Three, the United States seeks, as one of its peaceful goals, that these enslaved national groups of Europe and Asia shall recover genuine independence.

That is the purpose of the resolution now before you.

President Eisenhower proposes that our nation should reaffirm its awareness that the struggle in the world today is, above all, a moral conflict. We propose to attest our fidelity, without compromise or vascillation, to the principles of honor and political freedom upon which this Nation was founded and which have made us always the dread of the oppressor and the hope of the oppressed. We propose, in the spirit of the early days of the Republic, to do what we peacefully can do, in order to revive the hopes of those now enslaved.

RESOLUTION LOOKS TO THE FUTURE

This resolution is no call to bloody and senseless revolution. On the other hand, it is no idle gesture. It is an act of great historical importance and many consequences will stem from it. As its purpose becomes more and more widely understood, it will, over the coming years, revive the inherent longing for freedom which persists within the captive peoples so that that longing becomes a mounting spiritual power which will eventually overcome the material power of Soviet dictatorship to rule what it has, or to subjugate more.

This resolution looks to the future, rather than to the past. The past is controversial. Should past Administrations have made the agreements which they made? Were they foolishly beguiled by Soviet promises? Were they too much moved by considerations of short-term expediency, so that they sacrificed basic principles? Did they exceed their power in what they attempted; for these wartime agreements were never subjected to the constitutional processes of our Government? All of these questions have been, and long will be, debated.

The resolution which President Eisenhower has proposed would avoid this realm of controversy. It validates nothing that is invalid. It gives up no rights, if we chose to assert them. It also leaves us free to pursue other courses and take other steps in the future, as circumstances may indicate their desirability.

What the President seeks is a solemn act of dedication for the future. It is an act which needs, and deserves, the support of both great parties. It will provide the indispensable foundation upon which future foreign policies can again build a structure of peace, justice and freedom. Therefore, I beg, let us not, on this occasion divisively debate the past. Let us unitedly move on to mold the future.

A LEGAL DOCUMENT IS NOT WANTED

The CHAIRMAN. In the next to the last paragraph, you say: "It validates nothing that is invalid."

I suppose the issue that has been most discussed is whether it affirms acts, whether the Congress by this resolution, if enjoined, aflirms acts which were made in secret, which many think are invalid, or if they are valid, whether the Congress should affirm them.

Secretary DULLES. It is clearly my opinion, Mr. Chairman, that the resolution does not affirm anything.

The CHAIRMAN. Or confirm?

Secretary DULLES. Or confirm anything.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman-

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment, please, and I will turn it over to the committee.

Do you feel that the United States Senate could, without running into the risk involved in outright repudiation, strengthen the present resolution of the President?

Secretary DULLES. If by "strengthen" you mean can you do something to make it more effective as an instrument of foreign policy, my opinion is that it is already adequate. I am not thinking about domestic politics.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you not indicate its displeasure in some program or policy which you deem unwise or unsound from the very beginning, even before the Soviet Union

Secretary DULLES. You could do that. You are aware of course that there are about 40 of these agreements.

The CHAIRMAN. How many?

Secretary DULLES. I would say about 40, dealing with all kinds and sorts of subjects.

Now, if you are going to go through all these agreements and decide which you want to affirm, and which you want to reject, what you think they have violated, and what they have not violated, then you are developing a very significant, perhaps, legal document.

I do not want a legal document here. The President does not want a legal document here, and I do not believe a legal document will serve the purposes we have in mind.

What we want is a fairly simple declaration which will be effective propaganda all around the world, and which is sufficiently noncontroversial so that it will have the backing, virtually unanimously of the Congress.

A CLOSE VOTE WOULD DO TERRIBLE HARM

If you put a resolution like this through by a close vote of say 45 to 40, or something of that sort, you are just going to do terrible harm to it, because we have in mind then what would happen.

Then, Mr. Stalin will say to the captive: "Look at it. They have got this resolution by a majority of five. Your dependence on America is very slender, if you have just a very thin majority in the Senate." If it is going to be that kind of thing, it will be an absolute detriment to achieving what we want to do, which is to bring hope to the captive peoples, primarily, incidentally to the endangered peoples, but primarily to the captive peoples, that America stands unitedly for future independence and freedom; that we have never acquiesced and do not acquiesce in the interpretation and perversions of these instruments which have led to their enslavement, and we hold out the promise that we are always going to stay dedicated to that, and are not going to sell them down the river by some future trading deal which some people may have in mind.

If that declaration is made, then we will start new processes at work.

I can assure you that I speak on the basis of knowledge, that time after time people working for or with these captive peoples have

come right up to this issue, saying "Well, is it worthwhile to get. anything started? If you do, will you use us as a trading point to make some future deal with Stalin, whereby we in effect will saywell, you have from the China Sea to the Elbe, and we will divide the world." Those are the things which oppress these people, and which are holding them back. They don't dare to get started because they simply say, "What is the use?"

Now, I can assure you if this resolution is adopted in the spirit in which it is proposed, it will, not at once but over the next few years, have a tremendous effect. Thousands of little things will stem from it, and I believe that that is the thing to do as of this time.

OUR LEGAL POSITION FAIRLY SATISFACTORY

Now, take these agreements. We are in a position today which, from a legal standpoint, is a fairly satisfactory position, in the sense that the agreements have all, to a greater or lesser extent been violated. We are in the position today where we can, if and when it seems best to serve our purposes, use those violations, if we want, as a basis for terminating the agreements; also, we can still insist that the agreements should be fulfilled. Parts of them we can still insist upon.

Why should we, today, when we have an election of remedies and we do not have to make that election today, why should we freeze our position in one sense or another? Do we want to tear up the agreement which gives our status in Berlin and Vienna, which gives us the right to demand that there should be free and untrammelled elections in Poland. If we are in a position where we can demand the Soviet give support to the National Government of China, why throw those things away now?

If and when, Mr. Chairman, this Government has to face up with the problem of the actual legal status of these things, which we did when we had the Japanese Peace Treaty, then we can explicitly provide, as we did then, that nothing in that treaty should be construed to give any rights or recognition whatever to the Soviet Union as a result of the Yalta agreement, or otherwise. That resolution was, as I recall, unanimously adopted by the Senate, in connection with our ratification of that treaty.

Whenever we come up to a situation where we have to elect our remedies, then we can do it. But why, in advance, do we make a decision to reject or repudiate an agreement? It doesn't get you anywhere at all at this juncture.

Keep our election of remedies open until the time comes, and we have to choose, and then we can make our choice to the best possible advantage.

The CHAIRMAN. As I get the gist of your argument, it is that the resolution, as it is, is a psychological weapon.

Secretary DULLES. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not a fact that this resolution will lose its effectiveness in a psychological war, if we fail to state the strong moral purpose behind it

FOOLISH TO DENOUNCE ALL THESE AGREEMENTS AT THIS JUNCTURE

Secretary DULLES. I think you know, and I think I know, that to say these agreements were intrinsically immoral would raise a very serious controversial issue. That was one of the issues that was debated during the campaign, and it will be debated for a long, long time.

But even if we could get a virtually unanimous vote of the Senate denouncing these agreements, even then I would be against it, because I would say it is foolish to denounce all these agreements and all their parts at this juncture, as, many of them we still depend upon, and many we want to depend upon at least in part.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. You feel, Mr. Secretary, that the things of value in the agreements, and what many have thought have been injustices and wrongs therein, you think that overall it is to our advantage to have those agreements recognized?

Secretary DULLES. I don't say we recognize them at all, nor do I say the good in them overbalances the evil.

All I say is that you cannot accomplish the purpose of this resolution and still accomplish the purpose of going through these forty or fifty agreements and deciding what is now to the best interest of the United States to do, whether we want to repudiate them, whether we want to depend upon them in part, claim damages for breaches, or what do we want to do? That is a totally different problem from what we are facing, in this resolution.

PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION MISUNDERSTOOD

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Is not the misunderstanding due to the fact then that many people were hopeful, when we talked about Yalta and Potsdam, that we would repudiate them in some way, and a reversal of the way in which we gave China away, and Sakhalin-isn't it due to a misapprehension of what we were really driving at by the resolution?

To me you have made it very clear what we are getting at. I am in accord with it. But, I find people question me as to why did we do that, why don't we repudiate things that are admitted to be injustices. That is the area of misunderstanding. I think that ought to be clarified.

Secretary DULLES. The resolution says: "Whereas, the people of the United States, true to their tradition and heritage of freedom, are never acquiescent in such enslavement of any peoples."

As far as the morals are concerned, we are surely right, the American people have never been acquiescent in the enslavement of any peoples.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. An issue is a violation by Russia of the agreements. As the Yalta agreement itself recites it is for the freedom of peoples, for free elections and so forth and we are claiming, under that, that the Russians violated the spirit of that agreement, is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. That covers either alternative. If the agreement sold them into slavery, it says the American people never agreed to that.

We also do know that there were gross violations of those agreements.

Senator SMITH. That is all that I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George?

NO OCCASION TO DEPART FROM THE RESOLUTION AS PRESENTED

Senator GEORGE. I don't know that I have anything to say that is in disagreement with the Secretary.

As I state, Mr. Secretary, it is not a question of whether these agreements, or any one of them or all of them together were wise or unwise at the time, whether they were made with authority or without authority.

The condition has arisen in which many free peoples have become enslaved by a nation, or group of nations which is a party to that agreement, and we are now here expressing our disagreement with that interpretation or application of any agreement and all agreements combined, that have that effect, and that I fully agree with, Mr. Secretary, and that by doing anything else you would invite and certainly bring about a profitless and, at this time, a valueless long debate and a division which would be more harmful than if there had never been the suggestion by the President in his State of the Union message.

I am in full accord with it, and I see no occasion to depart from the resolution which has been set up.

That is all I have to say, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I might say that in this document, gentlemen, the resolution is found on page 2, if you want to turn to it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman: Mr. Secretary, I have been considerably troubled by this resolution because my personal inclination would be to make some more specific declarations of the ineffectiveness of many of these things; and I have been bothered by this for several days.

I will say to you that I have come to the conclusion that I think it better to adopt this resolution as it is than by tinkering, as I have been able to do, with it. There are some things I would like to say, and will reserve the right to say, on my own responsibility, as to my wishes.

Secretary DULLES. I have said some of those same things in the past myself, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have attempted to see if I could figure out language that would come nearer meeting my wishes. I have not been able to, without completely reorienting this whole thing, and I had considered that that would not be wise.

PRESIDENT'S POWER TO MAKE BINDING AGREEMENTS IS LIMITED

Now, on the legal end of this thing. I only want to ask you to explain a little more fully this idea of the language of the declaration here.

In the first "Whereas" it says:

Whereas, during World War II, representatives of the United States, during the course of secret conferences, entered into various international agreements or understandings concerning other peoples.