have not got all the pressures under this armistice that have so far been negotiated that I would like to see there. I say that frankly.

You see, what we inherited here was an armistice agreement that had been negotiated by us, the United States, that is, and to some extent under the United Nations participation, not at the United Nations itself, but through the representatives of the other governments who have forces in there.

Everything was agreed to except in one article, with the exchange of the prisoners of war.

Now, some of those things that were a great deal not precisely the way I would like to see them, but we were so far involved in this as a United Nations partner that it did not seem practical or wise to attempt to at that stage, at least, reopen the entire armistice negotiations.

I think myself that very serious consideration should be given to putting a time limit on the present talks and stating that if we do not get some satisfactory action quickly then we will not merely break up the talks but, perhaps, call off everything that has been agreed to so far because today we are being held to things that we agreed to on the assumption they would be all, and I do not think we should be indefinitely bound to some of those things that were agreed to.

Now, there is an understanding which I think is of some value. [Discussion off the record.]

Senator FERGUSON. Are we, in effect, starting where they left off now in their negotiations?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And recognizing all that has been said and done?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And are we going to continue the policy that we go into these talks and we are to stay there and will not leave, nothwithstanding anything that happens?

Secretary DULLES. No.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand that was the agreement before. The men were instructed, "You go in there and sit in these talks"Secretary DULLES. That is nothing to which we are bound. Senator FERGUSON. We are not bound by such a policy?

A SHARP TIME LIMIT FAVORED

Secretary DULLES. I would not favor that at all, no. I would favor putting a very sharp time limit on this thing, and although I have not discussed this with the President, and it is a matter in which his view would carry great weight not only because he is President but because of his military experience, I would be inclined to review all these previously agreed to articles, and if they are not pretty satisfactory, then, some of them do not seem to me to be satisfactory, I would say: "If you do not get agreement very quickly everything is off, and the next time you start from scratch."

in

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that would be a great handicap if we went

Senator FERGUSON. [continuing]. With an idea we were to continue these talks on into the future

Secretary DULLES. No.

Senator FERGUSON [continuing]. And we would sit there and listen to anything that they had to say no matter how absurd it was or how bitter it was against the United Nations.

Secretary DULLES. I think you can be sure that policy will not be followed.

Senator KNOWLAND. It seems to me we are entitled to have a demonstration of good faith on their part. If they are merely going to use it as a super Panmunjom and a propaganda background for stalling and maybe making troop dispositions, then it seems to me we should not be in a position of letting time work in their favor, as it definitely has done in the Panmunjom talks.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

ARE THEY BRINGING DOWN MUNITIONS WITH THE SICK AND WOUNDED?

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anything to this information that they were bringing down munitions with the sick and wounded?

Secretary DULLES. I do not know. I inquired about that of our intelligence officer this morning, and he could not confirm it. He said that the information that he had about their troop dispositions was that they were moving more onto a defensive position than to an offensive position, and apparently were making some redeployment of their forces as against the possibility of amphibious landings on their flanks, but I will have to look into that further.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, certainly a thing like that, if it would happen, that would affect the whole peace negotiations.

Secretary DULLES. It would certainly raise grave doubt right away as to the good faith of their maneuver.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Senator Taft, do you have any questions?
Senator TAFT. I am sorry that I had to leave.

PRESIDENT'S SPEECH WAS AMBIGUOUS ON KOREA

The President's speech yesterday was ambiguous to me as to just what was proposed to be done in Korea. He said:

The first great step along this way must be the conclusion of an honorable armistice in Korea.

This means the immediate cessation of hostilities and the prompt initiation of political discussions leading to the holding of free elections in a United Korea. It should mean-no less importantly- -an end to the direct and indirect attacks upon the security of Indo China and Malaya. For any armistice in Korea that merely released aggressive armies to attack elsewhere would be a fraud.

I do not understand whether that meant that the President was willing to undertake preliminary and immediate cessation of hostilities and wait on everything else or whether this was going to be part of the condition of an armistice.

Secretary DULLES. No. I was saying while you were out of the room, Senator Taft

Senator TAFT. Yes.

Secretary DULLES [continuing]. That the present negotiations involve a continuance of the cast in negotiations which resulted in an armistice agreement which was complete in every respect but one, that is, about the exchange of prisoners of war.

Now that we did not think was practical to disturb because it was not entirely within the authority of the United States to do it. It was a United Nations document, to some extent, and to disturb it would have caused very serious repercussions and difficulties with some of our allies; but we are carrying on and accepting the past negotiated provisions of the armistice. That armistice agreement itself provides that after the conclusion of the armistice, then in 30 days political talks will be initiated. I think that is what the President had in mind.

Senator TAFT. So we do just what we have been doing for the last year; we, in effect, cease hostilities and take a chance on whether we ever get anything else.

Secretary DULLES. That is correct.

AN ARMISTICE WITHOUT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WOULD BE A MISTAKE

Senator TAFT. Is that not just what we did at Yalta and everywhere else where we have negotiated with the Russians, given them what they want first, and then go on? Has not the very condition of an armistice been that there should be some settlement in Korea, and must we not settle it all at once?

Secretary DULLES. Well an armistice generally precedes a political settlement. I do not know that

Senator TAFT. That may be, but that is when you have got somebody beaten. The only effect of an armistice here is a greater buildup of the Soviet military machine so that they are able to save ammunition and save airplanes and build up airplanes, build up their forces, and generally put themselves in a position where they are less likely to agree to these political agreements.

You feel that we are absolutely bound to go through if they come in and say, "We will agree to your prisoner thing," that we are bound to sign up the armistice as is?

Secretary DULLES. That is the feeling, yes.

Senator TAFT. I think it is a great mistake, I may say, for myself. Senator SMITH. Are you in accord with those pressures as to that or is it because we think it is the right thing to do? It seems to me that is the reason why you have got to have a very close time limit on it or it will rise to another 6 months, and there will be another buildup, and they will be talking politics in Korea indefinitely.

Secretary DULLES. The pressure for an end to this fighting in Korea is, of course, very great not only among our allies, but also here at home. It, of course, is a very large budgetary item.

Now, it was the President's feeling that we should not cancel out all of the armistice agreement which had been made. You see, theoretically, the negotiations are still going on. For us to move in and cancel out what has been done will create a very great disturbance in our relations with our allies.

A REASONABLE TIME LIMIT ON THESE DISCUSSIONS

Senator KNOWLAND. It does seem to me that if we have not already done so, there ought to be a clear understanding with our associates, if not with the full U.N. membership, and because of the complexion of the U.N. that may not be feasible but certainly with the nations that are associated with us, that there should be some reasonable time

limit on these discussions, because while I find, of course, everybody has a deep desire for peace, and I have had any number of letters from men in Korea as well as the members of their families at home I was just out in California, and I found a considerable amount of sentiment that unless this thing could be settled right, they do not want to be forced into a situation of fighting again under maybe far worse conditions than we are now engaged in, and I would hope that the administration and our U.N. associates realize the grave dangers of having this in an open-ended, superduper Panmunjom operation.

THE INDIAN PROPOSAL

Secretary FERGUSON. Are we bound by the Indian proposal that has been approved, if they offer to accept that at the U.N.?1 Secretary DULLES. We voted for it.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean, but is it the idea of the new administration to accept that as a settlement?

Secretary DULLES. The President, in the course of the campaign, said that we would make an armistice on the basis of the Indian proposal.

THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT GIVES A FALSE PICTURE

Senator TAFT. Mr. Secretary, this is what bothers me. "This means the immediate cessation of hostilities and the prompt initiation of political discussions leading to the holding of free elections in a united Korea."

It seems to me that gives a completely false picture. Once the armistice is concluded, what on Earth-what chance is there in a thousand that they will ever agree to free elections in Korea any more than they have in Germany? You are presenting a picture which is going to happen, which is not going to happen if it is preceded by a complete armistice, and then we are through. Nobody is going to resume another aggressive war all of a sudden because they will not agree to these free elections, and it seems to me, unless it means that these things are part of the making of the truce, I think it is a misrepresentation to the American people to say that this means the prompt initiation of political discussions, and hold out the hope of free elections in Korea, and hold out the ceasing of attacks in Indo China. We throw away the only weapon we have got to enforce those things, and once we make that armistice those things are just so much hot air.

There is no chance of obtaining them. Why should they agree to them any more than they are agreeing to them in Germany? That is the thing that bothers me.

It seems to me that if that is what it means, then it seems to me the passage is a complete misrepresentation to the people of what we may hope for, because it holds out hopes that are completely foreign, if the armistice is to be made first. Unless we make those a condition of the armistice, I think we might just as well tear up the paper on which the speech was written.

1 A resolution adopted by the General Assembly on December 3, 1952, containing detailed proposals to the Chinese and North Korean Governments for resolution of the prisoner exchange issue.

Secretary DULLES. Well, there are a good many problems that you would get into when you take over a situation which is as far advanced as this one was when we took it over.

Senator TAFT. Yes, I know.

Secretary DULLES. One possible course of action was to say that we would renegotiate the entire armistice agreement. That would isolate us very much, whatever that means, from our allies, not merely-the alliance is important to us not merely in Korea, which is a less important part than in a good many areas in the world. Europe and the Near East, and in general it affects the whole question of whether or not we can have a cohesive working alliance between the Western European powers. We just cannot do that if we act wholly on our own wishes, and we have got to respect the fact that in practice there is a different continuity in government, and even if you have a change in administration you cannot, to your best interests, wholly destroy everything that has taken place before.

I think that there is a serious question which I have raised, myself, as to whether or not the armistice should not be more closely tied in with the political discussions than is the present timetable, and I think we may find ways to do that.

Senator TAFT. That is what I would hope.

Secretary DULLES. I am using whatever ingenuity I have, trying to find a way for moving in that direction, so that we can still maintain a pressure. We lose, certainly, a great deal of the available pressure if we make the kind of perpetual armistice here and that, in turn, leads to perpetual political discussions, particularly because the present armistice line is not acceptable to the South Koreans, a very acceptable position, and you may, if we do not look out-you are going to get into a situation where the South Koreans are going to say, "Well, boys, if this is the line you want us to hold, you hold it, and we will quit," and then we will really be in the soup. I do not think that is likely to happen, but there is a good deal of unrest in South Korea.

Senator TAFT. I do not want to stop any other senators. Have the other senators finished?

Senator SMITH. We have been around.

NATO READINESS DOUBTED

Senator TAFT. I have only one other question. I have, of course, as you probably know, complete skepticism about NATO, at least until the Germans are a full part of it.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator TAFT. You spoke of the goal of 50 divisions having been reached. I do not think a commander in Europe could muster 25 divisions if the Russians attacked. I do not know where they are, whose they are; there are not any, so far as I know of, more than 25, and I do not think we ought to hold out any false pictures, when we do this thing, of what it is.

I have been very anxious that-I suppose you will be advised by the present Joint Chiefs of Staff when you go over, who got up the present program, and I have been urging for a long time that they be dismissed, not so much because of themselves, but because it seems to me we ought to have a new look from the military end of this proposi

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