Senator BREWSTER. No, it was not an agreement at all. We were going to make a declaration of policy that we would immediately stop.

I have the whole thing before me.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What he is getting at was a condition precedent to the adoption of a policy that this thing should be stopped. Senator BREWSTER. And while we were discussing adoption of the policy we ourselves would stop and would dump what we had. He even says we would dispose of our present stockpile.

How you get any similarity between Stassen and Jessup is beyond my comprehension.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Of course, the Senator did not read all of that. He says, "Into the ocean or returning them to their original mixture."

Senator BREWSTER. What does that mean?

Senator FULBRIGHT. I suppose he means return it to the component parts.

The point I am trying to make is that at this particular time, many people were quite concerned about what to do with atomic energy. If it is possible to try to go back to the state of mind of the country as of that time, I do not think it is very unusual that people were making suggestions as to what we should do with a weapon that was unprecedented up to that time.

He says, for example, in No. 2:

For 1 year, which would seem to be a reasonable time for the Commission to mature its plans and to secure action on them by the governments concerned, we will stop accumulating plutonium and uranium 235 which are the essential ingredients of atomic bombs. The plants which produce these materials will be kept merely in a stand-by condition. For this purpose, they will run at the minimum rate compatible with maintaining them in good order but they will not accumulate the resulting purified and fissionable products. As produced, these will be eliminated by an appropriate means such as dumping them into the ocean or returning them to their original mixture.

He is referring there to the production of the plants, which he thinks is necessary in order to keep the plants in an efficient, working condition.

It is a very different thing from saying, "Totally destroy the whole thing."

He says:

for 1 year, let us have in effect a moratorium until we can try to get an agreement.

Now I am not defending the wisdom of it. I am only saying this, that there were other people-notably, I think, Mr. Stassen. He says, "No nation shall manufacture them." That means us. We were the only ones who could. Therefore, we would have a moratorium on the manufacture or possession of such a bomb. This does not say any particular time, but I think his thought was very similar.

Now I have one other point on that. Former Congressman William O. Burgin, of North Carolina-which is generally considered a rather conservative State-introduced a resolution for the discontinuance of the manufacture of the atomic bomb, on January 30, 1946.

(The document referred to follows:)

[H. Con. Res. 124, 79th Cong., 2d sess.]

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Whereas the President has, in collaboration with the British Commonwealth and the Canadian Government, tentatively agreed on a method of international control for the manufacture and use of atomic energy for military purposes; and Whereas the Security Council of the United Nations has the matter under consideration: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the manufacture of said atomic bombs by the United States Government be discontinued until the Congress takes further action.

My point is that there was a great working in the minds of many people on what we were going to do about this thing.

I do not see that that has any particular significance one way or the other with regard to the subversive affinity of Mr. Jessup to any subversive activities, especially in view of the presence of some very eminent scientists who are still considered reliable, participating in

that letter.

Senator MCCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, the chairman asked how long it would take to present this evidence. I said about a half hour. I certainly do not object to these speeches or the questions made by members of the committee. I do have a very important commitment which I hope I can keep at a quarter of 6. That means I have to leave this building about 5:30.

If, of course, the Chair orders me to stay, I will abide by the Chair's orders, but it will be impossible to do this if I am going to be interrupted by lengthy speeches on this subject.

Senator SPARKMAN. I would like very much for us to finish with your testimony this afternoon if we possibly can.

Are there any more questions, Senator Fulbright?

Senator FULBRIGHT. No.

Senator MCCARTHY. I assume there was a question the Senator was trying to ask.

Senator FULBRIGHT. No: it was not a question.

Senator MCCARTHY. Will you please not interrupt me. I have listened to you. When I have finished you may have the floor. Senator FULBRIGHT. That is kind of you.

NATIONS MANUFACTURING ATOMIC BOMB, 1945

Senator MCCARTHY. The Senator says that Mr. Stassen in 1945 suggested we have a provision in the U. N. Charter to outlaw manufacture of the atomic bomb. That would include right to send observation teams into Russia and every other country in the world. That is entirely different. There is no relationship whatsoever to an unilateral action upon our part under which we would destroy our atomic bomb material, quit manufacturing atomic bombs.

The Senator says now that we were the only nation manufacturing them. I think he should know better than that, if he has been following the Fuchs case and other cases. He should know that the spies were stealing our atomic bomb secrets before 1946 and how many atomic bombs Russia has manufactured, the extent to which she was manufacturing them and how many bombs she had at that time we do not know at this time.

We do know this, that the Comunist Party line in 1946 was identical to the line set down by Jessup in this.

Again it is an important link in the chain of evidence.

For some reason or other you find that Jessup always is following the Communist Party line. Day after day, year after year.

If you found this isolated link in the chain, you could say the man was mistaken.

As I said previously, I thought he was merely gullible, that he was being guided by someone. However, I doubt it very much. A man cannot be this consistent and be stupid. I doubt whether it is stupidity. I think Jessup perhaps knew where he was going although I do not think that point is important.

The point is that he was going in the wrong direction and therefore is incompetent to hold a top position.

Now the fact that some of these individuals are in atomic research, I think is a matter that should be looked into further by the appro priate Senate or House committee.

Are there any further questions on exhibit 5?

Senator SPARKMAN. Are there any further questions by anyone? Let us move to page 19.

FREDERICK VANDERBILT FIELD

Senator MCCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, Frederick Vanderbilt Field, who is serving a prison sentence for contempt in connection with the New York trial of the 11 Communist leaders and who has been named under oath as a Soviet espionage agent, served under Jessup in various capacities in the Institute of Pacific Relations and contributed over $60,000 to Jessup's organization, according to the testimony.

In the summer of 1950 Field helped organize the American Peace Mobilization which has been cited by Attorney General Biddle and Attorney General Tom Clark as Communist, and by the Un-American Activities Committee as

one of the most seditious organizations which ever operated in the United States. The following letters from IPR files and excerpts from sworn testimony show:

(1) How the Communist Politburo overruled Jessup's decision that Field could "serve better" in the Institute of Pacific Relations than in the Communist-controlled American Peace Mobilization.

On page 20 we have these citations. I will not take the committee's time in reading all of them, but let me read one if I may. It was first cited by Tom Clark, cited by Biddle, cited by the Un-American Activities Committee.

Senator SPARKMAN. That relates to Frederick Field, does it not? Senator MCCARTHY. This relates to American Peace Mobilization, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. But you have underscored there "Frederick Field, secretary of the same organization."

I presume you wanted to show his tie-up with that.

Senator MCCARTHY. That is correct. And I think one of the important things to be decided here in passing upon Jessup's fitness is to determine the relationship between Jessup and Field, and it is rather important.

89965-51- -9

Now, on the 28th of June, 1940

Senator SPARKMAN. That is page 21.

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes, I intend to go back to it.

On the 28th of June, 1940, a letter from the American Council Institute of Pacific Relations, the chairman of which is Philip C. Jessup, it should be noted that Jessup warmly praises Field and appoints him as staff adviser after Field had requested to be freed from some of his duties in the IPR in order to actively organize the Communist American Peace Mobilization.

In this letter, signed by Philip Jessup, he refers to the unusual abilities of Mr. Field.

I cannot acquiesce in his complete separation from the direction of the affairs of the American Council. I have therefore appointed him staff adviser with the understanding that he is to be on leave without salary for the next 6 months.

Budenz testified that Field came to the Politburo meeting and announced that Jessup thought he could serve better if he were to stay in the IPR. The Politburo overruled Jessup and ordered Field to head up the American Peace Mobilization, which he did.

JESSUP'S RECOMMENDATION OF FIELD

I would like to read one short paragraph from this letter. Quoting from Jessup, he says:

At this time the staff wish to express their appreciation of the leadership which Mr. Field has given to the American Council in the past. We consider that it is in the best interests of the American Council that Mr. Field should remain as closely associated with it as possible. We should therefore like to see him continue as secretary of the council, exercising the maximum amount of guidance in the determination of policy consistent with his desire to be relieved of the burden of administrative work and financial promotion.

Sincerely yours.

PHILIP C. JESSUP, Chairman.

I will have to refer to several of these together.

To show that there was nothing secret about the fact this was a Communist controlled organization, at dates which Jessup later wrote letters, on page 22 the committee will find again an article from the New York Times and one from the New York Herald Tribune, the one from the Times dated August 31, 1940, and the date is not contained on the article from the Herald Tribune, but it was August 31 or September 1.

Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt the Senator at this point?

Senator MCCARTHY. I am half way through one thought here, Senator, but I would be glad to have you interrupt.

Senator GILLETT. Go ahead and finish your thought.

Senator MCCARTHY. The thought I had in mind was to point out here that Jessup has full knowledge of the fact that Field is a Communist, that he is leading a Communist organization, from the various documents. The document of September 20, 1940, which is in the files of the IPR, in which William L. Holland gets a memorandum from E. C. Carter, saying that Field expects at any moment he may go to prison but desires to work full steam ahead until the moment of arrest in a gigantic Nation-wide effort to launch a moment which will

preserve and I do not have the rest of the piece. There is some highsounding language in it in any event.

IPR MEETING SEPTEMBER 18, 1940

The date of the articles labeling this organization as a Communist organization is August 30, and we find on September 18-that is 3 weeks after it was publicly proclaimed that this organization was a Communist organization--the officers of the IPR held a meeting at 5 p. m., at 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City. The program was to select someone to take Field's place.

We find that Jessup-first let us take those present: Parker, Harmon, Carter, and Jessup.

The chairman read a long telegram which he had received from Mr. Frederick V. Field in Chicago on September 1, in which Mr. Field indicated that he had been called to the secretaryship of a new society which was being created to strengthen the forces of democracy during the coming critical years. He had a deep conviction that he was obligated to accept this new responsibility because the election of officers was taking place at that time. He felt it was necessary to accept despite his obvious personal preference to postpone decision pending consultation with Dr. Jessup and others. As he anticipated criticism and misunderstanding, his continued deep interest in the welfare of the Institute of Pacific Relations demanded, he felt, the affirmation of his immediate resignation from all IPR responsibilities. Dr. Jessup explained that he had subsequently talked at length with Mr. Field who explained in detail the reasons that had led him to accept the new position.

If he explained in detail, he explained he went to the Politburo and told them what Jessup's advice was, and the Politburo overruled it.

Mr. Parker voiced the feelings of all present when he inquired whether Dr. Jessup felt that Mr. Field could not be persuaded to resume the secretaryship of the American Council. Dr. Jessup replied that he thought Mr. Field's decision was final. Under the circumstances it was moved that a minute be drafted indicating the committee's acceptance of the resignation with great regret. And they know he is heading up a Communist organization. The minute should include an appropriate appreciation of the distinguished service which Mr. Field had rendered during 11 years of service with the American Council. The hope was to be expressed that when his new task was completed, it would be possible for him to resume active leadership in the work of the American Council.

A SUCCESSOR TO FIELD IN THE IPR

Now here is a matter, Mr. Chairman, I think of great moment. We find they had the task of selecting a successor to Field. Let me read this:

Dr. Jessup then invited the attention of the committee to the question of Mr. Field's successor. Mr. Field himself had considered a large number of names in consultation with others. He had finally informed Dr. Jessup that of all these considered, he thought Mr. Harry B. Price was the best fitted for the secretaryship of the American Council. The committee went over a long list of names, considering various possibilities from many angles. Finally the committee came to the conclusion that Mr. Price was the most promising of all. So we find that Communist Field, after he is known as a Communist, is allowed to select his successor as secretary to Jessup.

FIELD'S LETTER, OCTOBER 29, 1950

Now of equal significance is a letter dated October 29, 1950. That is after the wire where Field says he expects to go to jail any mo