We went into it quite a lot at the NATO meeting. The French like to be encouraged by having everybody say that this is not merely a little French venture all by itself; it is part of a whole struggle against Communist aggression. We said that in a resolution, and we said everyone who was helping them should continue to do so, and they felt much more encouraged about the whole thing after that.

They have been working pretty well-not as well as it should be done on the raising and training of large native forces. They are particularly the forces of Vietnam; the other two kingdoms cannot contribute very much by way of forces, maybe 10,000 men each, but Vietnam very large forces.

The difficulties have chiefly been in the training field. We are anxious to help them more than they appreciate the necessity for. Our Army has developed ways of training people who have not got great educational background. For instance, this worked out in connection with the South Koreans.

So if you concentrate on certain aspects of the training of a man, and train only on that, you can, in an extraordinarily short time, get a man who is very efficient and competent in a limited field, and that is all he needs to be. He does not need to know twenty things; if he knows two things well, that is all that is necessary.

So we have tried to get the French to send instructors out to Korea and see how this is done, and we have offered to help them in every way we can.

We have been helping them financially very much in the past year, and I am sure that we will all want to continue that because their position is essential in Southeast Asia.

THE EDC AND GERMAN TREATIES

We discussed the European Defense Community [EDC], this treaty with Germany, and the treaty of the six powers creating a European army.

We examined the difficulties which had arisen in the way of ratification of those treaties. It seemed to us that they were substantial, that they were difficult, but they were not overwhelming, and one should not get depressed about it. I had some talks, both with the French and the Germans, who encouraged me very much to believe that this thing will be worked out and can be worked out.

The difficulties, as I say, look formidable, but I think that they can be surmounted; they have just got to be because that is such a very important aspect of the whole increase in military strength in Europe. The CHAIRMAN. Do recent developments still leave you that optimistic?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, I think so, Senator. I have a firm conviction that the Germans will be able to get this thing moving along; certainly, by the end of February they ought to have it finished.

I think that the French Government is determined to go ahead with it; they want to have some talks with the Germans on some separate protocols which will deal with certain aspects of the matter which, I think, can be dealt with.

For instance, the French want to be sure that there is a way if they

need forces for Indochina they can get those forces. They do not want their manpower completely frozen into this European army setup. Well, that is a reasonable request, but I think that can be done.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean get forces from their own forces rather than—

Secretary ACHESON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON [continuing]. From our forces?
Secretary ACHESON. From their own.

You see, when you now put troops into the European army you can only withdraw them on certain conditions specified in the treaty. One is internal difficulties, and what they want to be sure about is if they need to get a brigade or whatever it is, in Indochina, it will not take them six months to argue with European army people to get that brigade out. They can usually relieve a brigade from Indochina, and put another brigade in.

They have some problems dealing with the French officer corps which I think they can work out.

There is a strong desire for some sort of British association in the European army, which I think is not impossible, and can be worked out, too.

All of these are tricky; they are all difficult. Any one of them can blow up at any time, but I think everyone appreciates the vast necessity of going forward with this thing, so they will not blow it up. I think the thing will be worked out.

THE FALL OF SCHUMAN

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, is the dropping of Schuman1 particularly significant or will it have any particular effect upon the program?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think it is too bad-it is a sad thing. Schuman has done a tremendous thing in Europe, He is the one who has had the real vision for the unification of Western Europe, of course, and he has been in a leading position. He has either been Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, or Foreign Minister since the formation of the French Government in 1946.

That is a pretty wearing process in French politics. This is the 18th government that he has been in since the end of the war.

Also he has been very greatly criticized on account of the North African troubles. The control over North Africa falls under the Foreign Office, and when there have been difficulties there the criti-cism is and has been centered on Schuman, so he has had to lead in a rather difficult field in Europe. He has had to bear responsibilities in a rather difficult external field, and it just kind of wore him down politically.

It may be that if he goes out now for a while, he can come back in again.

Bidault is experienced; he has been Foreign Minister before, and he belongs to the same political party as Schuman.

I should hope that it will mean no great difference between Schu

1 Robert Schuman was replaced by Georges Bidault as Foreign Minister in the new French Government formed by Rene Mayer in January.

man and Bidault, between their policies, but it is too bad, it is a sad thing, to see a man who has done so much run into this problem.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Secretary, does that push Mr. Monnet1 out, too? He was the brains behind Schuman.

Secretary ACHESON. No; he is the head of the high authority of the Schuman Plan. He is no longer in the French Government.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. He is going to be right where he is; they are not going to move him around?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes. He is in this supranational authority. He is the chairman and head of the Schuman plan. He now lives in Luxembourg. He has his house there, and has his headquarters there, and is devoting himself to the very great work which that going concern is putting on in Europe.

THE SCHUMAN PLAN

The Schuman plan opens up the first of February, the great sixnation plan in coal and steel, and puts in effect in February the 1 percent tax which creates a revolving fund of $50 million a year for the increase in facilities in the coal and steel developments in Europe.

Monnet tells me that already the whole attitude of mind of the business and industrial world, as well as the labor world, in regard to coal and steel is utterly changed by this new fact.

People in the southern part of the French coal and iron industry are making contracts for the sale of their merchandise in Germany; Ruhr manufacturers are making contracts of sale in North Africa.

The Belgians, for the first time since the Industrial Revolution, have access to the ore reserves in France. They have dissolved the Comite des Forges, and the chairman of that has now come in to do the opposite of what he has spent his life doing, which has been restricting all of these things purely for French producers, and he has taken the lead in increasing the facilities for the production of French ore for the whole Benelux consumption. It is a great opening up and loosening up of economic endeavor which, I think, will give new life and vitality to that whole.

REACTION OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

Senator GREEN. Have you any reliable information as to what the reaction of the Soviet Government is to all of this?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that you can see how strongly they are opposed to what is going on by the constant effort they have made to slow it up and confuse it and stop it. The whole correspondence between the Soviet Government and the three governments in regard to Germany, which began a year ago last November, November of 1951, had been for the purpose of confusing this thing, stopping it, and the activity which they have been carrying on in Eastern Germany, all of the missions which some of the east Germans undertook, to go to Bonn and mix everything up, has been for that purpose.

I think you can now see that they are getting quite alarmed about the possibility that there really may be this strong unified group, because there is uncertainty and bewilderment in East Germany.

1 Jean Monnet, President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (Schuman Plan).

These purges take place when there is internal confusion and difficulty, and when they start arresting their own government people and confining them, and getting confessions, you know all is not well inside the satellite area.

I think they would do anything, Senator Green, to prevent the ratification of these treaties with Germany, and to prevent the development of a really closely knit and strong Western Europe.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean anything short of war?

Secretary ACHESON. Oh, yes. I do not believe that they are going to provoke an attack for that purpose.

Well, I think-George Perkins, have I left out anything in the meeting that you think I ought to cover?

Mr. PERKINS. No, I think that covers it.

Secretary ACHESON. I am looking at these notes.

I think that gives you a pretty full report. The last thing I should say over again, and I think I mentioned it, is that we agreed that there would be a necessity for a meeting early in 1953. They were not able to agree upon any date, but that that would have to be done by our successors. We thought, in general, it should be in April. Lord Ismay, the Secretary General, is authorized to take this up with the new administration here, and with other people, and to see when it would be convenient for them to have a second meeting necessary to close up the plans for 1953.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions, Senator Smith?

GRAVELY OPTIMISTIC

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I gather from your statement, Mr. Secretary, that you are optimistic about the whole thing rather than pessimistic? The newspapers were pretty pessimistic when we heard about the disintegration and chaos and that the whole NATO thing is endangered. I rather get the impression that it was not correctly reported through the press.

Secretary ACHESON. I think that is right, Senator Smith. I would not want you to have the impression that I do not see grave problems ahead

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I think we all realize that.

Secretary ACHESON [continuing]. But I do see grave problems. I must say, however, when I went to Europe on the 12th of December I was very deeply depressed about the whole thing. But after talking with the men who are carrying forward, it seemed to me that they understood fully the nature of the problems that faced them, the necessity of solving those problems, and had a great determination to do it, and I became convinced that they would do it.

Now, there are problems, not only the ones we are talking about, but one grave problem being time.

You are going to have in May of 1953 elections in Germany and in Italy. If these matters can be worked out, if we can get a ratification of these plans sufficiently before the election so that you will have returned to power in Germany and Italy the middle-of-the-road strong groups that we now have, then I think the future is fine.

If, however, these treaties and others run into snags, and it causes confusion, and you should have different results, so that you had in

Italy and Germany a reemergence of totalitarian groups and some increase of strength on the Communist side, I should think we are in very grave trouble, and that is why there is a serious problem.

If these elections came in the fall instead of in the spring, I would think that we would stand a very high chance of making this thing successful.

You have to say it requires energy and courage and some element of good luck to get through it, but I think you are right in saying that as between being optimistic and pessimistic, I am optimistic; I am gravely optimistic, not gaily optimistic.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green, do you have any questions?
Senator GREEN. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Taft?

Senator TAFT. No, I have no questions.

Is the Secretary going on to any other fields?

Secretary ACHESON. No, I was asked to come up here

Senator TAFT. On just this one matter?

Secretary ACHESON. I was asked to come up and report here.

THE IRANIAN SITUATION

Senator TAFT. I was interested in the Iran situation, and the recent developments, but I do not want to force that unless you want to talk about it.

Secretary ACHESON. Well, it is pretty hard to talk about at this moment because it is quite confused.

Senator TAFT. That is why I asked the question; I was confused. Secretary ACHESON. I do not know what the situation is. I think in the days immediately ahead, it will clarify quite quickly.

Senator KNOWLAND. For better or for worse?

Secretary ACHESON. It is right now on the lap of the Gods, and I could not say. I have some hope that it will clarify in favor of a solution, but there are so many things in which you cannot get any accurate reports on.

For instance, this row which developed on Sunday in the Majlis between [Ayatollah Sayed Abolghassem] Kashani and [Mohammed] Mossadegh, some radio report, something in the paper, would lead you to believe this morning that Kashani has backed down. Maybe he has, but our cables do not show that is the case, and if right in the middle of attempting to work out this whole thing, we are going to have a blow-up with the Moslem Brotherhood, on the one side, and Mossadegh and his National Front on the other, so that you get strong passions, religious on one side and nationalist on the other, and some cross-current of those two going at once, people get a shock in rioting around, and you cannot say what the outcome is going to be. It will change every rational factor into an irrational factor.

1 On January 18, at a critical moment in negotiations to resolve the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, Kashani, Speaker of the Majlis or lower house of the Iranian parliament and political ally of Premier Mossadegh, announced his break with the Premier over the latter's request for an extension of his emergency powers, thus threatening the fall of Mossadegh's government and adding a new element of uncertainty to an already uncertain and inflamed situation.