie Centrale." London, 1881; p. 25).

To this kind of schemes, boldly conceived but premature for execution, the mission entrusted to Sir John Malcolm was a due and appropriate answer. This highly talented English statesman easily succeeded in frustrating the effect of the French missions under Gardanne and Joubert, for the appearance of Malcolm, furnished with rich means by the Indian Government, was quite sufficient to baffle the efforts of French and Russian diplomacy. What Malcolm began was valiantly continued by Sir Gore Ouseley, and other subsequent British ministers at the Court of Teheran. Persia took nicely to the lesson of European civilisation; the Crown Prince of Persia had a particular fancy for the English language, and the British

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officers employed to drill the Persian army in the European style had answered beyond all expectation. For a time the tide of Persian sympathies for England ran very high, and naturally became the envy of Russia. A quarrel was soon pitched upon, which resulted in the Perso-Russian war, the disastrous end of which was the treaty of Turkman-chai, by which the Caspian Sea was turned into a Russian lake, and Persia was taught the lesson that English assurances in times of anxiety were of no great value in times of distress. No wonder, therefore, that the Shah's sympathies turned at once towards Russia, and English influence from that time began rapidly to go downwards. As men in their proper places are apt to work wonders, we must not be astonished that Sir Henry Rawlinson succeeded during the time of his mission to Persia in restoring the lost prestige of England in Teheran to its former place. Being, however, insufficiently supported by the Ministry on the Thames, his ability came to nought, and he very soon returned to Europe.

Since that time England's position in Persia has always been a secondary one, compared with the almighty and ubiquitous influence of Russia. There was no lack of gifted and zealous English ambassadors; but what use is there in the official zeal of single individuals, if the leading statesmen of the

home Government are unable or unwilling to second the aspirations of their representatives abroad. Persia was said to have become once and for ever unworthy of the care bestowed on her, and, by giving up every hope of winning her over to Western civilisation, she was left alone, i.e., in the fatal embraces of her northern wooer.

Russia, finding her way unchecked in this part of the Asiatic world, very soon set to work to utilise the favourable opportunity offered to her, by meddling with Afghanistan through Persia, as we had occasion to allude to in our previous pages. She thus became the real cause of the first Anglo-Afghan war; for, whatever may have been the reasons of the dispute between Dost Mohammed Khan and Lord Auckland, the former certainly would not have ventured to enter publicly upon hostilities with Great Britain, whose power and greatness he knew so well, if Russia, by her secret and public missions, had not fomented his hatred and encouraged the otherwise cautious ruler of Afghanistan to measure swords with England. During this first Anglo-Afghan war the English policy of vigilance against Russia had reached its climax. As I previously remarked, it went even beyond the proper limits; for the Russian outposts stood at that time very, very far from any point that might have been styled the gate of India.

But, alas! it is with States as it is with individuals in the ordinary concerns of life. Extraordinarily vigorous actions are almost inevitably followed by reaction; the excessive English vigilance inaugurated by the somewhat rash policy of Lord Auckland gradually turned into carelessness and indifference, from the time following the conclusion of the disastrous first Afghan campaign. The bleaching bones of the English soldiers left beyond the Kheiber Pass, the unexampled treachery, cruelty, and savageness of the Afghan opponent, seem to have left an indelible impression on the minds of the English. Add to this the accounts of the horrible murder of Stoddart and Conolly in Bokhara, and you will understand pretty well the detestation and scorn the English manifested of all matters connected with Afghan and Central Asia in general. Oh yes! we can understand, but not justify this aversion; for any other European power better qualified to deal with the Asiatics than the English are, would certainly have avoided the catastrophes connected with this campaign, and even if visited by misfortune, would not allow herself to be scared away altogether. Look at Russia. In spite of defeats by the score, she did not relax in her arduous work in the Caucasus until the most inaccessible gorges of rocks were cleared, and her victorious banner was made to float over all the