The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, as I said, there will be no difficulty about taking it up Tuesday, and that is within a few days and won't make any difference.

We have the general here for another purpose, and I suggest we go on with the main purpose of this meeting. Will you give us your own interpretation of these world events, and what you think will flow therefrom?

Mr. SMITH. I intended to do a rather unusual thing-and this is not on the record.

[An extended discussion off the record.]

A CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST LEADERS IN MOSCOW

1

Senator HUMPHREY. Has that ever been brought to the attention of the committee?

Mr. SMITH. No sir; it never has. Those are made by the Central Intelligence Agency and, as you know, the distribution of their analysis is very limited. The State Department, however, at any time this committee likes, can make an analysis which can be given to this committee in executive session, and I should be glad to do it in executive session, provided it is in strict executive session.

I may say again, while there are many things I may say in a session of this kind, and which you read in the newspapers, yet what I tell you is based on information which we believe to be accurate, and which is from extensive sources, whereas the newspaper man writes as his good judgment dictates, and there is a great amount of that. Senator HUMPHREY. I believe that that material is very important. There has been some analysis made of it in the Advanced Institute of Studies at Princeton, and also by a group in New York.

Senator FERGUSON. This last statement went on the record.
Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. I would like very much, Mr. Chairman, if it is possible at some time in the not too distant future, to have a report on it, because I cannot imagine that we can proceed without an analysis of that report. It seems to be very basic, from all I have heard. Mr. SMITH. We will be glad to give it to you.

The CHAIRMAN. An analysis of what report? You fellows hold your conversations down there between yourselves, in whispers, almost. Senator HUMPHREY. There was a period of about 30 days, from the latter part of August on, in Moscow when the top leading Communists in the world were called into conference at Moscow, at which time Mr. Stalin delivered a 25,000 word message, and Mr. Malenkov gave a 51⁄2 hour address on the tactics and strategies of the Communist International throughout the world, and apparently that conference had some very important purpose or strategic objectives in Soviet propaganda and action.

I think that is something we ought to know about. That is contemporary history. It may tell us a great deal of what is going on in

1 The following discussion refers to events surrounding the Congress of the Soviet Communist Party that took place in October 1952. Announcement that the Central Committee had decided in plenary session to convoke the Congress was made on August 20. On October 3 and 4, on the eve of the meetings. Stalin published his "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R." in two successive issues of Pravda. This is the "speech" referred to in the text. The keynote address or main political report to the Congress was delivered not by Stalin but by Malenkov.

such matters as trade, and perhaps problems in the European Defense Community.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this in executive session?

Senator HUMPHREY. What?

Senator FERGUSON. What you are talking about in Moscow, was that in the open, or what?

Senator HUMPHREY. I don't know.

STALIN'S SPEECH

Mr. SMITH. The speeches, Senator, have been published. Stalin's speech, which is a very important one, he calls it the "Economic Problems of Socialism," is a very important and very significant one, and has been published.

Senator HUMPHREY. By the Communist printers.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Have you analyzed what the significance of that Stalin speech is?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, and we have analyzed it in connection with other information which can only be conveyed to this committee in executive session.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I think it would be very important to have it.

Senator FERGUSON. They also held a closed session?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, they were all closed.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this in a closed session, later made public by the Communists?

Mr. SMITH. No.

Senator FERGUSON. It was open?

Mr. SMITH. It was a statement, a public speech given publicity in the Moscow press.

Senator SPARKMAN. Your analysis was not restricted to that, you brought other factors into it?

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the General a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Senator SPARKMAN. You said, near the end, that was a general estimate, but did not include the Far East. We hear so much about China, and her tie-up with Russia. I am not sure I ever heard you. express yourself. Do you feel that China is a satellite of Russia, or do you agree with these people who think there may still be some hope of breaking China away from Russia?

Mr. SMITH. Senator, I don't think that China is a satellite of Russia, in the sense, for example, that Hungary or Poland are satellites of Russia. I will describe the relationship between China and Russia, that China is being a willing junior partner, and willing junior collaborator. Certainly Peiping takes its major orders from Moscow, and certainly they couldn't continue to operate without the economic and military-that is, material military support of the Soviet Union.

Certainly they have loaned themselves to the Kremlin for an indefinite period.

My own view, for what it is worth, is that that is a partnership which cannot continue indefinitely, but, as you know, the Chinese and Russians measure time in very different terms from the way we measure time, and, when I say that, I don't want you to think that I mean that there is likely to be a separation within the foreseeable future, or within our lifetime.

But, it just does not seem to me that the background and the culture of the Chinese will lend itself indefinitely to the Stalinist form of Communism.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, some of the people on Formosa with whom I have talked several times, in discussing that phase of itSenator Smith and I were over there one time together-and, if I recall, K. C. Wu' took this line: That the thing they were afraid of was the systematic breakdown of the customs and traditions and family ties in China; and that that might make it possible for them to overcome these things that you say you cannot conceive as tying in with communism.

What do you think of that?

Mr. SMITH. Well, of course, you know Lenin said it takes three generations to establish Socialism, and he visualized the extermination of one part of the population, the enslavement of the second part, and the education of a third part.

I only lived in China a short time, and I do not know too much about Chinese history, but in times past, attempts have been made to exterminate Chinese culture, and the Chinese traditional ancestor worship and things of that sort, even to the extent, in the case of one Manchu emperor, where he required them to plow under all the tombs in China, and all that sort of thing, and it didn't work. Whether it will work now, I do not know.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did it ever follow through on this system, though, of cultivating the children and taking them away from their homes?

Mr. SMITH. No, they never have.

Senator SPARKMAN. It seems to me that is what the Communists have deliberately done, toward breaking up family relations, training the small children.

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. And the destruction also of those who held to the old traditions, interfering with progress in communistic teaching, that is what you referred to, is it not?

Senator SPARKMAN. That is right.

Mr. SMITH. Now, in connection with the incident which interests you all, I can give you some things, without having them on the record.

[There was discussion off the record.]

SPECULATION ON THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

Mr. SMITH. The immediate future seems to be covered by the press. And I cannot tell you any more now than you know already.

There does not seem to be any one individual who is large enough to fill Stalin's shoes.

When Lenin died, there was no one individual who was large enough to fill his shoes and what followed was a gradual and increasing struggle between Stalin and Trotsky and, you know the result: It caused the death of hundreds of thousands of people, and it shook the structure of Soviet communism to its foundations and yet, the party survived and its control survived.

Now, that was in a period when the Soviet Union was infinitely weaker than it is now.

Senator TAFT. But, it was not under great pressure from the outside.

Mr. SMITH. It was not under pressure from outside, but it is not now under great pressure from outside, Senator, in this sense: That is, it is under terrific internal pressure in its digestive process in respect to its satellites, though, and that I think is where one may look with a hopeful eye, but on the other hand, certainly Stalin has looked forward, because he knows better than anybody else what happened after Lenin's death, to prevent anything similar happening after his own death, if that is humanly possible; and he must have taken precautions about the succession, and it is probable that we will see some sort of a testament by Stalin, similar to Lenin's testimony, either actual or post-fabricated, which will more or less line up the succession and conceivably might well place it in the strong triumvirate of Malenkov, Molotov and Beria, but, as you well know, when a dictator dies there is a political vacuum and all sorts of things may happen. Undoubtedly in time there will be palace revolutions.

For the immediate future, however, the Central Committee and the Presidium will do everything within their power to give the impression to the world of complete solidity and complete agreement and full strength because they are well aware of the fact that the world is looking at this thing with anxiety and hope, and praying for a break, and they want to show that there is no break.

When the internal struggle will begin to manifest itself, one does not know.

MALENKOV IS STRONGEST

Senator GEORGE. General, who is the stronger young man in the outfit, over in the Kremlin?

Mr. SMITH. In my own view, Senator, Malenkov. He has followed Stalin's pattern quite consistently. He is now head of the Party Secretariat, as Stalin was, and it was that leadership of the Party Secretariat that enabled Stalin to consolidate his own power, because as Party Secretary, he could put men of his own choosing in the key positions within the Party and within the government, and even within the army and secret police.

Senator GEORGE. About what is his age?

Mr. SMITH. I don't recall his age

Senator FULBRIGHT. Fifty, I believe.

Senator SPARKMAN. In the upper forties, I think. There was quite a story about him not long ago in the press.

Mr. SMITH. He is relatively young.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Did you have a chance while you were over there to contact him?

Mr. SMITH. I met him only on one occasion.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Just once?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir, and had no real conversation with him.

As the Party man, he had almost no dealings of any kind with foreigners. When I was there, he was the only man, for instance, who wore the Old Party uniform of the high button-up collar and cap. that Party men always wear. He is a big man, very profane I am told, much more so than most Russians, and gives the appearance of a sort of flabbiness. He is not a man you would find attractive to meet, personally and otherwise.

Mentally, and otherwise, he is anything but flabby. He showed that during the war, when he had one key job after another. He revamped the airplane industry, he revamped the tank industry, and one thing and another and he was Stalin's Secretary, and then the Party Secretary, and probably he is the rising star in the firmament.

I should say that he is the man on whom I would put my money, in the long view.

Beria, of course, is a policeman, he still controls the secret police. Senator FERGUSON. Does Malenkov have any control over the secret police at all through the Party?

Mr. SMITH. Only as the Politburo does control the secret police.

RETURNING GOVERNMENT TO THE TECHNICIANS

You know they took Beria away from his post as actual head of the secret police when they removed the heads, that is, members of the Politburo, from the heads of executive branches of the government.

During the war is when Stalin took all of those positions and became Minister of Defense as well as Premier, and several others did the same.

They violated a longstanding custom by putting members of the Politburo in the jobs as heads of the executive departments, Molotov for foreign affairs, Mikoyan, foreign trade, Beria, secret police, and so forth.

They don't normally do that because they think of the heads of executive departments as technicians who take their control politically from the Politburo, but which are not on the same level.

Now, when the war ended they began to revert to old practices, those three Politburo members left the ministries and turned them over to successors and subordinates.

VISHINSKI

Thus, Vishinski, for example, a man whom I do not believe the Kremlin will ever entirely trust, because as you know he started out as a Menshevik, became head of Foreign Affairs, but he is looked on as a technician.

To illustrate that, I will tell you what I saw on one occasion on the stage of the Bolshoi Theater one evening on the anniversary of the founding of Moscow: Here was the whole Politburo sitting in front, and the lesser lights came in in the back rows and I saw Vishinski come up and bow from the waist, to lean over and shake hands