ELECTION OUTCOMES IN ITALY AND GERMANY

Senator HUMPHREY. What information, if any, do we have on the possibilities of the de Gasperi1 government being elected in Italy, and the same thing with the Christain Democrats, Adenauer government, in Germany?

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Secretary ACHESON. Well, I should think the chances are very good of de Gasperi continuing. I think he worries that he gets sniped at from both ends, and a thing like this Trieste issue is used by all the people who are against him, who say he is not nationalist enough. They say he does not stand up for Italy vigorously enough, whereas I think he does everything he possibly can to represent Italian interests. But the Communists hit him on the one hand, and the Monarchists and neo-Fascists hit him on the other end on an issue of that sort, but I think he will make it. I think his great worry is that he may not make it with a clear majority.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. And that would be too bad because then he has to choose who is going to be associated with him, and that is not strengthening him.

So far as Adenauer is concerned, I think that depends on how he comes out with the European army treaty, and how the French come out. If that goes through so that it is all done in a good length of time before the election, I think he will win because I think that the Socialists will adjust themselves to it. They are really carrying on now the tradition of Schumacher rather than the independent judgment of the present leaders of the Social Democrats.

Senator HUMPHREY. I was going to ask that question, as to whether or not the death of Schumacher had made any appreciable difference, overt difference, in the demonstrations of the Social Democrats.

Secretary ACHESON. It has not made any difference because the memory, the shade, of Schumacher is very long and very strong, and none of his lieutenants likes to be caught making statements which are contrary to what he used to say. But I think time will change that, and I think a thing of this kind in the Bundestag and Bundesrat will change that.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman?
Senator SPARKMAN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you a few questions. Originally, the Lisbon meeting had been planning on 96 divisions, 9,000 aircraft by 1954. I understood your explanation to be that that will not be accomplished as far as numbers are concerned, but in effectiveness they will be accomplished, is that right?

Secretary ACHESON. The effectiveness of the forces already in existence, and a smaller increment will be accomplished. They will not be able to take the full figures which they were hoping at Lisbon.

1 Alcide de Gasperi, Italian Premier.

Konrad Adenauer, West German Chancellor.

SUPPORT FOR FRANCE IN INDOCHINA

The CHAIRMAN. The Council adopted a resolution complimenting the French in relation to their stand in Indo-China and said, in other words, that it deserved continued support. I think you commented on it, but I think we should be told definitely, so far as possible, as to just what that support envisioned. In other words, will the United States be called upon to do anything more than it is doing at present in Indo-China?

Secretary ACHESON. There has been no

The CHAIRMAN. Commitment.

Secretary ACHESON [continuing]. Commitment of any sort, of any kind. But in all our discussions, what the French are eager to have us do is to increase both the material support, that is, the full physical goods that go out, and to take a larger share in the financial burden.

The latter is an extremely difficult thing to do. We have not devised any way which seems practical to accomplish it.

We have taken a very large part of the burden. I should think that, roughly speaking, about a third of the cost of the operation, aside from the contribution of men itself, is being borne now by the U.S. Government, airplanes and equipment for the first 12 battalions, and I think we have now gotten 24, a lot of supplies, ammunition, and all of that, which is going out in an increasing volume.

Indo-China is second only to Korea in priority of items for military use, and that is the area in which we have been working with the French, and expect to work with them.

RATIFYING THE EDC TREATY

The CHAIRMAN. How many nations up to date have ratified the EDC Treaty?

Secretary ACHESON. At the present time I think it has not been ratified by any of the parliaments. The Italians say that they will proceed with it right away, de Gasperi is going to put it before his Parliament.

The Dutch expect to act on it in March; the Germans hope to get it done by the end of February or the first part of March; the French are putting it into their committee stage now; the Belgians and Luxembourgers will act upon it immediately upon action by France and Germany.

The CHAIRMAN. At the meeting at NATO, the importance of early ratification was stressed, was it not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; it was.

The CHAIRMAN. You have already discussed in general terms the situation between France and Germany in relation to the modification of the contracts or arrangements.

Just very quickly, can you tell us what effect that would have on the NATO defense plans, their failing to get anywhere at present, and so forth?

Secretary ACHESON. You mean if it were not ratified?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. I think it would have very serious effects, Senator, very serious effects.

THE THREAT OF WAR HAS LESSENED

The CHAIRMAN. When Churchill was over here he said something about the threat of war had lessened, you will remember. I understand that is your viewpoint, too?

Secretary ACHESON. I should think it is fair to say that. It requires a lot of qualifications. It has certainly lessened insofar as its arising in Europe is concerned.

I should think also the increased strength in Europe makes it much less desirable for them to take steps elsewhere which might bring on a general conflagration. I should say this is a fair statement if one takes it cautiously.

NO SOVIET TIMETABLE OF AGGRESSIONS

The CHAIRMAN. With your vast experience in Government, and in your dealings with the Kremlin and the people in Europe, is it your idea that the Kremlin has an overall plan, has a timetable, which was partially upset, probably for a long time upset, in Korea. But the Kremlin is convinced, that it was chosen to take over the world, and its steps indicate that it has been pretty successful in doing so so far, and that it is going to carry on? Do you think that is the general outline of what we can expect that maybe the timetable has been postponed?

Secretary ACHESON. Senator, I do not think there is any timetable. I think that is one of the great differences between the dangerwhich comes to us from the Soviet Union and the danger which came from Hitler.

I think Hitler had a timetable, and the thing that really pulled him down was his rigid adherence to that timetable, and his taking steps at certain times which just got him into trouble when he did.

I think with the Russians they are much more willing to leavethis thing quite indefinite as far as time is concerned. I think that their ultimate ambitions and ultimate desires are very much as you have described them.

I think one has to have in mind always that at the center of all Russian thinking is the security of the regime; that is the thing which is right in their minds. Therefore, they will not do the kind. of thing which Hitler did, which was to take a step which threatened the whole business right at the start, because if he lost he lost everything.

Therefore, they will proceed in a way in which, so far as possible, they would not take a step which would endanger the regime.

THE DANGER OF KREMLIN ERROR

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That does not mean that they never would endanger it, there is the possibility of error and the possibility of error in the Kremlin is a very disturbing one, and it comes from two sources..

One is the error which they have put into the minds of all their people so that they are reporting from the outside world in a manner which is highly colored with what the reporter thinks the people at home want to hear and, therefore, they are quite apt to get erroneous reports as to what we or other people would do in a situation.

They also have another grave problem, and that is that they have on their eyes, even when they look at facts which are reported correctly, they have spectacles which are ground according to Communist dogma and, therefore, what they see is not what happened, but what happened reflected through these spectacles, and certain things have just got to happen; in other words, from their point of view the whole capitalistic system has to take a certain course, it just has to; it is inevitable, just the way the Earth revolves or the seasons change.

This idea that the capitalist world is going to distintegrate is inevitable. Also, the capitalist world is going to get itself into wars; they changed their doctrine quite a bit as to who it is the capitalist world is going to fight. A long time the idea was held that it was going to fight them in one last desperate struggle before it collapsed. Now they say it is not going to happen at all. It is going to be a war within the capitalist world first, and we will probably destroy ourselves, so we will not have to fight them.

But the possibility of error in their seeing things abroad is increased by the fact that they see it through these distorted lenses. Now, with those cautions and qualifications, I think that what they propose to do is to proceed in any place where they can push in without this grave risk, and if they thought that they could do something because we were incompetent or unable to stop them, I think they would do it.

I do not think that they would do it if they thought this was going to bring an attack right smack back on them; I do not think that they would. But, for instance, if one makes an assumption that certain retaliatory operations on our part were possible, it is quite possible that the stepping up of dangers in Europe will be very much increased, because it is this looking out for their situation at home which is very important, and that again is one reason why you have to have the alternative protection; you have to have your retaliatory striking power, and you have your defense on the ground so you may not be given the chance of not using your own striking power, because if you use it it will be used back on you, and a great deal of damage will happen.

A SEPARATE AUSTRIAN SETTLEMENT UNLIKELY

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I would just like to conclude by asking a few general questions in relation to the overall perimeter. What do you say about Austria. Is there any chance of our getting that treaty that was contemplated, that the Russians agreed they would

Secretary ACHESON. I should not think there was any chance of getting settlement in Austria before some kind of a settlement is reached in Europe.

THE SITUATION IN JAPAN

The CHAIRMAN. What is the general situation in Japan? Would you say it was pretty healthy?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I should think that it is extraordinarily healthy considering the facts of the world as they are today. The Japanese are faced with very serious economic problems. I do not quite see their way through all of those problems at the present time; that is one difficulty.

They have also a considerable difficulty ahead of them in playing their part in the defense of the Pacific as there is a strong resistance to any kind of armament in Japan. They have been through this thing, they do not like their own military class, they do not like anything about it.

They know they have got to do it, and I think they will do it. I think they will have to do it slowly. If we get too impatient, if we crowd them too fast, we will get a bad reaction out of them.

I think we are going to have in the future another problem, which is the behavior of considerable military forces of the United States in Japan. They want the forces there, we want them there, but the mere presence of troops of another nation within your own country is always a problem.

That will have to be handled with a great deal of tact and understanding on both sides to keep it on the track, but I think, on the whole, it is in pretty good shape.

NO PLAN TO COUNTER TUDEH PARTY TAKEOVER

The CHAIRMAN. If the Tudeh Party were to take over in Iran, have any plans been made or in conjunction with our allies, as to what should or should not be done?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I think there are no operational plans for that.

I think that the general idea would be that if it took over, and if the Government of Iran continued in some way, either in the country or out of the country, and wanted us to help them, we would do whatever we could to help them. But I do not think there are any plans as to how to do it or when.

THE SITUATION IN NORTH AFRICA

The CHAIRMAN. How is the French-Arab situation in North Africa getting along, the two countries there that France was interested in?

Secretary ACHESON. It is a very disturbed one; it is not in very good shape. We are hoping that now that this thing is over in the United Nations, the French will get on with their program of reform and improvement in North Africa, and that the Bey and the Sultan will cooperate with them, and this thing will quiet down; but there has got to be more movement than there has been in the past to keep

it stable.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to comment on the situation that relates to the Israeli and the Arab situation?