ARTICLE VIII

1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and will continue in force until three months after the receipt by either party of written notice of the intention of the other party to terminate it. This Agreement shall be submitted to the Korean National Assembly for ratification.

2. This Agreement shall be registered with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in compliance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done in duplicate, in the English and Korean languages, at Seoul, Korea, on this 26th day of January 1950. The English and Korean texts shall have equal force, but in case of divergence, the English text shall prevail.

6. Agreement between United States and Republic of Korea, January 26, 1950, establishing the United States Military Advisory Group

PREAMBLE

In conformity with the request of the Government of the Republic of Korea to the Government of the United States, the President of the United States has authorized the establishment of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (hereinafter referred to as the Group), under the terms and conditions specified below:

ARTICLE I

The purpose of the Group will be to develop the security forces of the Republic of Korea within the limitations of the Korean economy by advising and assisting the Government of the Republic of Korea in the organization, administration and training of such forces, including the Army, Coast Guard and the National Civil Police Force, and by insuring the effective utilization of any United States military assistance by those forces. The Group will consist of such number of military and civilian personnel of the Government of the United States as may be agreed upon by the two Governments. The number of Department of Defense personnel in the Group, however, shall not exceed without the mutual agreement of the two Governments, five hundred (500) officers and men. It is understood that the selection of men and officers for the Korean Security Forces will be decide by the Government of the Republic of Korea.

ARTICLE II

This Agreement may be terminated at any time:

(1) By either Government, provided that six months' written notice is given to the other Government;

(2) By recall of the Group when either Government deems such recall to be in its public interest and shall have so notified the other Government without necessity of compliance with provision (1) of this Article. However, termination of this Agreement by recall does not relieve the Government of the Republic of Korea from its obligations arising under this Agreement during such time, not exceeding three months; reasonably necessary to permit the Group to terminate its functions and physically depart from Korea.

ARTICLE III

The functions of the Group shall be to provide such advice and assistance to the Government of the Republic of Korea on military and related matters as may be necessary to accomplish the purposes set forth in Article I of this Agreement. The Group shall extend advice and assistance to such components of the Korean Security Forces as may be agreed upon by the two Governments.

ARTICLE IV

The Group and its dependents will be considered as a part of the Embassy of the United States in the Republic of Korea for the purposes of enjoying the privileges and immunities accorded to the Embassy and its personnel of comparable rank.

ARTICLE V

No member of the Group shall assume or cause to be assumed duties as a result of which he will be responsible to the Government of the Republic of Korea.

ARTICLE VI

All members of the Group shall be on active duty and shall be paid regularly authorized pay and allowances by the Government of the United States, plus a special allowance to compensate for increased cost of living. Such compensation for this special allowance shall be paid by the Government of the Republic of Korea in Korean currency. The special allowance shall be based upon a scale agreed upon by the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Korea, shall be revised periodically and shall be applicable for the entire period each member of the Group resides in Korea on duty with the Group.

ARTICLE VII

The Government of the Republic of Korea will grant exemption from customs duties on materials, equipment, supplies, and goods imported for the official use of the Group or the personal use of the members thereof or their families only. Such materials, equipment, supplies, and goods will not be subject to any Korean excise, consumption or other tax, duty, or impost, including export taxes in the event of reshipment to the United States from Korea.

ARTICLE VIII

(a) The Government of the Republic of Korea shall furnish from time to time to one designated representative of the American Embassy in Korea sufficient Korean currency to purchase local supplies (excluding foodstuffs), equipment, and services necessary to maintain the Group, its personnel and their families, including, but not restricted to, currency necessary to repair and maintain living quarters for the Group and their families and buildings and office space for the official business of the Group and such costs of indigenous services and costs of transportation as are provided in Articles VIII (b) and IX of this Agreement.

(b) The Government of the Republic of Korea will pay in Korean currency expenses incurred by members of the Group for travel in the Republic of Korea on official business of the Group.

(c) The Government of the Republic of Korea will provide without charge to the Group or to the Government of the United States suitable living quarters for personnel of the Group and their families and suitable buildings and office space for use in the conduct of the official business of the Group. Public utilities and fuel necessary to maintain the living quarters, buildings and office space, will also be furnished without charge to the Government of the United States for the use of the Group. All living and office quarters will conform, insofar as possible, to the standards prescribed by the United States Military Services for similar quarters. It shall be understood that the Government of the Republic of Korea will not be responsible for the payment of the cost of construction of new buildings unless the concurrence of the Minister of National Defense of the Republic of Korea is obtained prior to the incurring of such expenses.

ARTICLE IX

Costs of indigenous services required by the Group, including compensation of locally employed interpreters, clerks, laborers and other personnel, whose rate of compensation shall be determined from time to time between a representative of the Government of the Republic of Korea and a representative of the American Embassy in Korea, except personal servants, and including costs of transportation within Korea of supplies and equipment required by the Group and its members will be borne by the Government of the Republic of Korea. Official postal services, including free franking privileges and tax stamps required by the Group for the accomplishment of its mission will be provided without cost by the Government of the Republic of Korea.

ARTICLE X

The Government of the Republic of Korea will provide suitable medical attention to members of the Group and their families in places where United States medical personnel and facilities are not available. The Government of the Republic of Korea will, upon request, evacuate seriously ill members of the Group or their families to places in Korea where United States medical facilities may be available.

ARTICLE XI

All communications between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Group relating to policy will be directed through the United States Ambassa

dor to Korea. The Group may deal directly with officials of the Government of the Republic of Korea on matters of a purely military nature as may be authorized by the Chief of the Group.

ARTICLE XII

Disclosures and exchanges of classified military information to or between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of Korea will only be made subject to the mutual understanding that the information will be safeguarded in accordance with the requirements of the military security classification established thereon by the originating Government, and that no redisclosure by the recipient Government of such information to a third Government or to unauthorized personnel will be made without specific approval of the originating Government.

ARTICLE XIII

This Agreement shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations in compliance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE XIV

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and shall be considered as having become effective as of July 1, 1949; it being understood this Agreement will be submitted for ratification to the Korean National Assembly.

D. ESTIMATE OF TOTAL ASSISTANCE TO KOREA, INCLUDING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZED BUT NOT YET APPROPRIATED

Total economic and military assistance made available. Economic aid authorized by Public Law 535 (Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950) but not yet appropriated..

523, 000, 000

100, 000, 000

Grand total_.

623, 000, 000

Total....

1 Does not include amount allocated to Korea under title III of Public Law 329. This figure has not been disclosed. Also does not include approximately $253,000 of naval guns and ammunition and aircraft armament purchased by Korea at no cost to the United States under reimbursable aid provisions of Public Law 329.

This figure is the original acquisition cost; replacement cost at 1949 figures is estimated to be $110,000,000. This figure is original acquisition cost; replacement cost at 1949 figures is estimated to be $1,500,000.

III. THE PRESENT CRISIS

A. THE PRELIMINARY PHASE

1. Previous armed clashes between north Korea and the Republic of Korea

Committee on Foreign Affairs, House Report No. 1571, (81st Cong.) (excerpt):

At the time of the withdrawal of United States forces, some 7 months ago, many persons predicted the immediate dissolution and defeat of the Republic of Korea. For a time it appeared that these pessimistic predictions would be borne out. On August 4, 1949, forces from North Korea launched a large-scale invasion

of the Ongjin Peninsula, which juts below the thirty-eighth parallel in the northwest corner of the area of the Republic of Korea. After initial advance and heavy fighting this assault was repulsed. On October 14 the offense against the South Korean forces in the Ongjin Peninsula was renewed. Following several days of severe fighting, however, the offensive was again turned back.

The situation along the border (as of February 1, 1950) remains essentially as reported by the United Nations Commission on Korea in August 1949: "There is much military posturing on both sides of the parallel. This holds a serious danger of provoking open military conflict. Military conflict in Korea would mean the most barbarous civil war. The U. S. S. Ř. * * * lends countenance to northern leaders in bellicose utterances and in a refusal to consider ways of adjusting existing differences on any plane of relations between north and south. In this connection, note should be taken of the fact that the North Korean regime has recently concluded a treaty with the U. S. S. R. It is reported that an agreement for military aid has been concluded between North Korea and the Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria."

A dispatch to the New York Times from Seoul, dated January 14, 1950, notes that the border at the thirty-eighth parallel still bristles with guns and that Communist guerrilla forces are active at some points below that parallel. The fact remains, however, that up to now the territorial integrity of the Republic of Korea below the thirty-eighth parallel has been maintained. This is in no wise a prophecy of what might happen in the future.

2. Events leading up to invasion

Report from the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (New York Times, June 29, 1950):

TEXT OF REPORT ON KOREA

LAKE SUCCESS, June 28-(Following is the text of a report from the United Nations Commission on Korea, dated June 26, on events leading up to the invasion of Southern Korea on June 25 (asterisks indicate words garbled in transmission):)

The commission submits the following summary report on background events preceding June 25 outbreak of hostilities:

1. For the past 2 years the North Korean regime has by violently abusive propaganda, by threatening gestures along the thirty-eighth parallel, and by encouraging and supporting subversive activities in the territory of the Republic of Korea pursued tactics designed to weaken and destroy the Government of the Republic of Korea established under the auspices of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea and recognized by the General Assembly. During the same period the United Nations Commission on Korea has been the target for repeated propaganda broadcasts which denied its legality, dubbed it futile, and subjected its individual members to abuse.

This campaign has been relentlessly pursued during the past 8 months while the economy of the young republic remains shaky and the deliberations of the first national assembly have been frequently stormy and critical of the administration. There have been distinct signs of improvement in recent months in both economic and political stability of the country.

In early April the Korean Army and police climaxed a winter offensive against northern-supported guerrillas operating in South Korea by smashing two guerrilla battalions totaling some 600 men soon after their crossing of the parallel. At the same time internal security and domestic morale have been strengthened by suppression of subversive elements.

2. Although the North Korean regime by its radio, propaganda, and support of subversive elements endeavored to prevent the holding of effective general elections on May 30, these elections which were observed by the Commission were on the whole successfully conducted and in an atomosphere of law and order.

ALL PARTIES PARTICIPATED

3. This new assembly succeeded the republic's first national assembly, which was elected in May 1948, under the supervision of UNTCOK [United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea]. Unlike the 1948 elections, which middleof-the-road parties boycotted for fear that elections in only half Korea would make permanent the artificial barrier at the thirty-eighth parallel, all parties except the underground Communist participated in 1950 elections, although the two largest parties in the previous assembly, the pro-Government and the

opposition both suffered heavy losses and the most significant gains were made by those moderate elements which had boycotted the 1948 elections.

The new assembly with some 130 independents out of a total 210 members convened on June 19, 1950, in a hopeful atmosphere conducive to continued progress in the building of an effective representative government in an economically healthy state. The initial sessions have indicated determination to tackle the administration in a critical spirit for its numerous shortcomings.

4. At the beginning of June the North Korean regime's Pyongyang radio gave the widest publicity to an article calling for intensification of measures aimed at unifying Korea and on June 3 a communiqué stated that the signing by 5,300,000 northerners of an appeal for peace and unification meant that a renewed struggle for national unification was beginning.

5. On June 7 radio Pyongyang began to broadcast at repeated intervals a letter of appeal from the Democratic Front for attainment of unification of fatherland to all democratic political parties and social organizations in Korea proposing elections throughout Korea following the meeting of a proposed consultative council

6. The tone of the appeal indicated an ostensible change in the north's previous attitude in spite of such conditions as the exclusion from the council, as traitors, of nine top leaders in the South Korean Government, and the statement that UNCOK United Nations Commission on Korea] would not be permitted to interfere in the task of unification, included among the addresses. UNCOK sent a representative across the parallel to receive the text on June 10 and convey personally to three northern representatives the commission's desire for peaceful unification.

REPRESENTATIVES SEIZED

7. The three northern representatives came south next day carrying copies for all but a few of the leading parties and political personalities of the Republic. They were immediately placed under detention by the South Korean authorities who have since tried to induce them to switch sides by showing the facts in the South The southern action of detaining "envoys of peace" has been denounced violently by the northern radio. At a hearing the Commission was assured by all three of their good treatment by southern authorities, of their sincere belief in the good intentions of the northern regime though admitting their eyes had been opened through direct observation to numerous northern misconceptions of facts on political personalities of the Republic.

8. * * * received all traitors, including Premier Ki Il Sung if elected, with open arms and give the due positions if they repented and resolved to devote themselves to establishing a sound basis for the Republic of Korea.

9. Subsequently the * * * letter was replaced by another plan for peaceful unification prepared by the Presidium of the People's Supreme Assembly of the northern regime. This contemplated a procedure which involved the convening of the North and South Assemblies into a single legislative assembly but was accompanied by objectionable conditions similar to those of earlier appeal.

10. Both appeals have been denounced by the South Korean press, political parties, and leaders as sheer propaganda. An apparent intention of these appeals was to split the unity prevailing in the South Korean National Assembly by encouraging those who had opposed the 1948 elections to think there was a real possibility of peaceful unification by negotiation.

11. Meanwhile, the Commission had agreed to mediate if its good offices were acceptable to both parties in an exchange of important political prisoners originally suggested by the North. On June 10 Commission made clear its unwillingness to jeopardize exchange in any way although North Korea rejected on June 20 proposed Commission role. Arrangments for exchange were still pending at time of invasion.

12. In the light of the evidently increasing strength of the Republic of Korea in recent months and the utterly unexpected invasion on June 25 the radio propaganda offensive calling for early unification by peaceful means seems to have been intended solely for its screening effect.

13. Gen. Kim Il Sung in radio broadcast this morning at 0930 hours reiterated the North Korean claim first made at 1335 hours that South Korea having rejected every northern proposal for peaceful unification had crowned its iniquity by launching an invasion force across the parallel in the sector of Haeju, thus precipitating North Korean counter-attacks for which it would have to assume the consequences.