About one-third of these investigations were made by the FBI; the remainder were made by our own security office.

These are applicant investigations, and the results are these: The total applicants turned down, rejected, were 8,108. They were turned down for character, suitability, and security reasons. Of these, 4,524 were Americans, and 3,584 were aliens.

GETTING RID OF UNDESIRABLES

At that point I might say we applied the principle of resolving doubt in favor of the Government, and I want to now go on to the harder and more difficult job, that is the one of getting employees of the Department, and of Foreign Service, who have had allegations made against them, and to say that they are suspect, off the rolls until we clear them and determine that they are satisfactory employees.

At this point, I want to say that all of our employees have had FBI checks. Every last employee has had an FBI name check. We have checked this with them.

Another important point I want to make is that we use three ways of getting rid of undesirables: One, we discharge them; two, we accept resignations; and three, we use administrative devices such as reductions in force, abolish jobs, and so forth.

We have been criticized for allowing people to resign, against whom charges were pending.

Off the record.

[There was discussion off the record.]

Mr. HUMELSINE. I want to talk about a nameless man, as an example of what you are faced with in this business

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want the whole matter off the record or just the name?

Mr. HUMELSINE. No; just the name.

THE PROBLEM OF RESIGNATIONS

It is this problem of allowing people to resign.

Mr. Blank was an officer that charges had been made against. In the fall, he had been cleared on the basis of the most careful investigation and analysis we could make. In the fall of 1950, Mr. Blank came to my attention again, through the fact that an ex-Under Secretary of State sent an emissary to me to tell me that he had had a report from an individual that this fellow had become a member of the Communist Party back in the thirties.

This thing naturally worried me considerably. I got the whole. story. I took the story, and I went over to see J. Edgar Hoover about it. Mr. Hoover was not there. He was down in Florida on a case at that time, and I talked to his deputy, Mr. Ladd. I asked the question: If we proceed, will it cause you any problem as far as your investigation is concerned?

I got the answer back the next day that it would not.

I called Mr. Blank into my office and I said to him: "We have some pretty serious charges against you, Mr. Blank, of Communist associa

tions and Communist activities. We are going to see that you get a square break, but you are herewith suspended from this time on until we clear this thing up. We are not going to leave a stone unturned to get to the bottom of it. If you are guilty, we are going to see that proper action is taken. If you are innocent, we are as interested in proving that as you are."

Mr. Blank protested that he was innocent.

I heard nothing about the case until the following Monday morning, when I was called up by the Chief of the Departmental Personnel, who said that Mr. Blank wanted to resign, and what should he do? I said, "Accept his resignation," and I think that is a course of action I would always follow because, for one thing, you cannot keep a man on the Federal payroll if he wants to leave.

We had no firm allegation against this man, to the extent that we either knew or did not know that that particular charge was true. He left the Department.

We made a notation of it. We notified the Civil Service Commission that he had left while under investigation of this type of charge. The next thing we heard, well, Mr. Blank was employed by the World Bank. I had the security officer of the Department of State contact the World Bank and tell them the circumstances under which Mr. Blank had left our employment.

Nothing was done at the World Bank about this particular case. until after the rhubarb about the United Nations Communists, and very recently-well, they have discharged him.

I still do not know whether Mr. Blank is a Communist or not. I know that he resigned under those sort of circumstances. I am glad we got him off the rolls.

I would much sooner be criticized for allowing this fellow to resign, than for keeping him around, and have you gentlemen say, "Why did you keep him on? Why did you keep him from resigning?" I would have a pretty hard time answering that particular charge. Senator FERGUSON. Off the record.

[There was discussion off the record.]

REMOVALS SINCE 1947

Mr. HUMELSINE. Now, statistics on resignations during the period since 1947.

These are people that were gotten rid of for security or loyalty

reasons:

Resigned, 129;

Reduced in force, and other administrative action, 88;

Left after adverse rulings and findings, 27;

Total, 244 people that have been gotten out of the Department of State since 1947 for security or loyalty reasons.

Eight cases presently pending, make it a total of 252.

Of these, two are loyalty and six are security-no, the total figure I mentioned, six are loyalty cases, a total of six cases.

Senator HUMPHREY. Out of a total employment of

Mr. HUMELSINE. A total employment of the entire group, including security risks, homosexuals, and so forth that we have gotten rid of since 1947, 654 individuals.

Senator MANSFIELD. Roughly, how many?

Mr. HUMELSINE. The total roughly, the Department of State, Americans, is about 25,000, counting here and abroad. That does not include aliens. When we get aliens that we have problems with, that is, on the rolls, we discharge them, we don't have to worry about the Civil Service Commission, their Congressman, or anything. We simply get rid of them, and it is very easy. If we could only handle our other problems that easy, it would be much simpler.

THE M'CARRAN AMENDMENT

Senator FERGUSON. Under the McCarran amendment to the appropriations bill, can't you? 1

Mr. HUMELSINE. Under the McCarran bill?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. HUMELSINE. You could theoretically, but the past administration had a ruling that you would use Public Law 7332 on the loyalty

program.

Senator FERGUSON. And you avoided the McCarran rider?

Mr. HUMELSINE. We did not avoid it, we could not use it.

Senator FERGUSON. Why?

Mr. HUMELSINE. That was in the Executive order.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean

Mr. HUMELSINE. When you say "you" I was taking that in a personal sense.

Senator FERGUSON. I don't want you to take the question in a personal manner.

TECHNICAL PENETRATION

Mr. HUMELSINE. The next thing that I would like to talk about is technical penetration. This is engaged in by all governments, this business of technical penetration.

I want to show you a picture of a a hotel room in Mexico City, and also want to caution you Senators that travel that you must realize, when you travel, that every room that you are in, abroad, as an American official, you must understand that it is probably wired for sound, and everything you say in there is put down on a piece of paper and into a file of that other government agency.

This is the room of Assistant Secretary Miller, when he was down there for a conference [indicating photograph].

Senator MANSFIELD. Where?

Mr. HUMELSINE. In Mexico City, in the Hotel del Porada.

Here is the stand between two beds, the two single beds there. There is a radio in there. When that radio is playing, there is nothing working, as far as the listening device is concerned; but when

1 In 1946, Congress attached a rider sponsored by Senator Pat McCarran to the State Department's annual appropriation bill giving the Secretary of State power "in his absoInte discretion" to dismiss employees "whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States."

Public Law 81-733 extended and made permanent the type of authority contained in the McCarran amendment and similar legislation. It specifically authorized certain other departments and agencies to make summary dismissals, authorized the President to extend this authority to other departments and agencies not specifically covered in legislation, and spelled out the rights of accused employees.

Edward G. Miller. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs under the Truman administration.

that radio is turned off, it becomes a listening device and everything that is said in that room is heard and transcribed.

This is an actual picture that we got when we examined this room prior to Mr. Miller utilizing it for a conference down there, and you gentlemen would be interested in seeing it.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it recorded right in the back?

Mr. HUMELSINE. No, sir; it is not. It is tied in by wire [indicating on photograph].

Senator FERGUSON. Through an outside outlet?

Mr. HUMELSINE. Yes, sir.

The next thing I want to talk about is an example in Warsaw. The ventilation system of the Air Attache's bedroom had three microphones in it. They were connected by wire to a tape recorder in the attic. The whole complex was wired to expode if detected by an inexperienced security officer.

Here is the picture of a microphone which we got out of this particular ventilator.

I will pass that around.

There is the microphone itself which we pulled out.

Senator FERGUSON. Are some not even smaller than that?

Mr. HUMELSINE. I will show you some, and you will be really surprised.

Senator TOBEY. When you find such penetration as that, do you go to the State Department of that nation, and confront them with it?

Mr. HUMELSINE. No, sir; it is useless, everyone does it.

[Laughter.]

Mr. HUMELSINE. I might say, off the record, they might say, "You have been doing that, too."

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. HUMELSINE. The next thing I want to talk about is Bucharest.

LISTENING DEVICES

Within the past 4 weeks, we have picked up 75 listening devices as a result of our agents, and I want to show you some of these. Here is one. Pull that apart [addressing Mr. Boykin]. Senator FERGUSON. It might explode.

Mr. HUMELSINE. They won't. We have had them checked. Our security officers and I may say that we don't have security officers in the sense that a lot of people seem to think they are, quite insensible.

Here are two examples of the type microphone we picked up there. We have 75 of these which we picked up in the last 4 weeks.

Here is an ingenious little device which is standard equipment on every telephone in Europe, and by a very inexpensive method, they put this little device in there, and it makes every telephone that they have in any room a listening device.

In other words, when your phone is down, it is a microphone and just by the addition of that little simple device; and this is standard equipment, standard equipment.

Senator TOBEY. What is that called?

Mr. HUMELSINE. This thing?

Senator TOBEY. The little thing in your right hand that you took out of the other device.

Mr. HUMELSINE. That is a little contact breaker, for breaking the contact and diverting it around the close-off switch, but it is very simple, very inexpensive too and very well conceived.

Senator FERGUSON. Who makes these? Have you examined them? Mr. HUMELSINE. Who makes them?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. HUMELSINE. They can be made by any technical company.

I could go on and cite examples of this in Budapest, Prague, in Latin America, in fact, all over the world as to this type of thing. This is not telephone tapping. I want to make that quite clear.

Telephone tapping is so routine that we regard all telephone conversations as compromised, but all that fades into great insignificance when I tell about this next item.

Now, the next item is so secret that I would like to ask to take this off

Senator FERGUSON. Off the record?

Mr. HUMELSINE. Not only off the record, but I should like to ask. that only the Senators and members of the State Department be present, if I could, and the staff.

Senator FERGUSON. I so move.

Mr. HUMELSINE. The staff of the committee that I checked the other day, and I understand that they have had clearance from the Bureau.

[The reporter left the committee room, to be later recalled by the Chairman.]

The CHAIRMAN. What is your next subject?

LESSONS

Mr. HUMELSINE. Senator, you said in your letter the committee would like to know what lessons we have learned, and our recommendations for improvement, and I would like, with the committee's indulgence, to read that into the record, if I could, at your request.

You said this is the most important one, so I have tried to devote a little time to it, and again I must tell you that I did this in a hurry, and only had one day to consider it, but we have learned many lessons, and the principal ones are there:

First: It has become increasingly clear to me that it is not enough to conduct an operation honestly, conscientiously, and in fact, successfully. The operation must also appear to the public and the Congress to be honest, conscientious and successful.

Second: There is no overnight solution, no one-shot, end-all, cureall. This is a matter which requires day after day, year after year, thoughtful deliberate action and constant surveillance.

Third: A concentrated effort from the Department's point of view must be made to gain and hold this support of the press and the Congress. This means convincing the conservatives and liberals alike that the formula is fair but firm, neither disingenious nor conceived in political expediency.

Fourth: You cannot operate a security program in a goldfish bowl.