Senator GREEN. To him? Mr. ROBERTSON. Yes, to him, by me personally, the President of the United States and the Secretary of State. I can't make it any more emphatic than that. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Tobey. Senator TOBEY. Does he speak English? Mr. ROBERTSON. Oh, perfectly, and he writes the most beautiful English of anybody I know. Senator GREEN. I hope you will understand I am not in any way questioning anything that you have stated. Mr. ROBERTSON. It seemed to me, sir, that you were. Mr. ROBERTSON. I don't know how to express myself any clearer than I have done. Senator GREEN. If the Government of the United States-I am not claiming any particular administration, the last one or the present one has not made it clear to the public nor even to the Koreans that the statements are not well-founded and that he is not justified in making them, I think it is time we did so. I am sure you will agree with me. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Tobey, any further questions? HAVE WE GIVEN ASSURANCES CONCERNING RECONSTRUCTION? Senator TOBEY. In the event of an armistice, have we given them any assurance that we will help restore Korea? Mr. ROBERTSON. Oh yes. President Eisenhower in a letter to him on June 6 which has been published, we offered him-and that has all been published in the letter of June 6-we offered to continue our economic assistance, to continue to build up and strengthen his military forces to more or less 20 divisions, depending on supplies, and then a mutual defense pact. He is deeply appreciative of our help, and he thinks that America is the only friend he has got left in the world, and he is probably right about that. The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions, Senator Tobey? The CHAIRMAN. John! U.S. POLICY ON KOREAN UNIFICATION NOT CLEAR TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Robertson, first let me say I think what Senator Green was trying to get across was this: Not that you had not made it amply clear to Syngman Rhee, but that perhaps it had not been made amply clear to our own people here in the United States that we had never undertaken to reunite Korea by armed force. In other words, I think what he means is perhaps we have not emphasized that sufficiently to our own people. Mr. ROBERTSON. I agree with him on that if we haven't. I am surprised that we haven't because I didn't know that Senator SPARKMAN. There hasn't been much in the press about it except when he would say something about it. * Mr. ROBERTSON. Well, then I agree with you, I think it should be made clear to the American people as it has been made clear to Mr. Syngman Rhee. Senator SPARKMAN. As I understand it, that is what Senator Green had in mind. Senator GREEN. That is what I said. DOCUMENTS ON THE WAR Senator SPARKMAN. By the way, Mr. Chairman, I think it would be a fine thing if the State Department or the staff of this committee would bring together all of the various resolutions that have been adopted by the United Nations or any statements made by our Government relating to this, just have it in a compilation that each one of us could have. I have just been reading a book by two estimable authorities Wilcox and Kalijarvi.1 They have got most of them, but not all of them, and they are treated under different subjects. IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.N. RESOLUTION OF OCTOBER 7, 1950 Senator KNOWLAND. I thought when we were getting this up we had better have in mind the language of this October 7, 1950, resolution, because it was at least a little vague, to say the least. Senator SPARKMAN. What page is that on, Bill. Senator KNOWLAND. Page 423. It goes on where the third paragraph says: Mindful of the fact that the objectives set forth in the resolutions referred to above have not been fully accomplished, and in particular that the unification of Korea has not yet been achieved, and that an attempt has been made by armed attack from North Korea to extinguish by force the government of the Republic of Korea. And then it goes on, and on the next page, recommends that: A. All appropriate steps be taken to insure conditions of stability throughout Korea. Now, "all" is a pretty wide term when you are speaking about the aggression which has taken place. B. All constituent acts be taken including the holding of elections under the auspices of the United Nations for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea in the sovereign state of Korea. Meaning the whole area. D. United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives specified in paragraphs A and B above. Now when you get that broad language which indicates that the forces of the United Nations are going to be up in the north until the objectives are achieved, at least you can see where he might hang his hat on it to the point of feeling that he had been let down. 1 Francis O. Wilcox and Thorsten V. Kalijarvi of the committee staff. The book referred to is their Recent American Foreign Policy; basic documents 1941-51. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952. 72-194-77—vol. V 44 Now that may not have been in our minds, but at least the language is sufficiently vague to open the door to feeling that "all" would include military as well as political means. Senator SPARKMAN. Apparently that is the language that Mr. Dulles had in mind when he said there was sufficient language to raise the implication. Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, when you go back prior to that and you realize that the United Nations undertook to conduct an election in all of Korea as a united Korea, and left vacant seats in the north Senator KNOWLAND. 100 seats. Senator FERGUSON. Yes, because the Russians would not allow the Koreans, so there was a united Korea so far as the United Nations was concerned, and that the government represented all of Korea. You have to go back farther than this. I see Rhee's attitude on this. Senator SMITH. That was in 1949. The CHAIRMAN. We have got too many talking at once. Now let's address the Chairman. John has the floor. That way we will get somewhere. Senator SPARKMAN. I stated in the beginning Mr. Dulles had pointed out in one of the resolutions the language was so worded that it did raise implications, even though that was not our intent. WHAT PROVISIONS FROM THE JAPANESE TREATY DOES RHEE INSIST UPON ? I will say this: That the opening sentence of that resolution relates back to the previous resolutions, all of which were looking toward setting it up through free elections, and therefore it is tied in with those. Now here I think will be the only question I care to ask Mr. Robertson. What provisions in the Japanese Treaty was Rhee particularly insistent upon? Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. Young here has been working on this treaty. Have you got the draft of those treaties here with you? Mr. YOUNG. No, I haven't. Mr. ROBERTSON. He wanted to first ask for the language used in article I.1 Senator SPARKMAN. Isn't that where we undertake to defend Japan in case she is attacked or threatened by attack? Don't we use some such language as that? Mr. YOUNG. The intent of President Rhee was to have some language in this treaty with him which would mention the stationing of U.S. forces in Korea for the defense of Korea. Senator SPARKMAN. Until she was able to defend herself? Mr. YOUNG. No; without any time on it, so he suggested that the language in article I whereby Japan grants and the United States 1 Reference is to the security treaty signed by the United States and Japan on Sept. 8, 1951. Article I states: "Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts the right, upon the coming into force of the treaty of peace and of this treaty, to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers." accepts the right to dispose of forces in Japan would be inserted in the treaty with the R.O.K. Senator SPARKMAN. As I understand it, you did not suggest to him the willingness on the part of our Government to go beyond the treaty with the Philippines. Mr. ROBERTSON. To the contrary, let me read you what I wrote him: With respect to your suggestion that the treaty incorporate certain language from the United States-Japan Treaty, Secretary Dulles advises that there should be no difficulty including in the proposed treaty, a rough draft of which has been submitted to you, language similar to Article I of the Japanese Treaty, which I read to you this morning. That isn't what I am talking about. Senator SPARKMAN. That is permissive? Mr. ROBERTSON. Yes. And then here is my last letter of July 11: The text of the rough draft of the proposed Mutual Defense treaty submitted by you for your consideration and discussion has been cabled to Washington and is under careful study there. However, I feel I should point out that the initial reaction from Washington is that it would be better to follow closely the form of the draft treaty which we have submitted. Which is just practically a copy of the Philippines Treaty. This draft has already been shown to Senate leaders and has received their support. In the interests of prompt ratification upon submission to the Senate, I suggest that as few changes as possible be made in the language used. We have no commitment to him at all. Senator SPARKMAN. And that is a final communication? Mr. ROBERTSON. That is a final communication to him on the subject of the treaty. Senator SPARKMAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman. RHEE HOLDS TWO THINGS AGAINST US Mr. ROBERTSON. I would like to say to Senator Green, if I may, Mr. Chairman, he has two things against us. Senator GREEN. Who has? Mr. ROBERTSON. Syngman Rhee. Now you may know your history better than I do, and I am little vague about this deal in 1905, what Syngman Rhee and all cultured Koreans will tell you, that in 1905, in spite of the treaty we had with Korea in 1883 and in contravention of that treaty, we made a deal with Japan, allowing Japan to take over Korea and a free hand in Korea, in return for Japan giving us a free hand in the Philippines.1 Now since I have gotten home, dead from loss of sleep, I had no sources to look up that treaty when I was there, and I haven't been able to do since I got home, but all Koreans think we sold them down the river in 1905, and he is very much afraid that Korea is so unimportant that it will just be made a pawn and sacrificed to some other great power in order to get a settlement. That is No. 1. 1 Reference here is to the "Taft-Katsura Agreement," the July 27, 1905, "agreed memorandum" of discussions between President Roosevelt's Secretary of War, William Howard Taft, and Japanese Prime Minister Taro Katsura. And No. 2, he says that it is because of our deal with Russia in 1945 that Korea is divided today; that we made a deal with Russia that Russia take over surrender north of the 38th Parallel, we take over south of the parallel, dividing the country in two. Now, of course, the obvious answer to that is the true one, which I made. I said both governments were committed to holding elections and unifying the country, and the Russians welched on their deal. We didn't welch on ours. But he said: "But the Russians went and armed the North Koreans. The United States Government refused to arm us, and walked out and left us, and so they came down and invaded us. You did come back after they had done that and came to our defense, and we have a country now because of you." Now there are the two things. Senator GREEN. I don't blame him and I think they were hard handicaps that you suffered under. He was justified in his suspicions, and I think he was justified in his criticisms, but you had to get your agreement notwithstanding all of that, and I think you deserve a great deal of credit. Mr. ROBERTSON. I thank you, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson. Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand now that all of America's agreement with Rhee in relation to the armistice and the later political negotiations are in writing? Mr. ROBERTSON. Yes, sir, they are right here in this room. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will assume that it is the consensus of this committee that the staff here get up a committee print incorporating all the so-called Korean pamphlets or documents. Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have them go back of the war, and set out what the United Nations did under their resolutions and how they conducted the elections and left the seats vacant. The CHAIRMAN. Guy? Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that Mr. Robertson was charged with one of the most delicate missions and responsibilities ever placed on the shoulders of an American agent, and I for one am mighty proud of the way it has been carried out. While it isn't a completed situation, I think he is entitled to a lot of credit, and I want to express my personal pride in the work that he has done. Senator TOBEY. Amen. Mr. ROBERTSON. I greatly appreciate those gracious remarks. Senator FERGUSON. I want to compliment him, too. But do you think we are going to get this truce? [Discussion off the record.] The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mike. HISTORICALLY MR. RHEE HAS GROUNDS FOR COMPLAINT Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Robertson, I, too, want to compliment you on the success you have achieved to date. Going back to what Mr. Syngman Rhee has said, we might as well be honest here. He is right, because there is a letter, I believe, by our colleague's father |