All this was done by the defendants here. The instrument was then sent, in this imperfect condition, to their partner in London. This authorised him to fill the blanks and negotiate it in London, and he did so. It was purchased by the Bank without any notice of the manner in which it originated, or of the fact that it was issued in that city and not in Philadelphia. When that institution became the holder it bore the dress of a bill of exchange drawn in Pennsylvania; and, upon the principle that every one is presumed to intend to produce all the consequences to which his acts naturally and necessarily lead, the presumption is that the defendants intended that the purchasers of it should receive it under the belief that it was a bill drawn in Philadelphia in the usual course of business. The question is whether they shall be compelled to perform their contract in the sense in which they intended the opposite party to understand it, or in a sense contemplated only by themselves, and entirely excluded by the terms of the instrument itself. It is very material to the parties that this question should be properly decided. The bill was drawn on July 3, 1850. The act of May 13, 1850, reducing the damages on dishonoured foreign bills of exchange to 10 per cent., contains a provision limiting its operation to bills drawn after the 1st of August, 1850. So that, if the bill in question is to be enforced according to its terms, the act of 30th March, 1821, giving 20 per cent. damages for its dishonour, furnishes the rule of decision. "All writers of authority on questions of morals agree that promises are binding in the sense in which the promissors intended at the time that the promissees should receive them. Paley, chap. 5; Wayland, chap. 2; Adams, pt. 3, chap. 5. Upon this principle, it was deemed a gross violation of contract when Mahomet, after promising to 'spare a man's head,' ordered his body to be cut through the middle. When Tamerlane, at the capitulation of Sabasta, promised to 'spill no blood,' it was an infraction of the treaty to bury the inhabitants alive.' These monstrous constructions of contracts were condemned by the civilized world as gross violations of the established rule of construction already indicated (Vattel, b. 2, chap. 17, s. 274). There can be no plainer priuciple of equity than that which requires every one to speak the truth, if he chooses to speak at all, in matters which affect the interests of others. He that knowingly misrepresents a fact for the purpose of inducing another to part with his money or goods, is held to his representation in favour of the party who confided in it. It is upon this principle that the maker of a negotiable instrument is not allowed to impair its value in the hands of a bona fide holder, by denying the existence of a consideration, or by otherwise showing that it is not what it purports to be. Chitty on Bills, 9; 7 C. & P. 633; Byles on Bills, 65. On the same principle, a man who procures credit for an insolvent person, by knowingly misrepresenting him to be a man of ability, is bound to answer in damages for the injury thereby produced. In truth, the law merchant is a system founded on the rules of equity, and governed in all its parts by plain justice and good faith. Master v. Miller, 4 T. R. 342. "When this bill was dressed in the costume of a Pennsylvania bill, it thereby gained a credit in the foreign market which it would not otherwise have received. The act of 1821, providing ample damages in case of the dishonour of bills drawn in Pennsylvania, contributed to give it that credit. That act must be considered as operating on the minds of those who purchased it. In Ripka v. Gaddis, it was declared by this court, after a careful examination of the authorities, that 'it had been long established in the case of negotiable paper of every kind, that it is construed and governed, as to the obligation of the drawer or maker, by the law of the country where it was drawn or made; as to that of the acceptor, by the law of the country where he accepts; and as to that of the indorser, by the law of the country where he indorsed.' In Hazelhurst v. Kean (4 Dal. 20), it was affirmed that 'the parties in the purchase of a bill of exchange must be supposed to have in contemplation the law of the place where the contract was made, and it (that is, the law of the place where the bill was drawn) necessarily forms part of the contract.' In Allen v. the Bank, Wh. 4-5, the same principle was re-asserted. From this rule, thus repeatedly recognised and well established, it follows that the Bank in the purchase of this bill must be supposed to have had in contemplation the law of Pennsylvania, providing indemnity for its dishonour. The law of this State was therefore a part of the contract of purchase, and we have no right to impair its obligation. "There is no reason why the statute of 1821 should not receive a liberal construction. It has been held that it is not a penal, but, on the contrary, it is a remedial act; that the damages given are not for punishment, but are intended as compensation; that its provisions are just and equitable, and highly necessary in a commercial community, to guard the interests of innocent inuividuals, and to secure good faith in commercial transactions. 5 Wharton, 425. No one can foresee the extent of the injury which the holder of a foreign bill of exchange may suffer from its dishonour. It is not like a domestic obligation, the breach of which can, in general, be repaired by the presence and credit of the holder. But the dishonour of foreign bills may occur, and usually does occur, at points where the holders cannot supervise the result, and where they have neither means nor credit to provide against the injury. These instruments are generally procured at a premium by the holders for the purpose of making their purchases in the country where they are payable, or as the means of pursuing their travels, or maintaining their credit abroad. The great distance between the residence of the drawers and that of the acceptors, must necessarily cause great delay in procuring indemnity from the former. In the meantime the loss to the holders, if they rely exclusively upon the bills to maintain their credit, and carry on their business, might be irreparable. Under such circumstances the recovery of the face of the bill only, with the usual interest, re-exchange, and costs, would be but a cold and inadequate remedy for so great an injury. The act of 1821 was deemed necessary, in order to do justice in such cases, and for the purpose of maintaining our commercial credit in other countries. It should receive such a construction as will best promote the intentions of the legislature in these respects. Upon the whole, we are of opinion that the bill should be met by the drawers in the same sense in which they manifestly intended that it should be received by the holder, and we think that the District Court was in error in adopting a different rule. "Judgment reversed, and judgment for the plaintiff in error for 1,453 dols. 31c., with interest from the 18th May, 1852, and costs of suit." CHAPTER XLIII. RIGHTS RELATING TO SUCCESSION. DCCCLVIII. We now approach the consideration of the Third Division or branch of the subject of this volume, (a) namely, the consideration of what law ought to govern the rights relating to succession to property. These rights grow out of a rule which is in truth highly artificial, though so generally incorporated into the law of all civilized states as to appear natural—the rule that it is competent to a person to extend his power and will beyond the limits of his own existence, and to transfer after his death property to living persons. This will may be either expressthat is, by being recorded in a testament (testatio mentis); (b) and then there is a testamentary succession-the heir succeeds to the deceased; or it may be tacit-then the law presumes what the intentions of the deceased were; and there is a succession ab intestato. The Roman law was philosophical in its conception and precise in its language on this subject: "Nihil aliud est hæreditas quam successio in universum jus quod testator habuit." (c) By a remarkable fiction it treated the hæreditas as a moral person-"Hæreditas non hæredis personam sed defuncti sustinet." (d) And the countries which have adopted this law as the basis of their jurisprudence have the adage, hæres sustinet personam defuncti. (e) (a) Vide ante, pp. 23, 389. Savigny, viii. s. 366 (172), s. 375 (295). Merlin, Rep., Heritier. (b) "Testamentum ex eo appellatur quod testatio mentis sit." Inst. 1. ii. t. x. (c) Dig. lib. 1. t. xvi. 24. (d) Dig. 1. xli. t. i. 34, 61; et cf. Dig. 1. v. t. iii. 50; et. l. xxvii. t. v. 31. (e) 3 Massé, p. 392. DCCCLIX. The first question of importance is, What forum has jurisdiction over the whole question of the succession ?-that of the situs? or that of the domicil? Donellus examines this question, and concludes, "relinquitur omnino locus is unus, in quo controversia hæreditatis tractanda sit, ubi scilicet qui convenitur, habet domicilium.” (ƒ) And again: "nunquam alibi de hæreditate agi posse quam ubi possessor domicilium habeat." That is, the petitio hæreditatis should be in the forum,-where the heir or representative of the deceased is; though the petitio rerum singularum-e.g., as to legacies of particular things—may be, perhaps, necessarily preferred before another forum. DCCCLX. The next question is-By what law shall the forum, so seized of the general subject, decide the question which arises, mutatis mutandis, in the matter of testamentary succession, as in the matter of obligation; namely, as to 1. The legal capacity of the testator? 2. The form of the testamentary instrument? 3. The dispositions contained in it? 4. The construction or interpretation of it? Next, in the case of succession ab intestato, what law ought to govern the rights of parties to the property of the intestate? Or, in the language of continental jurisprudence, are the statutes which govern the matter of succession personal or real? (g) DCCCLXI. Upon the question of the Law generally, applicable both to testamentary succession and to succession ab intestato, the jurisprudence of states admits of a threefold division. 1. The jurisprudence which submits the universitas juris (both moveable and immoveable property) of the succession to the Law of the last domicil of the deceased. This is in accordance with the opinion of Savigny and with the decisions of superior tribunals of Germany. (f) Comm. l. xvii. c. xvii. p. 76. |