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Caucasus. Similar proofs of her perseverance she gave in her fights against the Turkomans, when, three times repulsed with severe wounds she again drew the sword, and did not give in until the enemy was crushed and the Akhal-Tekkes were lying at her feet. Of the reasons of this yielding spirit of the English we shall speak hereafter suffice to say here, that the epoch of English indifference concerning Russia's dealings in Central Asia dates from this period. Such is the official tone that prevailed, with slight interruptions since that time, in Downing Street as well as on the Hoogly; and if the individual views of certain ministers and leading statesmen occasionally proved an exception to this rule, the exception and the isolated facts proceeding from it are not sufficient in themselves to alter the whole line of premeditated policy.

Thus, many persons will find it rather surprising that Lord Palmerston could have feigned indifference to the Russian conquest of Tashkend, considering his views expressed as follows in a letter written to Lord Clarendon, July 31, 1851-"The policy and practice of the Russian Government has always been to push forward its encroachments as fast and as far as the apathy or want of firmness of other Governments would allow it to go, but always to stop and retire when it was met with decided

resistance, and then to wait for the next favourable opportunity to make another spring on its intended victim. In furtherance of this policy, the Russian policy has always had two strings to its bowmoderate language and disinterested professions at St. Petersburg and at London; active aggression by its agents on the scene of operations. If the aggressions succeed locally, the St. Petersburg Government adopts them as a fait accompli which it did not intend, but cannot in honour recede from. If the local agents fail, they are disavowed and recalled, and the language previously held is appealed to as a proof that the agents have overstepped their instructions. This was exemplified in the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, and in the exploits of Simonitch and Vitkovitch in Persia. Orloff succeeded in extorting the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi from the Turks, and it was represented as a sudden thought, suggested by the circumstances of the time and place, and not the result of any previous instructions; but, having been done, it could not be undone. On the other hand, Simonitch and Vitkovitch failed in getting possession of Herat, in consequence of our vigorous measures of resistance; and as they had failed they were disavowed and recalled, and the language previously held at St. Petersburg was appealed to as a proof of the sincerity of the disavowal, although no human

being with two ideas in his head could for a moment doubt that they had acted under specific instructions."

It is, therefore, beyond every doubt that in spite of outspoken anti-Russian feelings, and notwithstanding the Crimean war, a costly and quite objectless undertaking, the attitude of British statesmen in relation to Russian encroachments in Central Asia has had, from the first, that mark of leniency, indecision, and irresolution which has unfortunately prevailed up to the present time. Here and there we may have noticed an effervescence, a dubious rushing into action; but very soon abating, and always lame and without results in the end. Thus we find that during the whole conquest, from Tashkend to Bokhara, scarcely a voice was raised against advancing Russia. The public mind of England was swayed by her humanitarian swindling; and whenever the writer of these lines demonstrated the danger which was sure to arise out of the Russian advance to India, he was mostly pooh-poohed by the leading organs of both parties, nay, even rebuked for attempting to check the benignant work of civilisation, and the great blessing which Russia was to bestow upon barbarous and fanatic Central Asia.

It was only in 1869, when the outposts of the Czar had reached the Oxus, that a considerable

amount of uneasiness began to prevail in the optimistic circles of Great Britain. Prince Gortschakoff having been asked by Lord Clarendon about the ulterior plans of Russia, gave full assurance that his sovereign, the Czar, looked upon Afghanistan as completely outside the sphere within which Russia might be called upon to exercise her influence. For a certain time this restriction of the Muscovite sphere was faithfully observed; the Cabinet of St. Petersburg abstained from crossing the Oxus, in the north of Afghanistan; but four years later, nevertheless, she crossed the same river in the north of Khiva. After she declared war against the lastnamed country, England, alarmed at the magnitude of the preparations, again ventured to modestly ask what this meant. The answer of Russia was to the effect that the expedition dispatched against Khiva would be but a very little one; it would consist of simply four and a half battalions, with the purpose merely and solely to punish acts of brigandage, it being very far from the intentions of the Czar to take possession of Khiva, and that positive orders had been issued to the contrary. This little army consisting of four and a half battalions, consisted in reality of 53 companies of infantry, 25 sotnias of Cossacks, 54 guns, 6 mortars, 2 mitrailleuses, 5 rocket divisions, and 19,200 camels, with a complement of about 14,000 men.

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The British statesmen of the day, believing obstinately in the story of four and a half battalions, did not find the shadow of anything suspicious in Russia's doings, and when the ambassador of the Khan of Khiva appeared at Simla, where he was sent to implore the assistance of the British, he was told by the then Governor-General, Lord Northbrook, that the Queen was exceedingly sorry for the dispute which had arisen between the Khan and the Russian Czar, and that the best the Khivans could do was to make peace with the Russian Emperor and submit to his dictation.

Well, Khiva submitted; Russia got her foot on the left bank of the Oxus, and, in spite of all self-delusions, the uneasiness of England about Russian coterminousness with Afghanistan grew apace. The intention of safe-guarding the limits of the country intervening between England and Russia was in existence, but not the adequate will and power to obtain a desirable solution. Whilst walking in the avenues of Baden-Baden, Lord Clarendon and Prince Gortschakoff were quite happy to stumble over the new idea of a neutral zone to be made out of Afghanistan, a sort of buffer which was sure to prevent any future collisions; for his Majesty, the Czar, gave his sacred promises to fully respect the neutrality of the country of the Afghans; and English optimists, asking for

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