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a War Department recommendation which later formed the basis for General Order No. 1, defining areas of responsibility for accepting the surrender of all Japanese military forces.

"Among other recommendations prompted by military consideration to achieve this purpose, the one pertaining to Korea provided that Japanese troops north of 38 degrees in Korea were to surrender to Soviet forces while those south of 38 degrees were to surrender to United States forces. On September 8, the United States forces entered Korea, accepting the surrender of Japanese forces south of the 38th parallel in a formal ceremony on the following day."

The general order was issued over General MacArthur's name as Supreme Commander, on the basis of the recommendation of the War Department.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mrs. Douglas

Mrs. DOUGLAS. The General Order was issued on September 2, but the decisions in the order were arrived at prior to September 2, were they not?

Was this line that was drawn across Korea only for purposes of surrender, or was it also a line that was chosen to determine where the Russians would fight and we would fight?

Mr. ALLISON. I could read more from this document on that.

Mr. RICHARDS. Proceed.

Mr. ALLISON:

"The division between United States and Soviet forces along the 38th parallel was a line of demarcation adopted solely for the purpose of receiving the surrender of the Japanese forces. It was never intended by the United States to be the artificial barrier it has now become."

TESTIMONY OF GEN. T. S. TIMBERMAN

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* * * That decision was taken in the State-War-Navy Committee here in Washington and it was approved by the President. So the State Department did have a voice in this drawing of the thirty-eighth parallel. As to whether the Russians would stop on the northern border of Korea mv research * * indicated the Russians planned all along on coming into Korea, because they asked at the conference in July 1945, that the Americans cooperate with them in the reduction of the Japanese forces in Korea. At that time General Marshall explained to them that this was impossible as we were then trying to build up to the capture of the Japanese homeland, which would be the then total American military effort.

That discussion was at Potsdam.

The objective set by the Russians, the Russian forces, was the destruction of the Japanese Army in Manchuria. But in discussing where to draw the coordinating lines for our submarines and air, the Russians asked if we could coordinate with them, or assist them rather, in an amphibious landing in Korea.

General Marshall at that time stated that we could not, then, because all our effort would be placed in the invasion of the Japanese homeland.

2. General Order No. 1 of September 7, 1945 (excerpt):

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL,
Yokohama, Japan, September 7, 1945.

To the People of Korea:

As Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, I do hereby proclaim as follows:

By the terms of the instrument of surrender, signed by command and in behalf of the Emperor of Japan and the Japanese Government and by command and in behalf of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, the victorious military forces of my command will today occupy the territory of Korea south of 38° north latitude.

Having in mind the long enslavement of the people of Korea and the determination that in due course Korea shall become free and independent, the Korean people are assured that the purpose of the occupation is to enforce the instrument of surrender and to protect them in their personal and religious rights. In giving effect to these purposes, your active aid and compliance are required.

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, I hereby establish military control over Korea south of 38° north latitude and the inhabitants thereof, and announce the following conditions of the occupation:

ARTICLE I

All powers of Government over the territory of Korea south of 38° north latitude and the people thereof will be for the present exercised under my authority.

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Given under my hand at Yokohama, this seventh day of September 1945.
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR,

General of the Army of the United States, Commander in Chief,
United States Army Forces, Pacific.

C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMPASSE AND THE ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE IT

1. The "iron curtain"

Committee on Foreign Affairs, House Report No. 962 (81st Cong.) (excerpt):

A line of supposedly temporary utility for administering a surrender took on thereafter more permanent and wider significance. An "iron curtain" had enveloped Korea north of the line 38° north latitude. No one as yet called it an iron curtain, for this phrase for identifying the economic, cultural, and informational barrier that separates the areas in the Russian orbit from the rest of the world had not yet come into general usage. The commanding general of United States forces began a series of interchanges with the commander of Soviet forces, attempting to lower the barrier which the Red Army had thrown across the Korean Peninsula. No argument for restoring communications, freedom of movement, and commerce between the predominantly industrial northern and the primarily agricultural southern portions of the country prevailed.

2. Agreement for joint action

The Moscow agreement of December 1945 (excerpt:)

1. With a view to the reestablishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic government, which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport, and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people. 2. În order to assist the formation of a provisional Korean government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures, there shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the United States command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations. The recommendations worked out by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom, and the United States prior to final decision by the two Governments represented on the Joint Commission.

3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission, with the participation of the provisional Korean democratic government and of the Korean democratic organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government, and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.

The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted, following consultation with the provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the Governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years.

4. For the consideration of urgent problems affecting both southern and northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters between the United States command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea, a conference of the representatives of the United States and Soviet commands in Korea shall be convened within a period two weeks.

8. Division in the Joint Commission

Committee on Foreign Affairs, House Report No. 962 (81st Cong.) (excerpt):

The Joint Commission, which met repeatedly between March 20 and May 8, 1946, in pursuance of the second paragraph of the Moscow declaration, was even less successful in dealing with the political problems of the country than the conference had been in the economic field. The language of the Moscow agreement relating to a four-power trusteeship to help Korea along the road to national independence was repugnant to many Koreans, who remembered bitterly the Japanese protectorate of 40 years before and its disastrous sequel. It should be recalled here that most Koreans had looked forward to independence as an immediate objective. In the interval between the Japanese collapse and the arrival of United States occupation forces political activity had been feverish. During this period a number of Korean leaders had met in the capital, Seoul, to form a People's Republic. When United States forces arrived this group had offered itself as an official government through which the United States Army might carry out its mission. The United States commander had rejected this offer, just as he rejected also a similar offer from a more conservative group identified as the exiled Korean Provisional Government. In the view of the United States commander, independence was to be arrived at by hard work and the exercise of prudent judgment rather than through spontaneous and immediate expression of pent-up aspirations. With the announcement of the Moscow declaration, the nationalistic aspirations of the Koreans again were sharply manifested. Almost all Korean political groups joined in expressing resentment and in demanding immediate independence forthwith. The significant exception was the Communist groups in both zones. On January 3, 1946, these announced their support of the Moscow undertaking. In the Joint Commission the Soviet delegation insisted that the occupying powers should confine consultations with Korean groups to such as had agreed fully and consistently with the Moscow declaration. This was tantamont to giving a tremendous advantage to representatives of the Communist orientation. The United States delegation took a less drastic view-one which would have admitted groups to consultation not on the basis of past record but on the basis of present attitude. The difference was composed by a formula limiting consultation to such groups, democratic in principle, as agreed to uphold the aims of the Moscow accord and to abide by the Commission's decisions. The Soviet delegation then insisted upon barring from consultation individuals who had expressed opposition to the Moscow trusteeship provision. In the view of the United States delegation, such a restriction was at odds with the ostensible purpose of establishing a democratic government. Disagreement was so fundamental that discussion of other facets of the Korean political problem was impossible.

4. The issue between the military commanders

Letter of General Hodge of December 24, 1946 (excerpt):

* * * I consider it the right of a declarant party or organization to appoint the representative which it believes will best present to the Joint Commission its views of the implementation of the Moscow Decision. However, should such representative for good reason be believed to be antagonistic to the implementation of the Moscow Decision or to either of the Allied Powers, the Joint Commission may, after mutual agreement, require the declarant party to name a substitute spokesman

Reply of General Chistiakov of February 28, 1947 (excerpt):

* * * the Soviet Delegation considers it expedient that parties and organizations which will take part in consultation with the Joint Commission be informed beforehand that they must not designate for consultation such representatives who have compromised themselves by actively voicing opposition to the Moscow decision.

5. Efforts at agreement by diplomacy

Committee on Foreign Affairs, House Report No. 962 (81st Cong.) (excerpt):

A etter of April 8, 1947, from the United States Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Minister proposed

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* that our governments agree to instruct our respective commanders in Korea to reconvene the Joint Commission as soon as possible and charge it with expediting its work under the terms of the Moscow Agreement on a basis of respect for the democratic right of freedom of opinion * * *"" The Russian reply reiterated the position taken by the Russian commander in Korea but agreed to a resumption on May 20 of the Joint Commission. May 2 the United States Secretary of State again requested that the Soviet Government confirm the democratic right of free expression in the basis for resuming the work of the Joint Commission. On May 7 the Soviet Foreign Minister replied that the Soviet Union would accept the principles of the American commander's letter of December 24, 1946.

6. Renewal of the impasse; the issues in the Joint Commission

On

United States and Soviet views on consultative groups, July 14, 1947:

The Joint Commission has continued the discussion of a disagreement, which arose in the thirty-seventh meeting and extended through to the forty-second meeting, on the list of parties and organizations to be invited for initial consultation. The basic issues involved in this disagreement are 88 follows:

I. Soviet delegation's general position:

1. That parties and organizations falling within the following categories should not be included in the list for initial consultation, specifically:

A. Those not classified by them as social organizations, and

B. Those which it contends do not intend to support fully the Moscow decision, especially members of the antitrusteeship committee and similar organizations.

II. American delegation's general position:

1. That Soviet delegation's proposals are contrary to

A. Paragraph 1 of the three principles of the Foreign Ministers upon which agreement for reconvention to the Joint Commission was reached: "Signing the declaration in good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation."

B. Paragraph 5, Joint Commission decision published in comB. Paragraph 5, Joint Commission decision published in communiqué No. 11, mutually agreed to and signed by the Chief Commissioner of each delegation: "Subcommission No. 1, upon receiving the applications for consultation, shall compile a list of all democratic parties and social organizations and their designated representatives of North and South Korea which have signed the declaration III. The Soviet Delegation's specific contentions are:

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1. That industrial, mercantile and producers organizations, such as chambers of commerce, Industrial Medical Institute, Buddhist Research Institute, Accountants Society and societies organized for the study of politics and economics, are not in fact organizations as the word "social" is used in the Moscow decision.

2. A party or organization local in character which has no central zonal office is not eligible for consultation.

3. The good faith of a party or organization which signs the declaration and applies for consultation, and thus agrees to uphold the Moscow decision, is challenged by the Soviet delegation if such party or organization continues membership in the antitrusteeship committee or a similar organization. Such party or organization is acceptable for consultation only if it publicly withdraws from membership in the antitrusteeship committee or similar organi

zation

4. The fact that a party is eligible for consultation under the agreement of the Ministers, as published in Joint Commission decision, does not mean that it must be admitted for consultation by the Joint Commission.

5. In order for a party to be placed on the list for consultation, it must be acceptable to both delegations.

IV. The American delegation's specific contentions are:

1. A. The Moscow decision does not define the term "social organization.” B. The Soviet delegation refused requests of the American delegation to define the terms in the Joint Commission decision.

C. The American delegation served notice on the Soviet delegation prior to final decision that after joint approval of the Joint Commission, decision No. 12, the American delegation would not agree to amendment or change in the decision as finally agreed upon. Therefore, the term "social organization" must be interpreted as defined in the dictionaries of the world.

2. District and other purely local organizations are not barred by a provision of the Moscow agreement, the Marshall-Molotov agreement or Joint Commission decision. In order to eliminate small organizations, the American delegation several times offered to limit oral consultation to parties and organizations with membership in excess of 1,000 or any other reasonable figure proposed by the Soviet delegation. This proposal, however, has not been accepted by the Soviet delegation.

3. A. Parties which are members of the antitrusteeship committee and similar organizations are clearly eligible for initial consultation under the Marshall-Molotov agreement if they have applied for consultation and signed the required declaration.

B. They remain eligible unless and until they are by mutual agreement excluded after indictment as provided by paragraph 3 of the agreement reached by the Foreign Ministers namely, "individuals, parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission should not, after signing the declaration contained in communique No. 5 foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow decision. Those individuals, parties and social organizations which, after signing the declaration contained in communique No. 5, do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow decision, shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision excluding such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission."

4. The arbitrary line of distinction drawn by the Soviet delegation between "eligibility for consultation" and "admission for consultation" nullifies the agreements reached by the two Ministers (quoted in 1. A. above) and by the Joint Commission.

5. The first paragraph of the agreement accepted by Mr. Molotov and rewritten into Joint Commission decisions specifically states that all parties and social organizations which sign the application for consultation are eligible and must be accepted for consultation. The contention by the Soviet delegation is an attempt to establish an arbitrary veto power over consultation, which is implicit in the method of work now desired by the Soviet delegation. There is no provision in any of the agreements reached which provides such veto power.

There are two basic issues involved in the differences outlined above:

The first issue is whether one delegation may unilaterally exercise veto power and exclude from consultation any party or social organization that it does not approve. The Soviet delegation wishes to exercise such veto power. The American delegation maintains that this is an arbitrary position and is contrary to the agreement of the Foreign ministers. Furthermore, it is impractical in application because it could be used to exclude parties and social organizations to such a degree that consultation would not represent a fair sample of Korean opinion. The United States position is that exclusion from consultation can only be by mutual agreement of both delegations as specifically stated in the MarshallMolotov letters. The United States delegation has many times offered to review systematically the whole list of applicants and consider any and all objections by either delegation to various parties and organizations in order to make a decision as to which should be excluded through mutual agreement. The Soviet delegation has repeatedly refused such proposals.

The second issue is in regard to membership of a party or organization in the so-called antitrusteeship committee or similar organization. The Soviet delegation has not brought specific charges against any one party that it has actually fomented or instigated active opposition to the Joint Commission or the Moscow decision after signing the declaration, but has arbitrarily accused all the member parties of bad faith and imply that they are guilty even before they have been indicted. The United States position is that no party or social organization can be assumed guilty of acting in bad faith until it has been indicted and proved guilty of actions which do in fact incite and foment active opposition to the Joint Commission, the Moscow decision, or either of the Allies.

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