Korea, for a collapse in Indo-China would have immediate grave reactions in other areas of Asia, especially the rice bowl lands. He stressed the possible serious effect on India and Japan, which get a large portion of their rice from that region.

The greatest single obstacle to getting the European Defense Community going is the fear on the part of France that Germany will again be in a position to wage aggressive warfare on her neighbors. This fear is manifested in French reluctance to strip her European forces by sending sufficient troops to Indo-China to bring the hostilities there to an end. Our intelligence, however, points to evidence that given a sufficiently large striking force in Indo-China, the French could successfully halt the war, provided that training of Vietnamese troops could be stepped up appreciably. High ranking Vietnamese officers have been invited to Korea to inspect United Nations equipment and methods, but the French are so proud of their own military techniques, they may be unwilling to accept much guidance and counsel from U.N. military leaders. Also, the language barrier might pose difficulties.

Part of this overall problem is whether or not we have sufficient productive capacity to carry on the program of training and equipping the South Koreans, the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa and Vietnamese forces in Indo-China. There has been a very great failure to meet our commitments both in Asia and in Europe. Efforts here have been seriously retarded because of the lack of elementary weapons and ammunition. Our troops in Korea have had to be rationed to five rounds of 105 mm a day, for example. That situation, however, is beginning to pick up. The failure of U.S. production to meet anticipated levels has had a serious effect upon what we have been able to do to make our policies effective. The judgment, however, of our best military people is that a good deal could probably be done to change the situation in Asia to our advantage if we could work out a program in which we were able to treat Asia as a single front. As part of that, we would need to intensify the training of South Koreans and Vietnamese troops so that within 12 months their own forces woud be able to hold the line and the Communists could not funnel down into Indo-China as they have done in Korea. It is estimated that there are approximately 200,000 troops (Chinese Communist) in place on that border ready to move, and we certainly do not want a big influx of additional Chinese volunteer forces to spill over the border into Indo-China. There must be some means, therefore, of pinning down such forces so that they cannot march.

The aim of the Kremlin, of course, is to perpetuate the fighting because, by the use of satellite second-teams they are able to tie up the first-team of the Western world. Already we are committed, so far as our land forces in Korea are concerned, to a very considerable extent; the French are committed in Indo-China; and it is, therefore very difficult to develop the strength we need in Europe. From this it is apparent that we need to find a way to disengage our forces by doing what we can to enable our allies to hold the line against the Soviet satellites. If that can be done, it is hoped that the Kremlin will cease to find the fighting advantageous to them, and will react accordingly.

When Senator Taft raised the question of U.S. recognition of Communist China in the event hostilities cease, the Secretary replied that he did not anticipate it, certainly not in the foreseeable future or under present circumstances.

The Secretary stated that a good deal of thought has been given to the use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea, and, while that possibility has not been ruled out, Chiang himself does not desire it. Furthermore, there is evidence that Rhee is strongly opposed to the idea of using Korea as a possible battleground for civil war between Nationalist and Communist Chinese forces. Although using Nationalist troops in Korea would pose a training and equipping problem for us, on the other hand, it would give the Nationalists combat experience which they very much need. Such combat experience could be gained also under a rotation system for troops on islands off the mainland engaged in raids against the Communists on the mainland. A number of these islands are in the hands of Nationalist sympathizers.

Senator Knowland commented that in his opinion we should press for greater assistance from our allies than the present 10 percent they are contributing. He went on to say that the American public is growing tired of having to bear 90 percent of the manpower burden. To this Senator Taft added that our hands are more or less tied because the action in Korea is termed a U.N. one. Mr. Allison pointed out that the powers with the most forces to contribute are already heavily committed in the Far East-the British in Malaya and the French in Indo-China. He acknowledged, however, that we will have to ask them for more help.

The Secretary stated that in all honesty and fairness it must be remembered that at the time the U.S. intervened in Korea it was not a U.N. enterprise, that our allies were not overly anxious to come into the picture, and that they felt that having thrown the mantle of the U.N. around the operation, they had discharged the bulk of their responsibility. Senator Knowland remarked that if that was their attitude, it did not bode well for the future. He added that he felt we should not establish a precedent for the U.N. action by carrying a 90 percent burden of participation. Mr. Dulles went on to say that the sense of urgency on the part of our allies has lessened, partly beause of ammunition and other equipment shortages that tend to drag out the war. Also, the fact that the Congress has established a short term basis for the Korean operation has been a hindrance, he said. It was his view that our whole psychology of getting the war over quickly is bad, for it only emphasizes our natural moral repughance to war, a repugnance our enemy does not share.

The Secretary stated that at the present a reevaluation of the Korean problem is going on, and the administration is exploring the possibility of a blockade. It is, of course, apparent that on the pretext of negotiations for an armistice, the Communists have built up their strength and have dug in for a tenacious holding operation.

Another critical area at this time is the Middle East. Because of British and French commitments in the Far East, the Suez area is left very much exposed. Almost certainly there is a tie-in between antisemitic activity on the part of the Soviet Union and wooing of

the Arab bloc. This makes it all the more important to disengage our own and our allies' forces in Korea and rely on South Koreans more and more. For that reason, the Secretary said, he would not be inclined to put increased pressure on the British, for they may need all the force at their disposal to meet the crisis in the Middle East. Senator Knowland asked how the British could justify even one gallon of oil going to the Chinese Communists in light of their part in the Korean war. The Secretary replied that we have a very basic problem with the British who still recognize the Government of Communist China. The problem persists not only in British Labor circles but in the Churchill government circles as well. On the other hand, in private conversations with our people, both Eden and Churchill have been sympathetic with our position concerning Formosa. Public opinion in Britain, however, takes another view, and politically, the problem is a thorny one. Their majority in the House of Commons is so slight and opinion within the Churchill government so divided that no immediate solution can be arrived at.

Senator Smith remarked that the British are reluctant to reappraise their position for if they did, they would probably come out about where we are. So far as Chinese coastal trade is concerned, if we could furnish patrol boats and other light craft, we might be able to ease the situation, for the bulk of this trade is in military end items. Estimated Chinese imports for 1952 ranged from 12 to 2 billion tons, consisting mainly of petroleum, chemicals, drugs, etc, the Secretary reported, and he continued by saying that the TransSiberian Railroad could pick up some trade intercepted by sea and that would have nuisance value in that it would put a strain on Soviet rolling stock. Any proposed blockade would have to be figured in terms of overall effect-global wise-rather than an immediate bettering of our position in Korea.

The Secretary, in speaking of his recent visits to European capitols, said that the French were very much disturbed about certain parts of President Eisenhower's State of the Union message. Yet, he said, when he showed them how certain measures, if put into effect, might aid in winding up the fighting in Indo-China, they seemed pleased. India, however, would not react favorably to a blockade and other drastic action.

Senator Sparkman stated that Congressman Battle had recently urged that a careful examination of the situation be made before slapping on any embargo. To this Secretary Dulles said that we must create the impression that we are really serious about tightening up without at the same time enlarging the war. Senator Sparkman inquired if we intend to be cautious about consulting with our allies before initiating new policies, for he expressed the view that it was. dangerous to even talk about going it alone.

The Secretary said that it is extremely difficult to find precisely the right course, for the dilemma confronting us is that of allies in Europe who are, in a sense, old, tired, worn out, and almost willing to buy peace in order to have a few years more of rest. The leadership of the world has passed to us, and the free world will only be saved if it gets out of us what is lacking in the rest of the world. We have to avoid going so fast they can't keep up with us.

Senator Smith inquired if any assurances had been given our allies in that direction, and the Secretary replied that none have been given by the Eisenhower administration. Our allies are particularly anxious for assurances that we will not use atomic weapons from British bases without British consent-as well as from other areas. They want assurances that we will not take major action anywhere without prior consultation. The Secretary added that we already have a good deal of quiet consultation with the governments concerned and that our relations with them are much better than would appear on the surface and from the press. If our negotiations were formalized, on the other hand, we would not be free to exert pressures here and there, such as: "If you won't go along with us, then we'll just have to push ahead anyway."

MINUTES

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1953

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 11 a.m. in executive session. Present: Chairman Wiley, Senators Smith, Hickenlooper, Tobey, Taft, Langer, Ferguson and Knowland, George, Green, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, and Mansfield.

The committee first considered the nomination of Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce as Ambassador of the United States to Italy. Mrs. Luce was called to testify.

The committee then considered the nomination of C. Douglas Dillon as Ambassador of the United States to France. Mr. Dillon was present and testified.

No final action was taken on the nomination. It was expected that the committee probably would meet later in the week in connection with them.

The committee considered a suggestion of the chairman that when nominations reach the Senate and are referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, action in committee be delayed a week, the rule to apply to nominations of Ambassadors, Ministers and the highest echelon of the Department of State. Senator Langer made a motion that the delay be held to 6 days. This motion was carried by a showing of hands. Senator Hickenlooper voted against the adoption of the rule.

The committee considered fixing a meeting day of the committee. It was agreed that Tuesday would be the day.

A subcommittee will be set up to consider S.J. Res. 2, relating to executive agreements. The members were not named.

S. Res. 70, remonstrating against the persecution of Jewish people in Soviet Russia, introduced February 16, 1953, was referred to the committee today. The committee will consider the resolution and will modify it.

For record of proceedings, see official transcript.
The committee adjourned at 1 p.m.