Contract and Property in Early Modern ChinaMadeleine Zelin, Johnathan Ocko, Jonathan O. Ocko, Robert Gardella Stanford University Press, 2004年2月18日 - 398 頁 The role of contract in early modern Chinese economic life, when acknowledged at all, is usually presented as a minor one. This volume demonstrates that contract actually played a critical role in the everyday structure of many kinds of relationships and transactions; contracts are, moreover, of enormous value to present-day scholars as transcriptions of the fine details of day-to-day economic activity. Offering a new perspective on economic and legal institutions, particularly the closely related institutions of contract and property, in Qing and Republican China, the papers in this volume spell out how these institutions worked in specific social contexts. Drawing on recent research in far-flung archives, the contributors take as givens both the embeddedness of contract in Chinese social and economic discourse and its role in the spread of commodification. Two papers deal with broad issues: Zelin's argues for a distinctively Chinese heritage of strong property rights, and Ocko's examines the usefulness of American legal scholarship as a comparative analytic framework. |
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第 1 到 3 筆結果，共 59 筆
第 181 頁
other , because , once again , the costs of bargaining are too high . However , theorized Coase , in what has come to be known as the weak version of his theorem , if these costs were zero , then regardless of the legal rules or initial ...
other , because , once again , the costs of bargaining are too high . However , theorized Coase , in what has come to be known as the weak version of his theorem , if these costs were zero , then regardless of the legal rules or initial ...
第 182 頁
than a “ label for failure to reach a bargain " and suggests that we think of them instead as the " measurable costs of entering into transactions " ( Farber 1997 : 405 ) . Economist Yoram Barzel ( 1997 : 4 ) offers a similar but more ...
than a “ label for failure to reach a bargain " and suggests that we think of them instead as the " measurable costs of entering into transactions " ( Farber 1997 : 405 ) . Economist Yoram Barzel ( 1997 : 4 ) offers a similar but more ...
第 183 頁
From Cooter , then , we can infer that the structure of negotiation is itself arguably a transaction cost ... For example , since the costs associated with diamond traders ' extralegal agreements can reach or even exceed the transaction ...
From Cooter , then , we can infer that the structure of negotiation is itself arguably a transaction cost ... For example , since the costs associated with diamond traders ' extralegal agreements can reach or even exceed the transaction ...
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according additional agreed agreement amount appears authority banks branches brother building capital century Chapter China Chinese claims clear Code common concerned contract costs court created custom dated debt decision discussed disputes division documents early economic enforcement established evidence example fact field final firms four Guangxu Hayes head held household important included individual industry interest investment involved issues land late lease lineage loans magistrate manager ment merchants monopoly month norms noted officials operations original owner ownership paid parties partnership payment period practice production profits property rights purchase Qing received reclamation relationship rent responsibility rules sale price salt Shanghai shareholders shares signed social sold supplemental taels tang tenant tion tract transaction transfer trust Wang Zhang Zigong
書目資訊
| 書名 | Contract and Property in Early Modern China A study of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute Studies of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University |
| 編者 | Madeleine Zelin, Johnathan Ocko, Jonathan O. Ocko, Robert Gardella |
| 版本 | 圖解 |
| 出版者 | Stanford University Press, 2004 |
| 來源： | 加州大學 |
| 已數位化 | 2008年9月2日 |
| ISBN | 0804746397, 9780804746397 |
| 頁數 | 398 頁 |
| 匯出書目資料 | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |