Senator FERGUSON. Well, I do not think it is possible to keep Europe and the other parts of the world from thinking that it is not a reduction of our whole program.

I think our task is to show that an economic, sound America and an economic, sound Europe are essential to defense, and I have been one of those who felt that even Europe is attempting at the present time to spend too much, as we are.

Now, can we all agree on a smaller defense, but let us say, more efficient defense, and not have Russia feel that we are doing it because we have quit in a program of defending the Free World? I realize the importance of cutting taxes in this country, just as you do realize the importance of a new tax or not a new tax in France at an election time, and I think it is one of our big problems. But I think, if we are going to defend the Free World, we have to do it within a cost that we can afford and not bring about that which we are trying to defeat.

PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPARATION NECESSARY

Mr. PLEVEN. You see, I fully appreciate that, but what is very careful psychological preparation is one thing, because when we had the last NATO meeting, the Commander-in-Chief said very plainly that he did not have enough forces, and he wanted more spending to have more forces, more infrastructure, and so forth. Of course, he understood very well that he was giving his needs, and that it was only as men in the Government that we could decide whether those needs could be met.

But we are at the moment with NATO forces which are not yet at the level where they should be to give a feeling of security which is wanted. Then we have to take as facts what we have just said about the necessities in which you are in the United States. You realize that the arguments which you have given to me are going to be used in France, in England, in Italy, everywhere, to suggest a reduction in our own military expenditure.

Senator FERGUSON. I realize that, and I do not think we can prevent it.

Mr. PLEVEN. Yes; you see those are facts. I do not try to discuss whether it is possible, I agree with you those are facts that we have to live with and, therefore, I am trying to prepare this transition.

RECONCILING ECONOMIC AND MILITARY NECESSITIES

Some months ago, perhaps you will remember, I suggested that we should aim to what I called the cruising speed of the NATO forces. Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. PLEVEN. I believe that there may be an idea there which would make it possible to avoid the sort of contradiction between what we have to do from an economic and financial point of view, and what we hope to be able to do from a military point of view, and I believe also that the emphasis should be put on the fact that there are, perhaps, methods of spending which would give a higher yield than the methods which have been so far adopted. This is always what we have tried to explain at NATO, and so far with not much success. You remember the painful story of the two rifles, American rifles and

British rifles, amongst which nobody would accept to make a choice, you see.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think that we might pick projects and demonstrate to our own people as well as to Russia that we are interested in getting a better defense for, let us say, less money if we can pick the projects to demonstrate that?

Mr. PLEVEN. I think it is very much on those lines that we should approach this new situation created by the necessity of adjusting all around the military expenditures. If we are not able to bring the idea. you see, that through a better organization, a closer integration of programs, we are going to get a higher yield for the money we are putting into defense, I am afraid there will be a tendency all the world around to cut on those expenditures, and finally to mean lower forces. I believe a lot of care must be

Senator FERGUSON. Exercised about that.

Mr. PLEVEN. [continuing]. Exercised about that, not to allow any misinterpretation of what is going to happen, especially if there is a backlog of money appropriated in mutual aid. I believe it is very important that it should be used to soften the terms, you see. I do not know whether always my English is good, but I think you see what I mean.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I see it, personally.

The CHAIRMAN. I might say, in reply to what you said before, about the economic conditions in Russia, I had a peculiar experience while I represented this country at the United Nations for 10 weeks. They got up and bragged about their economic accomplishments, but when we wanted them to come across and make a contribution towards sustaining the Institution, then they squealed like stuck pigs. The result was that they always accentuated what they were doing, except when it came to a question of their doing the fair thing, and then they could not talk about their accomplishments. It was always this big America, this great successful, overproducing America, you see; that was the attitude of Vishinsky and the rest of them.

You direct a question to that Senator at the end of the table. That is Senator Mike Mansfield from Montana.

Mr. PLEVEN. Well, I have exhausted a bit of my stock of questions.

WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF INDO-CHLNA WERE LOST?

Senator MANSFIELD. Let me ask you a question. What would happen if France was to lose Indochina, or I should say if the Free World was to lose Indochina?

Mr. PLEVEN. Well, in my opinion, we would gradually lose what remains of Asia, and I say to you that we would have much greater and later difficulties in other parts of the world, like the Near East.

You see, I believe that the situation in Siam is very bad, very shaky. I believe that the situation in Burma would be practically untenable if there was not this Indochinese barrier. I believe that the social conditions in India are such that it would be very easy for the Russians, if there was contact between Red countries and India, to penetrate India.

I believe that Pakistan would be stronger; there would be a stronger difference, perhaps because they are more military-minded,

but then we would very quickly reach areas like the Arab countries, where many things might happen with small stakes for the Soviets, to put in there, and that is why for the last 8 years we have clung to Indochina, convinced that it was one of the doors to the Southern belt of Asia, and that if that door was being opened, let open, to the Communists, very probably the country would be through in a short number of years.

Senator MANSFIELD. In other words, there would be a chain reaction to the countries in the East which eventually would go beyond the Suez, into Africa, and in addition to that the wealth of the Indies would be open, that is, the rubber and oil and the tin in Malaya, all those things which are so important, plus the rice granary in Indochina, Thailand, and Burma, which could be used by lots of people; so what you have there is in a lot of respects probably the most important position in Asia.

INDOCHINA MORE IMPORTANT THAN KOREA

Mr. PLEVEN. We believe this part of Asia is strategically much more important than Korea, I mean strategy

Senator MANSFIELD. That is right.

Mr. PLEVEN. [continuing]. And I believe that people who have been recently in those areas, you see, have told me that it is amazing the importance and the interest which people in Indonesia, for instance, are taking with respect to the struggle in Indochina because they fully realize that it is a key position, and I think it is the only explanation also why the Chinese are constantly helping and pushing,

you see.

At the moment, you see, we feel that the movements of troops which make us believe there will be shortly an offensive, are directed towards Laos, and from Laos to Siam.

Senator MANSFIELD. If that happens, what happens to Burma and Thailand?

Mr. PLEVEN. That is right; I call Siam Thailand. It is certainly one of the strategy components of the world.

Senator MANSFIELD. That is right.

Mr. PLEVEN. And I believe also that the loss of prestige for the Western World will have great effects throughout Africa. Senator MANSFIELD. That is my question, Mr. Chairman.

PUBLICATION OF THE RECORD

The CHAIRMAN. Monsieur Pleven, I should say, as I have listened to these questions and answers, it sems to me that there would be little or nothing that should not get out to the public of much that has been said, and in back of it would be the strength of your own conviction. We would like to make this matter into a Senate document. I might say that Adenauer was here, and he agreed to the same thing. We agreed that someone from his Embassy could look over and make any corrections they wished of the record, but it seems to me that we that we have here a second precedent that has occurred recently where we have had the benefit of distinguished statesmen from abroad to counsel with this group, and I am sure anything you have said is

not in the slightest in disagreement with what we feel and what we have said ourselves, but it is a confirmation more or less of an international opinion that I think I would be very glad if you would agree that we could print it.

Mr. PLEVEN. I will tell you, I would like to consult our Ambassador

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. PLEVEN. [continuing]. Because, you see, the difference is that Mr. Adenauer was here on an official trip to America.

Here I am a friend, passing through Washington, and going to get a degree, and when Adenauer was speaking, he was speaking for the German Government, and I was not speaking here for my government.

The CHAIRMAN. No, you were not.

Mr. PLEVEN. I was just on my own.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what makes it all the more valuable.
We will abide by your wishes in the matter.

Mr. PLEVEN. I will speak to Henri Bonnet about it, and try to find out what he thinks.

The CHAIRMAN. We will do more than that. We will have it transcribed, and if he wants to come down and look it over there can be an agreement effectuated between him and Mr. Wilcox of the committee here, then, as to what should be done.

Senator GREEN. Negotiated is the word.

The CHAIRMAN. Anyway, I want to again express to you our appreciation for this very friendly and very profitable visit that you have paid to this committee, this group. You can see how interested they are. We hope ere long to get back to Paris and visit with you over there.

Mr. PLEVEN. Well, it is my hope, you see, I hope you Senators will come, and I will be glad to have a chance to repay this visit. Senator TOBEY. Vive la France!

Mr. PLEVEN. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:05 o'clock, the committee adjourned.]

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

1

FRIDAY, APRIL 17, 1953

UNITED STATES SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:25 a.m., in the Foreign Relations Committee room, U.S. Capitol, Senator H. Alexander Smith, presiding.

Present: Senators Smith, Hickenlooper, Taft, Langer, Ferguson, Knowland, George, Green, Gillette, and Mansfield.

Also present: Dr. Wilcox, Dr. Kalijarvi, Mr. O'Day, Mr. Cahn, and Mr. Holt, of the committee staff.

Senator SMITH. Gentlemen, will the meeting please come to order. At the request of the chairman, who has to be absent today, the second-in-command on the Republican side is presiding, I hope, with the indulgence of his colleagues.

MEETING OF THE NATO COUNCIL IN PARIS

We have Secretary Dulles with us, who is about to go to a meeting in Paris of NATO, as I understand it, and there are things that he wants to discuss with the committee. So, Secretary Dulles, we will give you the floor for whatever you may want to say to us. We welcome you here, as ever, of course, and we are delighted to see you again.

Secretary DULLES. Thank you.

Senator SMITH. And we hope you shot some ducks, or whatever you were doing last week.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SMITH. All right, Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN FOSTER DULLES,

SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary DULLES. Mr. Chairman, I asked for the opportunity to meet with your committee before going over to the meeting of the NATO Council, which will be held in Paris next week.

There will be, in addition to myself, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Humphrey, and the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Stassen, Director of Mutual Security.

It will be the first time that the new administration has had to deal with these NATO problems, which are extremely complicated, difficult, and as to which I still have a great deal to learn.

1 See note, p. 289.