General STEWART. Yes, sir. When you try to be extremely accurate in your reply it becomes a little involved. That is true except that each year we start this cycle about September.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is right.

General STEWART. Each year we are furnished some theoretical figure to work against. I do not even remember what the original figure was, but that does not in any way mean that what is said about the development of these lists was not done exactly as it is.

DETERMINING DEFICIENCIES

When it got back here, then we had to kind of figure that theoretical figure, but the field submitted their deficiencies against a force basis.

Senator HUMPHREY. What do you mean by a force basis?

General STEWART. Well, if you can figure deficiencies you have got to know what you are trying to equip.

Senator HUMPHREY. All right.

General STEWART. We used for the initial go-around last September, when we started to work up this program, a force basis known as the MRC12, which was a standing group recommendation for the forces which should be used for fiscal 1954. It was not at that time agreed internationally, but we had to have something, and that was -the decision was made that we would use that basis, so we went to the field and said, using MRC12, give us a deficiency list.

Senator HUMPHREY. In other words, using MRC12, which may have been interpreted as a certain number of divisions, with certain combat readiness and certain quality and quantity of armament and munitions, they were asked to give you their deficiencies, is that right?

General STEWART. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. And that, of course, was just a calculated judgment that was made unilaterally by the United States at that time?

General STEWART. Yes, sir. We had to start somewhere and, sir, we took that.

Senator HUMPHREY. Let me ask you the following question. Was that decision we made unilaterally as a starting point by the United States-was that later on altered or agreed to or amended in any way internationally?

Genral STEWART. I have it here, sir. I can give you the relative

basis of it.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think that would be helpful.

FORCE FIGURES

General STEWART. The MRC figure for 1954 was in round figures 61 divisions-this is D plus 30. That is what we counted, total divisions, not new divisions, the total we were dealing with, and what they finally came up with in Paris-I am speaking of 1954, calendar year 1954 figure now-was 53 2/3. I will have to go back again to be exactly accurate, sir. The original 54 figure was 61 divisions, plus a total of 12 for Germany, and that was what we started out on; and the ones that came up in Paris were 53 2/3, not

counting Germany, because Paris did not take in Germany since the EDC was not signed.

Senator HUMPHREY. I see.

General STEWART. So there was a difference, sir, between those two calculations.

Senatom HUMPHREY. In other words, the figure of $5.8 billion takes into consideration the noninclusion of Germany; in other words, Germany was not included, plus paring down from 61 to 53. divisions?

General STEWART. Yes, sir. That was the difference in our original basis from this one, and I might add that those figures did not include Greece and Turkey, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Did not what?

General STEWART. Did not include Greece and Turkey.

Senator SPARKMAN. General, you said D plus 30. Did you mean D-Day divisions, because I notice by the chart that D-plus 30 is 102 by the chart, and D-Day was 55.

General STEWART. You have to add in there, sir, Greece and Turkey. Unfortunately, it depends on where you start from, and I apologize for confusing people. If you start with the original title one, which I have been presenting to the Congress, you have my figures; if you start with General Ridgway's responsibility you have to add in Greece and Turkey, and sometimes it is confusing, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. But the difference would be about eight divisions, plus the German divisions; is that correct, General?

General STEWART. From the original calculation, yes, sir; it would be eight, and plus the German divisions, you are correct, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Are we not, sir, under the contemplated program, the one under this committee for purposes of authorization, contemplating some stockpiling of material for German divisions even under the present program?

General STEWART. We have in the present program, 1 division for Germany, and some aircraft.

Senator HUMPHREY. But your original estimates were being made on 12 divisions for Germany, is that correct?

General STEWART. On the existence of 12 divisions before the end of 1954, sir. Now, we are already funded for some German divisions. I have to keep breaking this up to be accurate, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, I think this is very helpful to get this. There has been a calculated military decision made, very careful decision arrived at, as well as one on the basis of economic ability of the nations to concentrate on the figure of 53 and a 3d divisions: in much more readiness, in combat effectiveness; that is the situation, is it?

General STEWART. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. And that is considered to be for the calendar year 1953 considered to be the goal, is that right, your goal of achievement for 1953, for calendar 1953?

General STEWART. The money that we are asking for, sir, will not apply to calendar year 1953, of course.

Senator HUMPHREY. No; but I am having a little difficulty with your chart. Your chart shows 53 1/3 as the 1953 goal, and you said the chart referred to calendar years.

General STEWART. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Of course, we are talking about fiscal 1954 in this budget.

General STEWART. Yes, sir. We intend to achieve the result that Genral Ridgway has just described to you of increasing the effectiveness of the 1953 calendar year goal by these increased shipments that we are now beginning to make.

Senator HUMPHREY. I understand.

General STEWART. He has given us critical lists of shortages or shortages of critical items, and we are doing everything to deliver those, and now coming off the production line, sir. But no 1954 funds will be involved in that.

Senator HUMPHREY. I do not want to take Senator Gillette's time here. I apologize for that.

The CHAIRMAN. What you mean there is while there are obligated funds or unexpended funds, the minute that these obligated funds produce the results, you then expend the money, and you have got several billions or more unexpended, have you not?

General STEWART. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. And by that-then there is another question. Out of the $7.2 billion there was a considerable cut of economic aid, was there not?

General STEWART. There was, sir.

UNEXPENDED BALANCES FOR AIRCRAFT

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. And the question of the rate of production is very intriguing to me, because while we have not gotten into the aircraft situation, except in a general way, which is being discussed all over America, you might be intersted to know, you gentlemen who are looking for some Africans in the wood pile, that the unexpended balance as of March 31 is $75 billion for aircraft. Senator FULBRIGHT. For aircraft?

The CHAIRMAN. For aircraft. As of June 30 it will be $62 billion, and you must likely know, since we went into power, we Republicans have increased the efficiency of the wings 50 percent.

Senator HUMPHREY. That could be possible, could it not, Mr. Chairman, that they are just getting it off the assembly line?

The CHAIRMAN. That proves it. In other words, we have added, as the General said, a little bit of oomph to the program and are getting results, but I did not mean to get into this.

Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to get into a discussion of the protective tariff.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, proceed.

FALLING SHORT OF MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS

Senator GILLETTE. I do want to ask two questions, and they are very simple ones. As I understood your reference to a bar on the left, it represented the honest judgment of the military as to what was necessary to build up the forces in the European area to meet an allout attack, and absorb the shock of it until reserves could be brought up?

General RIDGWAY. Right, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. That explains, does it not, General, the statement to which I called attention here, by quoting from your statement that when the North Atlantic Council fixed firm goals for 1953 and 1954, even if they attained them it would be short of the minimum represented by your requirements, your assessment of the requirements?

General RIDGWAY. That is right, sir; the right hand bars.
Senator GILLETTE. That is correct.

NO EVIDENCE OF ATTACK

Now, my second question is this: You spoke of the very marked buildup in the efficiency of the German strength and in a qualitative way rather than a quantitative way. Is there anything in that buildup that would indicate that there was any preparation in contemplation on the basis of your intelligence for an attack in the foreseeable or the near future in the European area?

General RIDGWAY. No, sir; we see no indications of an imminent attack in any areas.

Senator GILLETTE. My third question I will ask you privately rather than make myself ridiculous before my colleagues here; that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. General, we want to thank you very much. I take it that you will be continuously around these parts, will you not now?

General RIDGWAY. For a few days, sir; I have to return to my command, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You will not be around here for any length of time?

General RIDGWAY. No, sir; just for a few days.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, again we express our appreciation for your clarity of statement; and I am sure you have a complete understanding of the situation. However, you consider yourself subject to call whenever some of my Democratic colleagues want to inquire into some more of these intricate matters, which is all right with me. We will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, MAY 22, 1953

UNITED STATES SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session at 10:40 a.m. in the committee room.

Present: Chairman Wiley and Senator Mansfield. Senators Green and Gillette had come to the meeting at 10:15 when the meeting was originally scheduled to begin, but had to leave before the meeting actually got under way.

The committee had before it the following nominations: Edward T. Wailes of New York, to be an Assistant Secretary of State; Frederick M. Alger, Jr. of Michigan, to be Ambassador to Belgium; Walter S. Delany, of the District of Columbia, to be Deputy Administrator of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951.

The committee heard the nominees but no final action was taken on the nominations .

The committee then heard Samuel C. Waugh of Nebraska, whose nomination as an Assistant Secretary of State is expected to be submitted to the Senate by the White House next week. Senator Griswold and Congressman Curtis of Nebraska appeared and spoke in behalf of Mr. Waugh.

The committee recessed at 12:15 p.m., to meet again at 2:45 p.m. At the afternoon meeting which convened at 2:45 p.m. the committee met informally with Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Vice President of India. He was accompanied by Nr. Gaganvihari Lallubhai Mehta, Ambassador of India to the United States.

Present: Chairman Wiley, Senators Smith, Tobey, Ferguson, Knowland, Green, Sparkman and Mansfield.

Following the meeting with Vice President Radhakrishnan, the committee considered further the nominations discussed at the morning meeting. By voice vote they were ordered reported to the Senate. Senator Ferguson was authorized to report the nomination of Mr. Alger.

A stenographic report was kept of the morning meeting but no record was kept of the afternoon session of the committee. The committee adjourned at 4:20 p.m.