LOYALTY-SECURITY PROBLEMS IN THE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1953

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 3:10 p.m., in the Foreign Relations Committee room, U.S. Capitol, Senator Alexander Wiley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Wiley, Smith of New Jersey, Hickenlooper, Tobey, Taft, Langer, Ferguson, Knowland, Sparkman, Humphrey, and Mansfield.

Also present: Dr. Wilcox, Dr. Kalijarvi, Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. O'Day, and Mr. Cahn, of the committee staff.

THE OVERALL LOYALTY-SECURITY PROBLEM AT STATE

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I am going to call the meeting to order, and I am going to read a statement and you will see what this meeting is about.

I have called this meeting for the purpose of securing testimony from Mr. Carlisle H. Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary of State. Our subject is the overall loyalty-security problem in the State Department.

I have felt that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would benefit from securing a comprehensive picture of this problem.

Certainly, there is no committee in the Congress which has a more basic jurisdiction than ours for the effective functioning of the State Department.

It is my feeling that after Mr. Humelsine has presented his comments, we will probably turn over further exploration of this subject to various subcommittees of this committee:

For example, to the Subcommittee on Security Affairs, of which I am chairman.

To Senator Ferguson's Subcommittee on State Department Organization.

And, as regards those phases which deal with the International Information Administration, to Senator Hickenlooper's Subcommittee on the "Voice of America."

I would like to set forth a word of background on this session today. Ever since the start of this Congress, I have directed a series of confidential inquiries to Mr. Humelsine, to Mr. Hickerson-As

sistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs-and to various other governmental officials in which I have requested certain information on the security and loyalty problem.

I did so because I am concerned, as Secretary Dulles is, about cleaning up this problem and raising the prestige of the Department in the eyes of our people, so it can become a more effective instrument to accomplish the constitutional purpose of that very Depart

ment.

I have discussed these various requests with Mr. Humelsine. Moreover, I have directed the counsel for this committee to follow up on these requests.

On the basis of various talks which we have had, I have come to feel that my requests were merely getting at the information piecemeal.

I came to feel that what was needed was a comprehensive approach, such as I believe we will get today.

EIGHT PARTICULAR CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION

Last night, therefore, I conveyed a formal request_to Mr. Humelsine. It was delivered by messenger to him. In it, I asked for detailed information on eight particular categories. Those eight areas are as follows:

One: The nature of the loyalty-security problem.

Two: The size of the problem-statistics involved-how many applicants are turned down, how many violators are fired.

Three: Lessons which have been learned in coping with the problem-mistakes made which should be avoided in the future.

Four: The loyalty problem-involving tracking down of subversives.

Five: The security problem-including the problem of morals offenses, that is homosexuals, as well as other types of security risksalcoholics, blabbermouths, et cetera.

Six: The problem of physical security-of wire-tapping, of hidden recording devices in rooms.

Seven: The problem as regards allied diplomatic personnel-from friendly nations-their loyalty and security.

Eight: Finally, and most important, recommendations for improved coping with this overall problem.

This is, of course, a big order, and I have been anxious to get under way on it.

I should like to point out that it is not my intention that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee infringe in any way on the jurisdiction of any other committee of the Senate or House.

It is quite clear that our committee does not have the time nor the staff resources, nor money, nor the intention, of attempting a very detailed review of a wide variety of individual loyalty-security

cases.

However, the 15 members of this particular committee are the Senators most responsible for policies-I repeat, policies in this field. That is why I have scheduled this meeting today-to review policies.

I am hoping that we will permit Mr. Humelsine to present the

overall picture in a systematic fashion, and then we will ask questions of him, but if he proceeds in the way I think he can, without interruption, he will give us an overall picture that will be truly what we want, and I think will really clear away a great many things that we have been looking to have cleared away.

Let me say, too, that it is not my intention in making this study to accuse anybody or, on the other hand, receive self-serving statements, but rather simply to get at the facts on this overall problem.

I had originally envisioned that we would not hold this meeting for a while, but in view of the Lincoln birthday week and in view of the fact that some of our colleagues are already having to leave town, I felt that we had to advance the meeting.

I might say to you gentlemen who came in late, I asked Mr. Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary of State, to come to us in relation to the various categories that I have set forth, and I think I was reading them when you came into the room.

I felt, as I said, that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would benefit from securing a comprehensive picture of this problem. Certainly there is no committee, as I said, which has a more basic jurisdiction than ours, for the effective functioning of the State Department.

Now, Mr. Humelsine, you told me that the testimony you wanted to give, you wanted to be sworn.

Mr. HUMELSINE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you shall give this committee in relation to matters now under consideration will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HUMELSINE. So help me God.

TESTIMONY OF CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY SAM BOYKIN, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SECURITY IN CONSULAR AFFAIRS

The CHAIRMAN. Just tell the committee who you are, your age, your background, and then go into the categories.

BACKGROUND OF THE WITNESS

Mr. HUMELSINE. I will be 38 years of age this coming March. My background is: I am native of the State of Maryland; I was raised there, born in Hagerstown, went to the public schools, went to the University of Maryland, graduated from there in 1937; in 1937 to 1941, I worked as assistant to the President, University of Maryland, Dr. H. C. Byrd; in 1941, I went in the U.S. Army as a second lieutenant of infantry.

I was in there until 1945, when I left the Army I had the rank of colonel.

I was hired into the Department of State when Mr. Russell, who was the law partner of Mr. Jimmy Byrnes, was there.

I worked in the Department successively from that time until the present time; and at the moment, I hold the position of Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration.

The CHAIRMAN. You have a copy of that letter that sets forth these categories.

Would you kindly go on, in your own way.

Mr. HUMELSINE. I will say, at the outset, this is a rather comprehensive problem to cope with, and the committee must realize that I have only had since 6:30 last night to prepare my testimony, although I have been working in this field, which has been one of the fields of responsibility that have been under my general supervision and department, as Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. So, if I miss any point, I will be glad to take it, or them, afterward.

As the Chairman suggested, I would very much appreciate it if I would be allowed to make my complete presentation and then I will answer any questions that I possibly can.

IS THIS WITNESS FREE TO TELL THE TRUTH?

Senator FERGUSON. At the very outset, before going further, I would like to ask you a question.

It appeared from the testimony of a witness that, for instance-a certain agency, that people are forbidden to tell the facts, even though they take an oath to tell the facts.

I think you are familiar with the agency.

Mr. HUMELSINE. Yes, sir, I am familiar with that.

Senator FERGUSON. There is nothing in the State Department's rules or regulations which you feel in any way would keep you from giving on this record the truth or the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

Mr. HUMELSINE. If I took an oath to tell the truth, I will tell you the truth.

Senator FERGUSON. Under that agency, I think they take an oath also.

Mr. HUMELSINE. I have never had any such instruction since I have been in the U.S. Government.

Senator FERGUSON. I just wanted to make the record clear on that point.

Mr. HUMELSINE. I have never taken an oath to any other agency not to tell the truth.

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that.
The CHAIRMAN. Go on, sir.

A WORKING ASSUMPTION

Mr. HUMELSINE. I want to make two points, at the outset, if I

may:

First I want to offer an assumption. This assumption is that you are licked in handling this problem unless you proceed from the working assumption-and I want to underline the working assumption that the Department and the Foreign Service have been penetrated by subversive elements.

Second: I want to say that you must have a loyal, secure group of employees. I believe that no less should be tolerated.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

I am going to talk about the following topics. All of these are connected with the problems of physical and personnel security of the Department of State, and the Foreign Service.

These include physical pentration, homosexuals as security risks, loyalty-security dismissals, and technical pentrations.

Later on, you may want to touch on these other aspects such as the problem of alien diplomatic persons in the United States.

One reason I limit that last one is because I want to talk a little about it, and when you bring that up, about the fact that Mr. J. Edgar Hoover is the primary official in that particular field, I want to be very careful that I do not step on the toes of any other agencies in my presentation.

PHYSICAL PENETRATION

The first thing I want to start with is: I want to talk about physical penetration, I want to say that this is a most important problem that we have to deal with today, inasmuch as we are in this situation vis-a-vis the Russian state.

Within the last few weeks we have had incidents of breaking and entering our missions in Rotterdam and Sydney. Fortunately, the latest types of developments that we have perfected have kept that penetration from being successful.

I could talk about other attempts of penetration in Caracas, Baghdad, Damascus, Bolivia, Turkey, and so forth. It is worldwide in

scope.

For instance, I want to tell you about a situation down in Caracas, Venezuela. The Soviets purchased a building down there, leased a building to use as a culture institute. They happen to have purchased it right next door to our Embassy. We are convinced that they purchased that for the purpose of penetration.

I have a picture here, picture No. 1, which shows the location of these two buildings right together. The meeting room of the Soviet cultural institute is on the top floor, right next to the roof of our Embassy.

I might add that our code room is right under there [indicating on photograph]. We are certain that that was deliberate, that they took that step in order to penetrate us, to be close to the code room and so forth.

Here is the picture, and it shows where the code vault is, where the Embassy's telephone lines come in, where the Embassy's file room is, right here; and the culture institute of the Soviets is right here. Well, we took action on that. We tightened our security guard right away, and within a period of 6 months we moved out of that particular building and got ourselves another building where we could have more security than we had right there.

I would like to talk to you now from picture No. 2.

SECURITY MEASURES OVERSEAS

Picture No. 2 [exhibiting the photograph] is a picture of General Gerow's office in Moscow. I show you this picture to show what